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In the following thesis I examine the experience and etiology of madness in Epicurean 
philosophy and focus on Lucretius’ accounts of epistemology, disease and emotion in De rerum 
natura. I situate my general argument within Lucretius’ accounts of the physical and cognitive 
aspects of emotional disorder. 
In the introduction I provide a brief survey of ancient views on madness from the 
perspective of poets, medical writers and Hellenistic philosophers and demonstrate a critical 
bifurcated tension between physiological and cognitive accounts.  
In the first chapter, ‘Madness according to Epicurean Physics,’ I provide an account of 
the physical soul according to Epicurus and Lucretius and give a survey of Epicurean 
epistemology and perception. I argue for a theory of perception in which various epistemological 
aspects (preconception, mental selection, belief and judgement) are shown to be included within 
the perceptual minimum and responsible for the ‘total effect’ in Epicurean perception. The 
accounts of Lucretius and Diogenes of Oenoanda on dream visions show the conditions in 
which synaesthesia or hallucination takes place within Epicurean physics and show that a 
necessary condition is the simultaneous disturbance of the rational soul (animus) and irrational 
soul (anima). 
In my second chapter, ‘Psychogenesis of Madness,’ I provide an account of Epicurean 
moral and intellectual development. I distinguish between true and false beliefs in terms of the 











Mind which is consistent with observations from the first chapter and shows that rational 
developments depend both on the mind of the rational agent and on environmental exposure. I 
demonstrate the interrelationship of mind and sensation and distinguish between the pathe of 
pleasure and pain and full blown cognitive emotions. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of 
the normative function of Epicurean emotions as therapeutic and not retributive and relate 
these again to ethical taxonomies. I stress the importance of mnemonics and repetition in 
Epicurean psychological procedure, as these reflect and address the mental complexity of the 
disturbed subject’s associative developments. 
In the third chapter I turn to Lucretius and examine the poetic surface of his text as it 
relates to the reception of information from a perceived object. I provide an account of a general 
movement in the text from species to ratio and show that this broadly tracks Epicurean 
discussions of intellectual development and a movement from appearance to reality. I discuss 
various examples of physiological disturbance in Book 3 and contrast these with an account of 
the psychological development of the ‘madness’ of love in Book 4. Lucretius implies towards the 
end of Book 3 that madness is peculiar to the mind and the gradual emotional progression of 
love at the end of Book 4 supports this. I conclude the chapter by distinguishing between the 
debilitating transient effects of disease and intoxication on the animus and anima which depend 
on external causes and the emergence of madness proper which seems to depend on an internal 
cognitive stimulus from the animus which affects the anima and so affects perception and 
awareness. This reading solves, in terms of Epicurean physics, the contrast between cognitive 
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Near the beginning of De rerum natura (1.102-106) Lucretius warns his dedicatee, Memmius, 
not to deviate from the philosophical path or be overwhelmed by the fear-mongering threats of 
soothsayers (vatum dictis, 1.102-3). These men concoct dreams (fingere … somnia, 1.104-5) 
which subvert the rational principles of life (vitae rationes, 1.105) and confound (turbare 1.106) 
good fortune with fear. Lucretius conversely identifies himself as a philosopher medicans who 
treats problems of the mind1 and his warning comes after a passage on the sacrifice of Iphigenia 
and the ironic consequences of superstition (religio, 1.83) which leads, through fear, to evil and 
impious deeds (scelerosa atque impia facta, 1.83).2 Lucretius appears to have both poets and 
prophets in mind in his use of vates3 and certainly presents each as dangerous or misleading. 
Both poets and prophets concoct dreams of one kind or another,4 and Lucretius (1.121-2) 
shows that Ennius is one of those responsible for misleading descriptions of the underworld and 
it is from here that Homer visits Ennius in a dream (1.124-5).5 Homer provides two feminine 
                                                 
1 Cf. Debra Hershkowitz, The Madness of Epic: Reading Insanity from Homer to Statius, (Oxford; New 
York: 1998), 5-6 and see generally Marcello Gigante, "'Philosophia Medicans' in Filodemo," CronErc 
5 (1975), 53-61. 
2 Cf. Lucr. 1.101: tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.  
3 See Diskin Clay, Lucretius and Epicurus, (Ithaca; London: 1983), 222: ‘poets and priests,’ cf. James J. 
O'Hara, "Somnia Ficta in Lucretius and Lucilius," CQ 37 (1987), 518: ‘Lucretius is exploiting the 
ambiguity of the word vatum in 102,’ but see T.P. Wiseman, Historiography and Imagination: Eight 
Essays on Roman Culture, (Exeter: 1994), 56. Wiseman warns against identifying the Lucretian vates 
as the Augustan ‘inspired poet.’ The identification is certainly problematic but not essential, as 
Lucretius clearly has Ennius and Homer in mind (1.117; 1.121-5).  
4 See O'Hara (1987), 517-519 who demonstrates a potential connection between ‘somnia ficta’ in 
Lucretius and Lucilius (484-9 M); 518: ‘both Lucretius and Lucilius appear to link superstition with 
belief in the lies of poets’ 
5 See O'Hara (1987), 518: Lucilius mentions the ‘fictions of Homer’ (480-3 M: multa homines portenta 
in Homeri versibus ficta | monstra putant, quorum in primis Polyphemus ducentos | Cyclops longus 
pedes: et porro huic maius bacillum | quam malus navi e corbita maximus ullast); at 519 O’Hara 
concludes: ‘Lucilius would seem to be linking belief or disbelief in the ficta of Homer with belief in the 











daemonic personifications of madness, Ate and Lyssa. Ate, Zeus’ eldest daughter, means in 
Homer a ‘disastrous state of mind’ and is connected with the internal causes of madness: inner 
confusion, delusion and recklessness.6 Agamemnon refers to ‘savage ate’ (ἄγριος ἄτη, Il. 19.88) 
who damaged his phrenes and caused his misjudgement in offending Achilles (Il. 19.86-89); 7 in 
other descriptions (Il. 1.103), his dark phrenes are filled with rage, menos (µένεος δὲ µέγα 
φρένες ἀµφιµέλαιναι | πίµπλαντ' 1.103-4) and his eyes flash with fire (ὄσσε δέ οἱ πυρὶ 
λαµπετόωντι, 1.104).8   Lyssa, the daughter of Nyx, 9  dominates as the personification of 
madness in fifth century tragedy (λύσσα appears only three times in Homer, all in the Iliad: 
9.239, 305, 21.542); she goads men to disaster and destruction, has a canine aspect and is 
associated with the outward signs of madness, meaning rabies and ‘wolfish rage.’ 10 In Euripides’ 
Heracles she causes Heracles’ madness: he tosses his head (τινάσσει κρᾶτα, 867), rolls his eyes 
(διαστρόφους ἑλίσσει σῖγα γοργωποὺς κόρας, 867) and cannot control his breathing 
(ἀµπνοὰς δ' οὐ σωφρονίζει, 869). Together these two divinities ‘epitomise epic and tragic 
                                                 
6 Ruth Padel, In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self, (Princeton: 1994), 162; see 
Il.19.91-5. 
7 See Padel (1994), 162; Il.9.505-7, 19.86-89. Cf. Shirley Darcus Sullivan, Psychological activity in 
Homer: a Study of Phrēn, (Ottawa: 1988), 150-152: ‘By being present in phrenes, ate distorts their 
nature and function. These phrenes, blinded by ate, were clearly involved in the decisions Agamemnon 
reached.’ 
8 See Sullivan (1988), 46: ‘One explanation offered for these ‘dark’ phrenes is that they become 
suffused with blood as the emotion of rage (menos) takes over; a second explanation is that the 
darkening of the phrenes occurs because of smoke or vapour welling up and engulfing them … menos 
too may be experienced in a similar way as it arises within. If menos is experienced as a form of fire 
rising within the chest, the reference to eyes become part of the image. Smoke may darken the phrenes 
and the same fire may blaze out of the eyes.’ For blood see F. Kudlein, "Schwärzliche' Organe im 
frühgriechischen Denken," Medizin-historisches Journal 8 (1973), 53-58; for smoke see Eleanor Irwin, 
Colour Terms in Greek Poetry, (Toronto: 1974), 138. 
9 HF 822, 844. 
10 Padel (1994), 163; HF 815-73. See A. Ernout, "Lyssa," Revue de Philologie 23 (1949), 154-6. 
Ernout relates lyssa to the Greek lykos (wolf) and notes the specialised usage to denote the illness 
‘rabies.’ The word is not used for wolves, only for other animals and humans (155). See Bruce Lincoln, 
Death, War, and Sacrifice: Studies in Ideology and Practice, (Chicago ; London: 1991), 134-5: ‘one 
does not speak of the “wolfish rage” of wolves as a disease – wolves are wolfish by nature. It is only 











representation of psychic disintegration,’11 and some distinction between the internal causes and 
the external experience of madness emerges in Homer and the dramatists: these kinds of 
madness may come about as a consequence of our actions and influence our subsequent actions 
but both have their origins in divine intervention.12 
 
The author of the Hippocratic De morbo sacro (On the Sacred Disease) attempted to 
demythologise so called diseases of the soul like epilepsy, which was traditionally associated with 
madness in the ancient world: it is shown not to be the result of external divine intervention 
but rather an internal physiological cause.13 The kind of madness which afflicts Heracles in 
Euripides’ play of the same name could be interpreted by ancient physicians to be caused by a 
natural and internal event (related to phlegmatic or bilious accumulations) separate from the 
external divine visitation of Lyssa.14 Euripides (who is probably influenced by medical writing) 
and the author of On the Sacred Disease describe similar symptoms: rolling eyes, foaming at the 
mouth and irregular breathing. 15  This separation between internal and external causes of 
madness also distinguishes the medical writers from the philosophers who treat madness as a 
                                                 
11 Padel (1994), 163. 
12 Padel (1994), 44-48 emphasises the connection in Homer and the dramatists between the ‘physical’ 
and ‘psychological’ aspects of human beings, esp. 48: ‘In the Iliad, multiplicity, and damage, is a 
condition predominantly of the external body, but from Homer onward, the innards’ damage is seen as 
madness. Tragedy, unlike Homer, specializes in insight into the disunity of, and damage done to, 
mind … Greek mind-words, in fact, suggest a unity in multiplicity somewhat similar to that which 
preoccupied Greek philosophers from the beginning, as they set out to give an account of inner and 
outer worlds in terms of the same material.’ 
13 See Hershkowitz (1998), 2-3. 
14 For a reading of Heracles’s madness in light of late fifth century learning and On the Sacred Disease 
see e.g. Heinrich von Staden, "The Mind and Skin of Heracles: Heroic Diseases," in Maladie et 
Maladies: Histoire et Conceptualisation: Mélanges en l'honneur de Mirko Dražen Grmek, ed. Danielle 
Gourevitch, (Geneva: 1992), 131-50. 
15 For arguments for and against see Brooke Holmes, "Euripides' Heracles in the Flesh," ClAnt 27 
(2008), 231-281. esp. 239: ‘It is likely that On the Sacred Disease was performed publicly in the last 
quarter of the fifth century. It offers solid evidence that symptoms, especially spectacular ones, had 
become contested sites of interpretation in this period, which coincides with the probable date of the 











disease of the soul. Heracles remarks at the end of the play that the poets’ stories of gods who 
are set in opposition and engage in adultery are lies ‘since god, if he is really a god, wants for 
nothing’ (δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὀρθῶς θεός,| οὐδενός, 1345-46); the remark is a 
difficult one in terms of the mythological integrity of the play and Heracles ‘invokes a 
contemporary understanding of divinity that is detectable in the fragments of Xenophanes and 
other early philosophers.’16  
 
Just as religious models, as opposed to the medical writers, might associate madness with 
dysfunctional social relationships ‘between man and man’ (in the case of pollution and pursuit 
by the Erinyes or Furies) and ‘between man and god’ (in the case of divine intervention),17 
Cicero (Tusc. 3.5) demonstrates that philosophers distinguish between diseases of the body 
(morbi corporis) and diseases of the soul (morbi animi) and stresses an intellectual rather than a 
medicinal cure. Cicero urges that philosophy, as an animi medicina, requires the participation of 
disturbed patients to heal themselves (ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus, Tusc. 3.6). Philosophy, 
like the religious models, accepts external causes and associates diseases of the soul with the 
emotions and perceptions of the mind.18 For the Stoics, ‘psychological equilibrium is based on 
the domination of the λόγος:’19 a divine element which is all encompassing, both manifest and 
implicit in all things.20 The Stoic universe is made of matter and its formation and quality is 
                                                 
16 Holmes (2008), 251. See Holmes (2008) n66: ‘Xenophanes (DK21 B11; B23). But see also Meliss. 
(DK28) B7–8; Antipho. (DK87) B10; Emp. (DK31) B134; Anaxag. (DK59) B12; Democr. (DK68) 
B166. At X.Mem. I.IV.10–11.’ 
17 Hershkowitz (1998), 4-5. 
18 Hershkowitz (1998), 7. 
19 See Giuseppe Roccatagliata, A History of Ancient Psychiatry, (New York: 1986), 53. 
20 See M. E. Reesor, "Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy," Phoenix 19 (1965), 286; the term 











dependent on the soul (πνεῦµα) of the universe (which itself is a living being, a ζῷον)21 and 
derives from ‘god’ (θεός) which is the purest, unsubordinated form of λόγος. 22  λόγος 
manifests itself in the various forms and qualities of matter e.g. ‘shape’ (width, breadth, height), 
‘weight’ and ‘colour’ and, depending on the complexity of the substance, more qualities are 
added to the basic ones, e.g. for animals qualities such as ‘life’, ‘growth’ and ‘sensation’ and, only 
in man, ‘intelligence’.23 The λόγος is synonymous with fate because it is responsible for all of 
the movements between the elements and for the composition of the elements in their various 
qualitative substrata.24  For Chrysippus the workings of λόγος through its divine mind (νόος) 
and providence (πρόνοια) entails a normative view of all events (they are all fated and 
representative of god’s will, which is necessarily good) and so-called malfunctions, or ‘bad events’ 
merely seem that way from the perspective of individuals (but are good from the divine 
perspective). Cleanthes, however, maintained that individual badness is not attributable to god 
and that there is a portion of the world that is not in accordance with god’s will.25 The physical 
account of the Stoic cosmos demonstrates the connection between ‘human rationality’ and 
                                                 
21 SVF 2.633; (cf. Diog. Laert. 1.106,5-23) and see J. Gould, "The Stoic Conception of Fate," JHI 35 
(1974), 17-32. This idea is present in Plato’s conception of the world as a ‘ζῷον’ but the analogy is not 
carried out as extensively as it is by the Stoics. It is worth noting that the Epicureans also apply the 
analogy to some aspects of the cosmos (although it is never a physical reality in the sense that the 
cosmos is alive), they consider atoms as a sort of ‘cosmological food’ (see F. Solmsen, "Epicurus on 
the Growth and Decline of the Cosmos," AJPh 74 (1953), 34-51). 
22 See L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," AJPh 57 (1936), 290 and Reesor (1965), 
286. 
23 Reesor (1965), 286, cf. Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion, (Chicago: 2007), 20 and see SVF 
1.58. 
24 For Chrysippus, Fate is ‘all-embracing Truth’ and ‘all-determining cause,’ (Susanne Bobzien, 
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, (Oxford: 1998), 60: fate is the ‘determining cause,’ i.e. 
the ‘final cause’ and the agenda of fate is divine providence) it is a ‘nexus of causes’ and consists of 
pneuma (‘wind’/ ‘air’) and is thus corporeal. Things which are in accordance with fate are at the same 
time things which are ‘true’ and they are actualised predicates or states which are qualified though 
movements in time (see Bobzien (1998), 60). 











‘divine purpose;’26 for the Stoics, experience of the passions (πάθη, affectus) is a sign of madness 
in rational beings (who share and participate in logos and whose physical characteristics are 
products of πνεῦµα)27 and the Stoic sage, or wise man, does not experience the ‘passions’ 
(πάθη), but only ‘good feelings’ (εὐπάθειαι). The Stoic’s emphasis in psychology is on cognitive 
‘propositional content’ (i.e. the beliefs and intentions) of our mental experience, yet the mind is 
a material thing causally embedded in the material world and Stoic authors supplement their 
cognitive accounts of human emotions with descriptions of low-level accounts of the theoretical 
physics of mental events.28 Stoic perception involves the ἡγεµονικόν, or mind, located in the 
chest, and the ψυχή, or soul, which is diffused through the sense organs which are subordinate 
to it;29 the mind registers an impression (φαντασία) or alteration of the ψυχή which produces 
awareness and proceeds to form a cognitive opinion about it, the mind then can convert this 
impression, in the form of a ‘pre-emotion’ (προπάθεια) or ‘bite’ (δηγµός), into a belief (i.e. 
form an opinion, δοξάζειν) through assent (συγκατάθεσις) and does so by determining if the 
impression is true or false and it is here that moral accountability lies.30 Assent can trigger an 
impulse (ὁρµή) to certain kinds of action and emotions involve assent to impressions of a 
                                                 
26 Graver (2007), 17. 
27 Fate is seen to exploit the nature of animals (including human beings). In a passage by Origen (SVF 
2.988), animals respond to certain kinds of presentations which arise in them and respond accordingly 
in impulse reactions (e.g. spiders making webs and bees making honey; see Gould (1974), 22: these are 
responses to ‘a movement of nature which has been presentationally arranged,’ SVF 2.988). Human 
beings have the ability to choose and judge between presentations because of their logos, but still, this 
is so that we might be guided ‘in accordance with them (sc. presentations),’ (So the presentations 
which arise within us are still responsible for guiding us, SVF 2.988). Human logos is seen to be an 
aspect employed by fate; man, guided by his own ‘impulse reflective’ logos, chooses the best 
presentation to react to, this, though, happens in accordance with fate. It is perhaps easier to envisage if 
human logos is imagined as a qualitative substratum of the divine logos (human logoi are envisioned as 
constitutive of the divine logos and therefore human free will is subsumed as an aspect of the free will 
of the whole cosmic organism – hence human freedom is a substratum of divine freedom and cannot 
help but be in accordance with the ‘fate’ of the whole – i.e. what is freedom of the divine manifests as 
fate in its parts). 
28 Graver (2007), 16-18. 
29 Graver (2007), 22. 











propositional nature.31 People are ‘hard-wired’ in their pursuit and rejection of good or bad and 
having the correct beliefs about these distinguishes the Stoic sage from common people. For 
the Stoics anger was seen as unnatural; when human beings are properly human32 (i.e. when 
they are a Stoic wise man or sophos, σοφός) they will not feel anger. It was also an unacceptable 
response (seen as useless and counterproductive) 33  and a false response (the result of an 
incorrect judgement about good and evil). 34  Emotional detachment and ‘extirpation of the 
passions’ (ἀπάθεια) is an important tenet of Stoicism. The passions (πάθη), both in their 
origins and their effects, are considered irrational and the wise man must be free from such 
irrationality: only the Stoic wise man is sane, and everyone else is, in a sense, mad.35 The ‘good 
feelings’ (εὐπάθειαι) of the sage might resemble the destructive emotions (πάθη) of the 
common man but they are rationally ‘corrected versions’ of common emotions.36 The Stoics 
distinguish between two types of insanity and appeal to the physical in their explanations: the 
relatively normal deficient moral and epistemological rationality of all who are not wise and 
therefore susceptible to emotion (explained in the Stoic paradox ‘all fools are mad’),37 and the 
medical condition of melancholia (i.e. expressed in the Hippocratic texts as the result of the dark 
humor of black bile, µέλας χόλος) which affects the agent’s ‘capacity for impressions’ and is 
                                                 
31 Graver (2007), 26-7; Cf. 33. 
32 Cf. Graver (2007), 51: ‘The perfected human would resemble Zeus in goodness, though not in 
comprehensiveness; he or she would be practically a lesser divinity.’ 
33 Cf. Seneca, De ira 1.5.1. 
34 See John Procopé, "Epicureans on Anger," in The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Juha 
Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, (London: 1998), 185. 
35 Hershkowitz (1998), 7-8. The wise man can experience some emotions but these are distinguished 
from ‘the passions’ (πάθη) as ‘good feelings’ (εὐπάθειαι)… e.g. joy (χαρά) vs. pleasure (ἡδονή), 
watchfulness (εὐλάβεια) vs. fear (φόβος) and wishing (βούλησις) vs. appetite (ἐπιθυµία). Wise mεn 
therefore can be moved by emotions as long as they are moved by ‘good feelings’ (εὐπάθειαι) and not 
‘the passions’ (πάθη). Cicero criticises Zeno and such orthodoxy (Acad. 2.135). 
36 Graver (2007), 52. 











‘deranged and hallucinatory.’ 38  Chrysippus says that it is the latter sort (i.e. non-culpable 
madness, melancholia) which afflicts Orestes who suffers a fantasy or hallucination 
(φανταστικόν) of Furies that no-one else can see.39 Hallucinations of this sort, according to 
Chrysippus, have no real object ‘underlying’ them (ὑπόκειται) 40  and Stoic epistemology 
distinguishes between phantasia and phantasma: the former refers to the making of an 
impression (phantaston) which is causally derived from an existent object,41 the latter is the 
product of ‘empty attraction’ (διάκενος ἑλκυσµός, SVF 2.54) and produces hallucination 
(φανταστικόν) without any external cause and examples of these are dream images (see Diocles 
of Magnesia, SVF 2.55)42 and the hallucinations of the insane (SVF 2.65), though sometimes 
hallucinations may derive from existent objects but do not properly represent that object, as, 
apparently, in the case of Orestes (SVF 2.65, though this appears to contradict Chrysippus 
above), 43  and sometimes both dreams and delirious ravings may seemingly derive from 
significant sources. 44  There is some indication in Stoic thought that these two species of 
                                                 
38 Graver (2007), 111-2. 
39 Graver (2007), 111-114. Aetius, Views of Philosophers 4.12 (Long and Sedley 39B).  
40 Aetius, Views of Philosophers 4.12 (Long and Sedley 39B). 
41 See R. J. Hankinson, "Stoic Epistemology," in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad 
Inwood, (Cambridge: 2003), 61. 
42 Cf. Diog. Oen. fr. 10 Smith col 1.1-4: ‘κενὰ σκιαγραφήµατα τῆς διανοίας’ (i.e. ‘empty fantasies of 
the mind’). Note, however that the Stoics deny the existence of emptiness, or ‘void,’ in the Epicurean 
sense (See Diskin Clay, "An Epicurean Interpretation of Dreams," AJPh 101 (1980), 350) and Stoic 
physics leaves no room for uncaused motions; an uncaused motion would disrupt the space-time causal 
network (i.e. fate) of the Stoic cosmos; it was seen by the Stoics as ‘the destruction (or explosion) of an 
otherwise unified cosmos,’ Gould (1974), 18, citing SVF 2.912. An uncaused event would imply 
something happening independently from the divine logos and would deny the ‘two principle’ system 
of Stoic cosmogony and physics in which all elements and movements are qualified and derived from 
the world-soul. 
43 SVF 2.65, ‘some (impressions) are such that, although they come from an existent object, they do not 
represent that object, as in the case of mad Orestes.’ Hankinson (2003), 61. There is clearly some 
contradiction between Chrysippus and the statement in SVF 2.65. 
44 E.g. prophetic dreams of a divine cause, see Cicero De div. 1.118.2-9: ‘Nam non placet Stoicis 
singulis iecorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum; neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec 
fieri ullo pacto potest; sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa 
praecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus, alia in ostentis, alia in stellis, alia in 
somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus.’ Cicero also speaks of Chrysippus' Liber somnium (De 











madness, cognitive impairment and medical melancholia, might be related: 45  Posidonius 
identifies ‘impressions’ as corporeal events in association with the mind’ in the same category as 
‘melancholy,’ ‘lethargy’ and ‘pre-emotions’ or ‘bites,’ and so the causation of insanity may be 
similar to the experience of ‘impressions’ in dreams (which come about through relaxed 
pneumatic tension) and the effects of alcohol on perception, thought and speech.46 For the 
most part, however, common or foolish irrationality and internal disease appear to be discrete 
and mutually exclusive for the Stoics.47 
 
For the Epicureans there is no divine ruling principle permeating and guiding physical reality; 
the gods are relegated to the µετακόσµιος, the space between the worlds;48 they did not create 
the world49 and they do not intervene in the affairs of mortals. The Epicurean universe is 
founded on the atomic system of Democritus: the world consists of permanent, moving atoms 
and void; the ultimate realities of the universe are matter (i.e. atoms) and void and every 
                                                                                                                                            
most unlikely that Chrysippus, whose intention was to illustrate the workings of divine providence 
through prophetic dreams, would have described dreams as 'empty' or 'illusory representations of the 
mind,' if, indeed, he thought of them as a significant means of contact between gods and men.’ 
45 Graver (2007), 112: ‘while the etiology of deranged or hallucinatory insanity could be assigned to 
black bile  or other medical causes, it may also have been a Stoic view that repeated episodes of strong 
emotion can cause a person to become mentally ill.’ 
46 Graver (2007), 114; one brief fragment calls drunkenness a ‘little insanity,’ Stobaeus, Ecl. 3.18.24 
(519W [SVF 3.713]), citing Chrysippus. 
47 Graver (2007), 112: ‘(melancholia) as the conception directly opposed to ordinary rationality (i.e. the 
madness of fools), sets the bearer beyond the scope of responsible action; in effect, it makes one 
morally subhuman.’ 
48 Epist. Herod.76-8. See Dirk Obbink, "Epicurus and Greek Religion," in Philodemus: On Piety, 
(Oxford: 1996), 7: ‘Epicurus states emphatically that the gods, being blessed and imperishable, could 
not conceivably reside in this world where they could be neither entirely free from care nor immune to 
terrestrial forces of destruction.’ Cf. Lucretius 5.146-7, illud item non est ut possis credere, sedis | esse 
deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis and see Cicero De div. 2.40 for the gods dwelling in the 
intermundia, the interstices between cosmoi in the Epicurean universe. Epicurus, it seems (De pietate 
col. 12), believed that the gods did not have a constitution like ordinary objects, which have a one-to-
one correspondence with themselves (an apple is an apple, because every bit of matter in the apple, no 
matter how small, exists in a defined relationship both to itself and to every other bit). Instead, the gods 
are a relationship between certain recurring states of matter, rather like thoughts in some current 
models of human cognition, or action in a movie, or, to use Obbink's own metaphor, a waterfall. 











compound object, including the whole word, is a temporary atomic concilium. The vibrations of 
atoms within a compound cause it to shed fine atomic films (εἴδωλα, simulacra) which are 
responsible for our sensations, thoughts and dreams. The mind (animus or mens) and soul 
(anima)50 are, like the body, material; they are born with the body and they die with the body – 
a point made emphatically by Lucretius in Book 3 of De rerum natura. Epicurus was primarily a 
moral philosopher; philosophy, for him, was supposed to secure the ‘happy life’ 51  and its 
primary aim is to free the mind from all disturbances and fears (pains) and attain tranquillity of 
mind (ἀταραξία); in a fragment Epicurus compares medicine and philosophy: one is for 
treating the body, the other, the soul. 52  In outline the ethical system that Epicureanism 
presents is a simple one: pain is bad and pleasure is good and these two ‘feelings’, or πάθη, form 
one of the three criteria for truth in Epicurean epistemology, along with ‘preconceptions’ 
(πρόληψις) and ‘sensation’ (αἴσθησις).53 In the psychosis of madness and during dreaming 
empty simulacra move the mind: for Epicurus these empty appearances are not empty 
attractions produced by nothing, as the Stoics seem to maintain with the hallucinations 
(phantastikon) of melancholia in which objects appear to be present when they are not,54 but are 
the result of real simulacra, atomic images, colliding with the mind. In Epicureanism the types 
of images we select from the multitude which are available at all times and the kinds of beliefs 
                                                 
50 Technically the animus and anima (mind and soul/spirit) are held together, compound in nature, the 
mind situated in the breast dominates the anima which is broadcast throughout the body which is 
responsible for sensation and responds to the animus.  
51 219 Us. 
52 423 Us. = Plutarch Non Posse 1091B and see Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: 
Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, (Princeton: 1994), 102. 
53 These three criteria are apparently given in the Canon (see Diog. Laert. 10.33); Epicurus thinks that 
we have certain ‘preconceptions,’ concepts such as ‘body,’ ‘person,’ ‘usefulness,’ and ‘truth,’ which 
are formed in our (material) minds as the result of repeated sense-experiences of similar objects. 
Further ideas are formed by processes of analogy or similarity or by compounding these basic concepts. 
Thus, all ideas are ultimately formed on the basis of sense-experience. 











we formulate about them are dependent on our psychosomatic state. Epicureanism’s emphasis 
on the bodily nature of the soul and on the causal atomic truth of all perceptual information (i.e. 
that all perceptions are caused by atomic simulacra) encourages a physicalist reading of mental 
phenomena in terms of the status of the mental instrument and the status of the perceptual 
object. Cicero (Tusc. 3.7) demonstrates that the Latin morbus does not adequately express the 
Greek πάθη and uses perturbationes to describe movements of the soul which do not obey 
reason (motus animi rationi non obtemperantes).55  Lucretius uses the word repeatedly in his 
descriptions of the soul’s atomic disorder during sleep and illness (e.g. 4.666, 4.922, 4.930) but 
also for the emotions produced in illness (e.g. perturbata animi mens in maerore metuque, 6.1097). 
Epicureanism does distinguish between the kinds of diseased states described by the Hippocratic 
physicians and which take place below the experiential level and cognitive emotional states such 
as anger which, in excess, is said to lead to madness (484 Us. = Sen. Ep. 18.14), but cognitive 
disorders are described in terms of their physical and constitutional causes and their effects on 
the body and the soul, so that in Epicureanism, because the soul is somatic, it is possible to 
examine the relationship and similarities between morbi corporis and morbi animi more closely. 
 
Madness is a difficult subject to define or circumscribe for ancients and moderns alike and 
paradoxically resists rational definition because, by definition, it lies outside of reason.56 It seems 
best, in searching for a definition, to consider three kinds of madness understood by the 
ancients to be relevant to philosophy. The first is ‘divine madness’ encountered in Homer and 
                                                 
55 See Hershkowitz (1998), 7. 











Euripides where characters, because of their actions, are driven crazy by various gods (or 
goddesses) and experience hallucinations. These classic examples are reduced in Stoic 
explanation to diseases of the body, the kinds which the Hippocratic physicians describe in 
terms of bile or phlegm and which, the Stoics say, afflicts Orestes. For the Stoics the divine, or 
the logos, represents reason and does not produce the opposite.57 Common man is also said to be 
mad in a psychological or social sense in terms of his inability to construct appropriate beliefs 
about his experiences of the outside world (i.e. the fool’s paradox that nearly everyone is mad). 
Lucretius’ approach appears to encompass all three relevant ancient models (religious, medical 
and psychological): he describes emotions such as anger in terms of the contributions of the 
atoms of the soul (i.e. dysfunctional internal processes) to the appearance of the angry person; 
he explains the same emotional states in cognitive terms of intentions, desires and false beliefs 
where delusion is produced by a misapprehension of nature; he also explains the onslaught of 
delusional emotions in the form of empty simulacra in the delusional’s own terms: i.e. that they 
represent the attack of a god (e.g. the shafts of Venus causing the furor and rabies of love in 
Book 4).  
 
In the first chapter I intend to present a model of delusional and hallucinatory madness within 
the context of Epicurean physics by examining Epicurean epistemology and its relationship to 
the accounts of dream experiences found in Lucretius and Diogenes of Oenoanda. Having 
established the physical conditions for this particular symptom of madness, I will show, in the 
                                                 
57 Cf. On the Sacred Disease 1: οὐ µέντοι ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ ὑπὸ θεοῡ ἀνθρώπου σῶµα µιαίνεσθαι, τὸ 












second chapter, how Epicurean moral and intellectual development provides a framework in 
which these sorts of conditions might be cognitively generated. In the last chapter, I will 
examine various case studies in Lucretius, focussing on the catalogue of diseases and bodily 
afflictions in Book 3 and the psychological progression of the ‘madness’ (furor, 4.1069, 1117) of 
love in Book 4, to show that, while Lucretius may superficially distinguish between morbi 
corporis and morbi animi in these examples, there is significant overlap in relation to symptoms. 
Finally I show that, despite their external similarity, disease and cognitive psychosis have 
fundamentally different etiologies: the pathological disturbances which characterise disease, 
intoxication and transient emotional states rely on external stimulation and may be an efficient 
cause, over time, for cognitive impairment; extreme emotional states, on the other hand, affect 
perception and the body internally and encompass both the traditional physical and cognitive 
























Madness according to Epicurean Physics 
 
  
The world in which the Epicurean lives is an inherently chaotic one. He is bombarded by a 
stream of independently unintelligible atoms which collide, coalesce and apparently swerve 
unpredictably in infinite space, at least from time to time. Against this background, the 
Epicurean tries to eliminate the turbulence around him or at least parse it into something 
meaningful, ordered and untroubled, as he engages in a task that requires interaction between 
this outer world and his own internal one. In his Letter to Herodotus Epicurus explains that the 
mind, along with the other sensory organs, participates actively in sensation (aisthesis) as it 
receives images from outside and, according to Lucretius’ account of Epicurean physics, 
‘prepares itself’ (se ipse paravit, 4.804) for the images received as mental thoughts, and this 
process opens up tiny channels into our waking soul.58 Analogous to ordinary sensation, the 
atomic content of emotions and thoughts exists in the first instance both inside and outside the 
receiving mind, and since all mental events are physical and atomic in constitution and 
contingent on external reality, empirically, the ingredients for madness are readily available at all 
times in the ambient constitution of the cosmos itself.   
 
Madness is not an explicitly defined topos in extant Epicurean literature and in most descriptions 
madness is linked with extreme emotion. Epicurus, who seems to have written little on the 
subject, explains that ‘immoderate anger begets madness’ 59  a connection reinforced by 
                                                 
58 ‘Soul,’ in this chapter, unless otherwise stated is equivalent to Lucretius’ animus-anima complex. 











Philodemus of Gadara who aligns madness and irascibility, calling anger ‘madness of a short 
duration.’60 Near the beginning of his treatise on anger Philodemus provides a πρὸ ὀµµάτων 
(before the eyes) description of the outward physical appearance of the angry person,61 he has 
the eyes of madmen (µαιν]οµ[έ]νων... τοὺς ὀφθαλµούς) which flash and ‘send forth sparks of 
light’,62 his face is flushed or even blood red, his neck strained with swollen veins and his saliva 
bitter. Lucretius’ vocabulary of anger in Book 3 of the De rerum natura strikingly resembles that 
of Philodemus: ‘the mind has also that heat, which it takes on when it boils in wrath and fire 
flashes more fiercely from the eyes.’63 Philodemus associates the state of being angry with the 
physical condition of ‘pyrexia,’64  while Lucretius explains that those who are angry have a 
preponderance of heat-like atoms in their soul and indicates that there are types of people who 
are more susceptible to an intense form of anger: ‘there is more of the hot in those whose bitter 
hearts and irascible minds easily boil over in anger.’65 There is sufficient consensus between 
Lucretius and Philodemus here in terms of their physical descriptions of the state of being 
angry and if, as Philodemus says, anger is ‘short-lived madness,’ then those who are irascible or 
                                                 
60 De ira col. XVI ‘ὀλιγοχρόνιον µανίαν’ cf. Horace Epist. 1.2.62; Cicero Tusc. 4.52. 
61 De ira 1. fr. 6. I am extremely grateful to David Armstrong for providing me with a working version 
of his forthcoming English translation of Philodemus’ De ira (to be published in the series ‘Writings 
from the Greco-Roman World’ of the Society of Biblical Literature). See David Armstrong, ed. Vergil, 
Philodemus, and the Augustans (Austin: 2004), 12: ‘its "vividness," its quasi-medical and therapeutic 
use in putting the ugliness of unrestrained anger and particularly the vicious pleasure of revenge pro 
ommaton, "before the eyes," and gives a long diatribe of his own in the Stoic manner…’ 
62 De ira 1. fr. 6. 
63 Lucr. 3.288-289: est etiam calor ille animo, quem sumit, in ira | cum fervescit et ex oculis micat 
acrius ardor. I am using the English of the translation by W. H. D. Rouse (updated by M. F. Smith, 
1992) unless otherwise indicated.  
64 De ira 8.22 (ἐκπυρώσεως) . 
65 Lucr. 3.294-295: sed calidi plus est illis quibus acria corda | iracundaque mens facile effervescit in 
ira. Here using Sanders’ translation in Kirk R. Sanders, "Lucretius on Irascibility and Anger: Lucr. 
3.294-295," SO 82 (2007), 52-4, accepting Sanders’ rejection of R. Bentley and E. J. Kenney’s  
proposed emendation (iram for the mss. ira). Sanders’ rejection is adduced from Philodemus’ 
categorisation of genuinely irascible people (ὀργίλοι) who suffer intense or prolonged anger called 
‘rage’ (θυµός) or ‘empty anger’ (κενὴ ὀργή). Sanders, 53: ‘Lucretius’ image of an irascible mind that 











pathologically angry (iracundia) are identifiable as mad and the emotional response (anger) and 
the pathological state are at least physically convergent.66  
 
Epicurus also associates the delusional states of madness and dreaming, explaining that both the 
hallucinations of madmen and the dreams one receives are ‘real’ or substantial because they 
induce a real response in those who experience them,67 and Epicurus assures his mother in a 
letter68 that her anxious dreams about him, although they may seem to be connected with him, 
only appear to be so and are really just impressions or presentations (φαντασίαι) from film-like 
images (εἴδολα) travelling through pre-configured pores or passages into her soul.69 As a topic 
in Epicurean philosophy and psychology, dreams have only recently become an area of more 
intense study and the literature is fairly underdeveloped. New fragments uncovered from 
excavations at Oenoanda, specifically between 1969 and 1970, from Diogenes’ Physics Treatise 70 
have added considerably to an explanation of Epicurean dream interpretation and help to shed 
light on Lucretius’ treatment of the subject in Book 4. Lucretius discusses dream visions 
alongside accounts of ordinary sensation and mental perception and follows this with a rejection 
                                                 
66 The distinction between the πάθη of pleasure and pain and cognitive emotions will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
67 Diog. Laert. 10.32: ‘τά τε τῶν µαινοµένων φαντάσµατα καὶ <τὰ> κατ' ὄναρ ἀληθῆ, κινεῖ γάρ’, 
see Clay (1980), 349. 
68 Diog. Oen. fr. 125 Smith (= fr. 52 Chilton). Smith’s edition provides the text of the available 
inscription: Martin Ferguson Smith, Diogenes of Oinoanda, The Epicurean Inscription, (Naples: 1993). 
For concerns over the authenticity of the inscription see Pamela Gordon, Epicurus in Lycia: the 
Second-Century World of Diogenes of Oenoanda, (Ann Arbor: 1996), Chapter 3. That the inscription is 
Epicurean and agrees philosophically with Lucretius is enough for my purpose. 
69 The idea concerning the creation of these pores (the verb is ποροποιεῖται, fr.  9 Smith col. 3.8) is 
inferred from Diogenes of Oenoanda’s Physics Treatise (esp. fr. 9 Smith cols. 3-6) and identified as an 
explication of phenomena described in Epicurus’ Letter to mother. Clay (1980),  353. 
70 Diskin Clay provides a valuable survey of the text and layout of Diogenes’ inscription: Diskin Clay, 
"The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda: New Discoveries 1969-1983," ANRW 36.4 
(1990), 2446-2559, and a translation of the relevant portion of the text (fr. 9. Smith cols. 3-6 [=NFF 5/6] 
is provided in Clay (1980). NF = new fragment(s) of Diogenes’ inscription. NF 1–124 were first 











of teleology. In this section (4.722-822) Lucretius frequently pairs waking and dream visions 
and it is clear that both abstract thinking and dreaming participate in similar modes of 
perception.71 Both involve mental responses to special kinds of external simulacra which are 
finer in texture than those which cause vision.72 These simulacra move in all directions and 
stimulate the mind directly, without the involvement of the senses, and are responsible for 
mental visions, among which Lucretius catalogues visions of monsters: Centaurs, Scyllas, 
Cerberus and the dead (all of which do not exist on the Epicurean view).73 These chimeras are 
the result of fine simulacra from real solid objects forming composite images, combining as they 
move through space. What distinguishes waking and dream visions is that, while asleep, the 
same kinds of mental images cannot be recognised as false because the sleeping mind does not 
have its ordinary recourse to the senses and sense perception (αἴσθησις) remains the basic 
criterion for truth74  which, together with the feelings (πάθη), provides the foundations of 
opinion and belief (πίστις).75 Waking hallucinations, those ‘hallucinations of madmen’ which 
Epicurus describes, stem likewise from an inability to refute the falseness of certain kinds of 
images76 while awake and in this way the physical state of dreaming bears a resemblance to the 
mechanisms at play in the delusional aspects of madness and insanity. 
 
                                                 
71 Indeed, Lucretius seems to interleave his discussion of mental perception and dream visions. Asmis 
proposes a rearrangement of the text between 4.768 and 4.822 in Elizabeth Asmis, "Lucretius' 
Explanation of Moving Dream Figures at 4.768-76," AJPh 102 (1981) 138-145. The topics are 
nevertheless parallel in Lucretius and both are introduced together from 4.777 onwards. 
72 Lucr. 4.728-729: quippe etenim multo magis haec sunt tenuia textu | quam quae percipiunt oculos 
visumque lacessunt.  
73 Lucr. 5.878-924. 
74 Lucr. 4.762-764 and cf. Diog. Oen. fr. 9. Smith col. 4.7 – 6.3. 
75 Epist. Herod. 63.1-2. 
76 Cf. David Konstan, Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology, (Leiden,: 1973), 59: ‘a false opinion 











In Book 3 Lucretius also mentions madness (furor) in a catalogue of afflictions which affect 
both the soul and the body in an argument for the soul’s mortality. Lucretius assimilates mental 
and somatic afflictions brought on by disease and intoxication. Along with bodily disease, the 
mind also experiences disease in the form of the emotions of care, grief and fear (curas acris 
luctumque metumque, 3.461) and the soul is physically affected in delirium and coma (3.464-9, 
the animus wanders in the former and withdraws in the latter) and the anima is disturbed 
(conturbare animam, 3.483) by wine when its heat (ardor, 3.477) penetrates the body (3.476-86). 
The mind is also afflicted by epilepsy, the ‘sacred’ disease, and the symptoms bear some 
similarity to his descriptions of extreme anger: foaming at the mouth (3.489), delirious raving 
and strained tendons or nerves (3.490). Epilepsy was associated with madness in antiquity,77 and 
Lucretius’ account is of physical and atomic dysfunction: the soul foams in violent disturbance 
like the wind-ravaged surface of a stormy sea (3.493-494) and is torn apart (3.500-501). As a 
conclusion to his argument Lucretius describes the susceptibility of the mind to cognitive 
afflictions and torments of its own, quite apart from those brought on by diseases of the body 
(praeter enim quam quod morbis cum corporis aegret, 3.824). These are described in intentional 
terms: fear of the future, care and remorse (3.825-827) and added to them is madness (furor) 
which is ‘peculiar to the mind’ (animi proprium) and which is connected to failing memory and 
the unconsciousness of lethargy (3.828-829).78  
                                                 
77 See Hershkowitz (1998), 3. This is illustrated in the example of Heracles’ madness in Euripides.  
78 See Cyril Bailey, De rerum natura, (Oxford,: 1947), vol ii, 1131: “oblivia rerum and lethargi … 
undas, are the successive stages of it.” I’m not convinced by Bailey’s reading of ‘adde quod … 
atque … adde quod (3.828-9)’ as successive stages of furor, see E. J. Kenney, Lucretius: De rerum 
natura Book 3, (Cambridge: 1971), 192: ‘praeter quam … quod “apart from the fact that…” leading the 
reader to expect that L. will proceed accedit quod “there is the additional fact…”; instead he switches 
to a personal construction, advenit id quod “there arrives (cf. 821-2 veniunt) that which torments …”, 












These species of madness (anger, dreams and disease) require a working model of the Epicurean 
soul and an account of mental perception to explain how they operate on a physical level. This 
is not to exclude the relevance of the mostly cognitive emotional psychogenesis of anger or 
states of madness in the first place. However, for the Epicureans, the soul and the mind are 
necessarily material (the binary physics of atoms and void available to the Epicurean does not 
permit an alternative) and any sensation, thought or mental activity can, theoretically, be 
described in terms of its low-level atomic interactions. In De Anima Aristotle explains that 
emotions such as anger comprise dual cognitive and physiological aspects where anger can be 
defined alternately as ‘a desire for retribution’ or ‘the boiling of blood or heat around the 
heart.’79 Aristotle indicates that an emotional state can be described in both ways and that these 
need not conflict with one another.80 In the framework of Epicurean physics, which rejects 
peripatetic teleology,81 it is difficult to ascertain to what extent cognition can be separated from 
                                                 
79 Aristotle De Anima 403a 30: anger is ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως and ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵµατος 
see Rhet 2.4 1382a 1-5 (on friends and enemies): ‘ὀργὴ µὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ 
καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν …’ 
80 See Graver (2007), 16: ‘both may be true in their own way’ and see Richard Sorabji, "Body and Soul 
in Aristotle," in Articles on Aristotle 4. Psychology and Aesthetics, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. 
Sorabji, (London: 1979), 55. For Aristotle, anger is not merely a physiological process. Emotions 
cannot meaningfully be separated into mental and physical components because, like other phenomena, 
emotions consist of both matter and form. Aristotle uses the analogy of a house (403a 25 – b 17) where 
the function of the house is differentiated from its bricks and mortar, also see Gerrit Glas, "Hierarchy 
and Dualism in Aristotelian Psychology," PRef 57 (1992), 99. 
81 See Lucr. 4.713f for Lucretius’ broad rejection of teleology. Philodemus also objects on ethical 
grounds to Aristotle’s statement that ‘apart from the pleasure of revenge, anger is suffering’ (De ira fr. 
1.1), cf. Aristotle NE 3.8, 1117a6: ‘οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόµενοι µὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιµωρούµενοι δ' 
ἥδονται’ (‘And human beings feel pain when angry, and take pleasure when taking revenge’).  
Following Indelli (Giovanni Indelli, L'ira: Edizione, traduzione e commento, (Napoli: 1988), 133) and 
Philippson (R. Philippson, "Philodems Buch über den Zorn. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Wiederherstellung 
und Auslegung," RhM 71 (1916), 427): generally in the first three fragments of De ira we are given the 
thoughts of the Peripatetics. See also David Armstrong, "'Be angry and sin not': Philodemus versus the 
Stoics on Natural Bites and Natural Emotions," in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman 
Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, (London; New York: 2008), 80: ‘Philodemus' On Anger offers a clever 
variation from the Epicurean side on Aristotle's classic definition. The pleasure of anger is joy in 











physiological processes; certainly many kinds of complex emotional activity can seemingly be 
described only in intentional terminology, and the reductibility of the physical soul is called into 
question. Various solutions have been offered, from theories of radical emergence to 
compatibilism. These are relevant to a certain extent and will be considered later in this section; 
for the most part, however, these are peripheral to the main task of providing an account of 
how physicalism does provide at least a partial description of states of madness, and these may 
inform an analysis of madness at the cognitive level. 
 
The precise constitution of the soul according to Epicurean philosophy is reasonably contested 
and reconstruction depends on the problematic Letter to Herodotus by Epicurus and support by 
subsequently attested material. Lucretius’ account in Book 3 of the De rerum natura of the 
structure, combination and operation of soul atoms is framed frustratingly, but not 
unexpectedly, by an apology that the subject cannot be adequately expressed in the Latin 
language;82 he proceeds to give a rather basic description, and on this there is at least some 
consensus. Kerferd’s survey83 provides a stable basis for more recent scholarship and describes 
the four-element structure of the soul.  
 
Epicurus gives a summary of Epicurean physics in his Letter to Herodotus84 and he describes the 
physical nature of the soul. The soul consists, he says, of a relatively stable85 structure made of 
                                                 
82 Lucr. 3.260: abstrahit invitum patrii sermonis egestas. Cf. 1.136-139, 832. 
83 G. Kerferd, "Epicurus' Doctrine of the Soul," Phronesis 16 (1971). 
84 Diog. Laert. 10.63-68. 
85 See Konstan (1973),  62; n12: ‘On the physical causes of the stability of the soul, cf. David J. Furley, 











smooth and very round atoms86 which is responsible for its ‘disposition’ (διάθεσις) and its 
atoms are ‘fine particles’ (ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ σῶµά ἐστι λεπτοµερές) dispersed throughout the frame 
of the body (παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισµα παρεσπαρµένον) and it is ‘exceedingly mobile’ (αἱ 
εὐκινησίαι).87 Epicurus goes on to describe the internal structure and composition of the soul 
or mind and it is here that his account becomes problematic:88 the soul is a mixture (κρᾶσις) of 
particles similar to heat (θερµός) and breath (πνεῦµα) and futhermore there is a part (µέρος) 
which is superior in fineness and speed and is affected by feelings (συµπαθής). The problem 
resides in different readings of the passage: (1) that it refers to three elements which compose 
the soul (heat, breath and a third ‘unnamed’ element)89 or (2) that the whole soul is both like 
heat and like breath and is possibly divided into parts which do not correspond to any material 
distinction between these two ‘aspects’ (though the reference to a ‘part’ in the letter could 
simply be used to designate the soul as a ‘part’ of the body). 90  The latter arrangement is 
plausible (though not necessarily widely accepted) on a minimalist reading of the language in 
Letter to Herodotus which indeed indicates a unitary soul (by the singular ‘σῶµα λεπτοµερές’). 
This construction, however, is exacerbated by traditional dissections of the soul in later 
Epicurean authors and commentators into two basic parts (τὸ λογιστικόν and τὸ ἄλογον: 
                                                                                                                                            
atoms as a consequence of their weight, and Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus, a study, 
(New York: 1964), 337-8, 345-9, who suggests that concilia have a kind of organic cohesion.’  
86 Scholium in Epist. Herod. 66 = 311 Us.; cf. Lucr. 3.177-230 for Lucretius’ arguments on the size and 
shape of soul atoms. These atoms are extremely different from (yet analogous to) those atoms which 
compose fire, see Kerferd (1971),  82-3 and Julia Annas, Hellenistic philosophy of Mind, (Berkeley: 
1992), 137. 
87 Epist. Herod. 63. 
88 See Annas (1992), 137: ‘It is puzzling that Epicurus’ own Letter to Herodotus 63 so undermines the 
doctrine as to be seriously misleading’ and n50 on Kerferd’s solution to what he identifies as ‘The 
problem of the first two sentences of par. 63’ (Kerferd (1971),  80–96). 
89 For this view see Bailey (1964), 388-9; Furley (1967), 196-7 and Annas (1992),  137-8. 











Lucretius’ animus and anima)91 and into four constituent elements (which in Lucretius are 
breath, heat, air and a nameless element).92 This appears to challenge the second view, that the 
whole soul is uniform in structure, yet this model is compatible with the standard division into 
two basic parts (animus and anima)93 and these can be reconciled with an elemental soul if the 
four elements are common to both parts94 and are understood to be so combined that the 
resultant mixture forms a single body with its own properties.95 The mixture is explained by 
Aëtius as a κρᾶµα96 and Epicurus suggests that this is not a mere juxtaposition of substances 
but a dissolution and re-combination at the atomic level to produce a new substance (akin to 
Stoic σύγχυσις).97 The importance of the unity of parts is demonstrable in the violent and 
sometimes lethal consequences of the disruption of the soul in Book 3; the soul’s existence as 
soul is not amenable to separation and depends physically on its complex nature.98   
 
The soul is responsible for life, sensation and thought:99 Diogenes of Oenoanda explains that 
‘the soul provides nature with the reason for the presence or absence of life.’100 The entire 
                                                 
91 Lucr. 3.136 f (cf. 311 Us. = Diog. Laert. 10.66; 312 Us. = Aetius 4.4.6 = 140 Arr.; Diog. Oen. fr. 37 
Smith col. 1). Note that in the scholium on Epist. Herod. 66 the division into rational and non-rational 
parts is attributed to Epicurus. 
92 Lucr. 3.245 (so Aetius 4.3.11 = 315 Us. = 139 Arr., Plutarch Adv. Col. 1118d = 314 Us. = 138 Arr., 
Alexander Aphr. De Anima 1.8 = 315 Us.). 
93 This division is attributed to Epicurus in the scholium on Epist. Herod. 66. Here with the caveat that 
µέρος in Epist. Herod. 63 may not refer to parts of the soul at all but rather the soul as a part of the 
whole body (Kerferd (1971),  94). 
94 See Kerferd (1971),  84-85 (so Bailey (1964), 392). This is the prevailing view. 
95 So Kerferd (1971),  89-90. 
96 Aetius 4.3.11 = 315 Us., 139 Arr. the soul for Epicurus is a κρᾶµα. Cf. Plut. Adv. Col. 1109e, 
Alexander Aphr. De Anima 215.11, 231.28, 232.28. 
97 Kerferd (1971), 90: Epicurus is opposed to Democritus here (60 Us = Plutarch Adv. Col. 1110 b = 20. 
2 Arr.) and cf. Arius Didymus (fr. 28) ap. Stobaeus Ecl. 1,153,24-155,14 Wachsmuth (= Dox. Gr. 
463,14-464,8 = SVF 2.471) on the Stoic categories of µῖξις, κρᾶσις and σύγχυσις.  
98 Cf. Lucr. 3.231: ‘nec tamen haec simplex nobis natura putanda est’ and cf. 3.234: nec calor est 
quisquam, cui non sit mixtus et aer.’ 
99 Kerferd (1971),  83. 











structure of the soul is atomic, as Epicurus’ meagre physical ontology demands, atoms and void 
being the only ultimate realities, and this is also the case for Lucretius where interactions 
between body and soul demonstrate its material nature.101 The soul is clearly composed out of a 
separate kind of material from that which comprises regular inanimate bodies102 and it is only in 
conjunction with the atoms of the body that it exists in the first place and can produce the 
necessary qualities of life.103 Lucretius describes the soul as a combination of four kinds of atom, 
they are like104 fire, like air or like breath and added to these is another, fourth, element (quarta 
natura)105 which does not have a name;106 he expands these analogies to explain the effects of 
the soul’s διάθεσις on the individual, and this is, apparently, his own innovation:107 wild lions 
have an excess of heat, timid stags an excess of cold and placid cows have peaceful air (3.288-
322). The mixture of the elements has a temperamental influence on emotional states, and an 
excess of heat, for example, results in an angry disposition (i.e. like that of a lion). The fourth 
element has no analogical counterpart in nature and therefore its nature is entirely theoretical 
and its existence inferred.108 Lucretius explains that it is like ‘the soul of the soul’ (animae quasi 
totius ipsa | proporrost anima et dominatur corpore toto 3.280-1): the fourth element is that which 
                                                 
101 See Annas (1992), 124 on Epicurus’ φυσική: for Epicurus the soul acts and is acted upon (void 
cannot do this), Epist. Herod. 64-65; for Lucretius the soul affects the body and the body affects the 
soul (i.e. their nature must be similar), 3.161-76 and 2.246-255. 
102 Kerferd (1971),  83. 
103 Lucr. 3.323-32, 3.331-36, 3.350-58; See Annas (1992), 148-9. 
104 So Annas (1992), 137 n51: ‘Plut. Adv. Col. 1118d-e; Aët. 4.3, 11, 9. 388 Diels; Lucr. 3. 231-322.’ 
But see Sharples (1980, 117-20) who argues that Lucretius is talking about real fire, air and wind. 
105 Lucr. 3.241. 
106 These correspond to Aëtius’ κρᾶµα ἐκ τεττάρων (4.3.11 = 315 Us.) the four elements being 
πυρώδης, ἀερώδης, πνευµατικόν, and ἀκατονόµαστον. 
107 These diathetical analogies are unattested elsewhere and see Annas (1992), 138: ‘Lucretius develops 
a theory about differing contributions made by the first three elements.’ 











animates the soul just as the soul animates the body and is made of unsurpassed subtleness.109 
This element, specifically, is responsible for sensation, sense perception (αἴσθησις)110 and, for 
Lucretius, it initiates the ‘movements of sensation’: nec tamen haec sat sunt ad sensum cuncta 
creandum, | nil horum quoniam recipit mens posse creare | sensiferos motus et quaecumque ipsa 
volutat (3.238-40). The fourth element is also traditionally associated with emotions and higher 
cognitive faculties; according to Plutarch it is ‘that by which the agent judges and remembers 
and loves and hates, and in general the intelligence and reasoning.’111 
 
Lucretius explains that the animus, ‘rational soul’ or ‘mind’ (animum … mentem quam saepe 
vocamus 3.94) has a fixed location in the chest112 and is responsible for reasoning, cognition and 
emotions113 while the anima, the ‘irrational soul’, is spread throughout the body and the limbs 
and is responsible for movement and sensation.114 These two together are parts of a single 
compound and are made of the same substance.115 The four elements seem common to both 
parts (this agrees with Kerferd’s reading of Letter to Herodotus),116 indeed for Lucretius it is the 
remaining part of the anima (cetera pars animae)117 which is spread out in the body (i.e. apart 
                                                 
109 Annas (1992), 141: ‘the fourth element stands to the soul as the soul stands to the body; it and the 
other soul elements are mutually dependant in that without them it would have nothing to ‘animate.’ 
And without it they would not hold together as a single kind of thing.’ 
110 Aët. 4,3 11, p. 388 Diels (= 315 Us.); cf. Lucr. 3.237-42. 
111 Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1118e. 
112 3.140-42; damage to this part is more destructive than damage to other parts. 
113Annas (1992), 144; indeed, the location is in the chest ‘because this is the region of emotions.’ Cf. 
Lucr. 3.141-42 (hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum | laetitiae mulcent) and see Schol. in 
Ep. Herod. 66 (= 311 Us.). 
114 Lucr. 3.143. 
115 atque unam naturam conficere ex se (3.137); see Kerferd (1971), 83: ‘The important statement 
which follows in the scholium (in Epist. Herod. 66) clearly attributes the basic distinction between 
animus and anima to Epicurus, but it does so in such a way as to suggest that they are differentiated by 
location rather than by any difference in the constituent elements’ cf. Bailey (1964), 392. 
116 See Kerferd (1971), 85 for doxography.  











from that which constitutes the animus).118 The elements form a composite whole (Lucretius 
calls the whole soul the anima)119 and their collective atoms are intermingled, moving at speed 
among themselves (inter enim cursant primordia principiorum | motibus inter se 3.262-3); this 
‘mixture’ (κρᾶµα) is not simply a juxtaposition of the elemental substances but rather a new 
configuration of their constituent atoms to form one body (ex his | omnibus est unum perfectum 
corporis augmen; 3.267-8) which cannot be separated (nil ut secernier unum | possit nec spatio fieri 
divisa potestas; 3.263-4).120 This physical mixture of elements to form one substance which is 
phenomenologically distinct from any of its components is responsible, on some readings, for 
the mind’s epiphenomenal or emergent qualities, and this seems to be the concept Lucretius is 
having difficulty describing in Latin at 3.260.121  
 
David Konstan remarks that ‘sensation and other modes of awareness [are] accidents 
(συµπτώµατα) of the motions of atoms in the soul, bearing to the soul the same kind of 
relationship that colour bears to physical objects.’122  Certainly this interpretation is broadly 
compatible with the kind of comprehensive physicalism that Epicureanism asserts, where 
sensation, and even mental perception, could be understood as passive sensory impinging on the 
                                                 
118 Cf. note 34 above. 
119 Lucretius says explicitly that when he refers to the soul as a whole he will use anima, the word for 
the irrational soul (3.421-24). 
120 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture, 140 (214.28 - 215.8) = 290 Us.: and see Kerferd (1971), 
90. 
121 See Kerferd (1971), 89-90 for the idea that ‘atomic blending’ is the concept Lucretius is struggling 
with in his Latin translation at Lucr. 3.260 and for the idea that this has to do with a ‘doctrine of 
molecules’ in Epicurus. 
122 Konstan (1973), 67. See Epist. Herod. 64, 70-1 and cf. David Sedley, "Hellenistic Physics and 
Metaphysics," in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra, et al., 











body-soul complex,123 but Lucretius seems to imply more than this. Exactly how sensation and 
specifically the kinds of mental perceptions which are responsible for our awareness and, 
crucially, our beliefs and emotions actually operate at the physical level continues to be a subject 
of debate. Mental sensation includes ‘thoughts, dreams, memories, hallucinations, and so on’124 
and the mind, like any sense organ (and Lucretius makes clear that the mind is as much a part 
of the body as hands or eyes),125 senses by receiving particles from the outside in the form of 
simulacra, atomic streams flowing off solid objects. As with the other senses, this is not simply a 
passive reception of impressions from the perceptual stream of atoms, but an active response 
through ‘direct application’ (ἐπιβολή) by the sense organ.126 In Book 4 Lucretius describes 
mental images (4.768-822) and defends Epicurus’ view that the mind has an active role in 
perception and also that no sensation is self-caused.127 Here he is dealing with two criticisms of 
Epicurean theory: (1) how can the mind think of anything at will? (2) how do dream images 
appear to move?128 The responses to bo h of these problems depend on the same physical model 
of mental sensation and thought129 and are important in dissociating the physical conditions of 
                                                 
123 See Julia Annas, "Psychology," in Companions to Ancient Thought, ed. Stephen Everson, 
(Cambridge: 1991), 99-100. 
124 Elizabeth Asmis, "Epicurean Epistemology," in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 
ed. Keimpe Algra, et al., (Cambridge: 1999), 265. 
125 Lucr. 3.96-7. 
126 Diog. Laert. 10.62: ἐπεὶ τό γε θεωρούµενον πᾶν ἢ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαµβανόµενον τῇ διανοίᾳ 
ἀληθές ἐστιν. cf. Lucretius’ animi iniectus (2.740). See Asmis (1999), 271-272 contra Furley (1967), 
208. 
127 I.e. that perception is ‘true’ because it is not self-caused and in itself is evidence of atomic causation 
and perceptual continuity; this is the reason why the things which appear in dreams and the 
hallucinations of madmen are true, see Diog. Laert. 10.31.7-32.1: πᾶσα γάρ, φησίν, αἴσθησις ἄλογός 
ἐστι καὶ µνήµης οὐδεµιᾶς δεκτική· οὔτε γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῆς κινεῖται οὔτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινηθεῖσα δύναταί 
τι προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν.  
128 Lucr. 4.777-793. 
129 The same mental images are involved: ‘nisi quod simulacra lacessunt | haec eadem nostros animos 
quae cum vigilamus’ (Lucr. 4.758-759). But cf. P. H. Schrijvers, "Horror ac divina voluptas; Études 
sur la poétique et la poésie de Lucrèce" (Ph.D Thesis, Amsterdam: 1970), 103-6 who differentiates 
between the images evoked at will and dream images (as the former are used to ‘give meanings to 
words’ and inform reason, whereas the latter invite false opinion because sense perception and reason 











waking visions compared to irrational dream visions. Almost all editors have identified a 
disorder in the text here and variously attributed problems to textual revision or transmission,130 
but the arrangement has little import on the broad interpretation of the passages.131 Indeed a 
critical discrepancy over the logical sequence of lines 4.794-801132 demonstrates that Lucretius’ 
explanations here are homologous in terms of their general relevance to either question and to 
the overall picture of Epicurean mental sensation. 
 
Lucretius’ description of the mechanism of mental sensation is ‘overwhelmingly visual’133 and he 
explains the dependence of mental thought and impressions on external atomic images: there 
are a great many images supplied to the mind in any particular moment and space (fit uti quovis 
in tempore quaeque | praesto sint simulacra locis in quisque parata 4.797-8)134 and the mind cannot 
perceive any of these clearly unless it prepares itself (se ipse paravit 4.804) for a particular 
sequence of streaming images, at which point the other images perish; clear and sequential 
thought then occurs based on the mind’s expectation of what will follow on from a particular 
                                                 
130 See Asmis (1981), 138: ‘(1) following Lachmann, many have supposed that lines 777-817 were 
composed by Lucretius some time after he had composed lines 768-76, as a revision or addition which 
he did not fully integrate with the earlier text; and (2) following Merrill, others have supposed that all 
of the text from line 768 to line 822 was written as a single rough draft which Lucretius would have 
revised if he had had the opportunity.’ Lines 4.768-776 are mostly a repetition of 4.788-801 and appear 
to offer a solution to one of the two questions only posed later at 4.777-793 (see also Bailey (1947),  
vol iii. 1274-1275). Attempts at re-arranging the texts have involved transposing 4.768-776 into the 
passage and revising the logic of Lucretius’ sequence accordingly. 
131 The consensus is that 4.768-776 is a response to the second question on the movement of dream 
images.  
132 E.g. Bailey assigns 4.794-801 to the second question (and 4.802-818 as the response to the first [i.e. 
in reverse order]; Bailey (1947),  vol iii. 1274) whereas Asmis suggests that 4.794-815 belongs to the 
first (‘Lucretius now claims that it is no longer at all difficult to know the answer to the second 
question. The reason is that he has already supplied the answer in his explanation of the first problem.’ 
Asmis (1981), 140). 
133 Brooke Holmes, "Daedala Lingua: Crafted Speech in De Rerum Natura," AJPh 126 (2005), 551: 
‘This is unsurprising, given that the extremely fine, mobile mental simulacrum, like the corresponding 
eidolon in Epicurus (Epist. Herod. 49), is modeled on the visual one.’ 
134 Here the relative divisibility of time is related to the ubiquity of simulacra in space; see Bailey 











image. Lucretius compares this process to the focussing of eyes on a particular visual 
simulacrum135—this requires attentiveness and a deliberate ‘active response’ to the perceptual 
atomic stream which in turn ‘determines the effect of the incoming streams’.136 Certainly it is 
not voluntas, or ‘will’, which summons or materialises particular simulacra (this is the suggestion 
of the hostile critic at 4.781-787) but rather, as Lucretius appears to explain, a weaker process of 
catalysis initiated by an impinging simulacrum from the many available which produces 
something like a chain reaction in which the mind ‘hopes for’ or ‘expects’ (speratque 4.805) each 
subsequent image.  
 
The same influx of images is responsible for producing dreams in the sleeping mind and it is 
important to account for the relative ‘truth’ of these images in terms of Epicurean epistemology 
and to explain how the mind’s state is disordered during sleep and so conducive to mental 
delusion.  Perceptible bodies emit simulacra in a continuous stream that extends from the solid 
to the sense organ and produces ‘presentations’ or ‘impressions’ (φαντασίαι) and this process is 
identical to ‘perception’ (αἴσθησις).137 Because of the rapidity of this stream simulacra cannot be 
perceived individually; rather the perceptual object itself is perceived as a ‘total effect’ which also 
preserves the likeness (effigia)138 of atoms deep within the solid.139 Given the distinction already 
made between mental and visual simulacra, Lucretius describes how images which reach us 
come about in different ways: they can stream directly from an external source, preserving its 
                                                 
135 Lucr. 4.749-751; 4.807-813. 
136 Asmis (1999), 272. 
137 Asmis (1999), 264. Epicurus classifies mental sensation as a subdivision of ‘perceptions.’ Later 
Epicureans made it a separate category, but this did not alter Epicurus’ theory.  
138 Lucr. 4.42, cf. 4.85 and 4.105 
139 Mark Holowchak, "Lucretius on the Gates of Horn and Ivory: A Psychophysical Challenge to 











likeness, or they can form spontaneously in the air (like clouds 4.129-42) which appears to be 
the result of simulacra combining into composite images as they travel through space (4.722-
48).140 No matter the source, these images are always considered to be true in themselves, they 
consist merely of stimulation from an external referent (or composite referents) and their 
collision with a receiving mind constitutes a ‘raw act of cognition;’141 it is only a secondary 
motion within ourselves that adds beliefs which may be true or false to the presentation.142 
Dreams belong to a category of images which Epicurus identifies first as ‘likenesses’ or 
simulations of what is ‘existent and true’ (as opposed to straightforward perception of what is 
‘existent and true’),143 but while the images which form dreams may appear to be false in that 
they do not intuitively seem to correspond to present external reality their similarity to 
identifiably true sensations of an everyday kind implies that they are in fact true semblances of 
real things (‘things we encounter’) and so the categories seem to collapse.144 Presentations can 
be called real or true for two reasons: the first is phenomenal: they bear accurate resemblance to 
                                                 
140 Asmis (1999), 270, conflates images which form spontaneously and those which combine: ‘…and a 
stream may form spontaneously (i.e. combine) in mid-air.’ I suspect she and the commentators are 
correct in this, although she does not appear to qualify this assumption, indeed she complicates it with 
her introductory remark that ‘[these] images do not … come from an [one?] external source.’ For a 
counter-interpretation see Holowchak (2004), 357. It is difficult, though, to see how images could 
actually generate spontaneously with no external referent in the first place: this would deny atomic 
continuity and causality between the perceptual object and its impression which is one of its crucial 
epistemological features.   
141 Asmis (1999), 265. 
142 Asmis (1999), 265-6; Epist. Herod. 50-2. 
143 Asmis (1999), 266; Epist. Herod. 50-2. See Sextus Empiricus Math. 8.65 on this distinction between 
appearances that come from solid bodies and appearances that come from images.  
144 ‘Epicurus’ language is circumspect and strained’ (Asmis (1999), 266). Epicurus seems ultimately to 
approximate ‘images obtained as a likeness or that happen in sleep’ to images obtained in ordinary 
sensation (‘things we encounter’ πρὸς ἃ βάλλοµεν) as part of his proof that falsehood or error is 
always something which is added to the presentation (despite our possible intuitions to the contrary). 
This would account for his initial separate categorisation as an organised response to the Stoic (?) critic. 
Cf. Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.206: ‘What fools some people is the difference in the appearances that 
seem to strike us from the same perceptible (e.g. visible) thing, in virtue of which the existing thing 
appears to be of varying color or varying shape or in some other way changed. For they supposed that, 
of the appearances that thus differ and compete, one of them must be true, while the other one of 
opposite origins turns out to be false. Which is silly, and typical of men who fail to see the nature of 











the perceptual object; the second is causal: the images are obtained from real atoms from real 
objects causing authentic impacts on the sense organ. But the truth of the causal event (2) 
explains why we can see things accurately (1); in other words, perception is true because of 
atomic causation specifically because it is caused by something external and is not self-
moving. 145  The kind of truth, which depends on the complete phenomenal accuracy of 
perception, does not always seem to be guaranteed:146 images can degrade after travelling long 
distances and so the perceptual stream becomes disturbed and images which merge in the air 
and form composites no longer faithfully resemble the entire referent. 147  The impinging 
simulacra we encounter are nevertheless true in that the atomic information contained in the 
stream is real information (causally) 148  which requires the correct interpretation (in the 
formation and addition of true or false beliefs) to prevent false conclusions.149 Sextus Empiricus 
employs the example of the madness of Euripides’ Orestes repeatedly and explains how, for the 
Stoics, Orestes’ vision of a Fury (when he is actually seeing Electra) is both true (Electra was 
real) and false (there was no Fury).150 For the Epicurean, Orestes’ madness and his sensation of 
the Furies is ‘activated by images’ which are true (the images exist) but ‘the intellect in thinking 
that they were solid Furies had a false opinion.’151 Sextus links Orestes’ madness and the state of 
                                                 
145 Asmis (1999), 267-8. 
146 Asmis (1999), 269-70. 
147 This should not, I think, preclude their truth value: in any perception we only perceive a part of the 
sensory information from the available stream and so degraded or hybridised/corrupted information is 
not even phenomenally compromised in terms of its authenticity if we interpret it as such. 
148 See Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.210: ‘The specific role of sense-perception is to apprehend only the 
thing that is present and affecting it.’ 
149 Sextus Empiricus explains this difference between the impinging simulacra and their source as the 
reason for the diversity of opinions both true and false (Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.210). 
150 This is a non-apprehensive appearance which is both true and false; the appearance was not ‘drawn 
in accordance’ with the real thing, but was nevertheless ‘drawn from’ the real thing (Sextus Empiricus 
Math. 7.244-9). 











dreaming, 152 indicating these are both to do with confusion between true and false appearances 
for the Stoic, true and false beliefs for the Epicurean. 
 
Sextus complains that Epicurus falls into the same epistemological paradox of those who 
distinguish between true and false appearances in his own theory of true and false beliefs. 
Appearances can be deceiving (through degraded or merged simulacra, or, as in the case of 
Orestes, through belief), yet our means of testing these impressions by judging our beliefs to be 
true or false  depends on ‘plain experience’ (i.e. via sensation) in the first place.153 Beliefs consist 
of a secondary and internal motion added to perception (‘another motion that is attached to 
perception, but is distinct from it’).154 Belief itself, though, is judged by our perceptions (they 
are ‘the ultimate basis of judgement; for there is no further criterion by which the perceptions 
themselves can be judged).155 That perceptions judge our beliefs about perceptions is troubling 
to ancient and modern critics alike, for how is a mad or otherwise deluded person able to refute 
his beliefs about a particular perception if his beliefs must yield to perceptual information in the 
first instance?  
 
                                                 
152 Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.245 on Stoic apprehension,  also Sextus Empiricus Math. 8.59 on truth, 
against Democritus and Plato. 
153 Sextus Empiricus Math. 8.64-5. 
154 Epist. Herod. 51 and cf. Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.203: ‘Epicurus says that there are two objects 
that are connected with one another – appearance and opinion.’ 
155 Diog. Laert. 10.32; Asmis (1999), 266: ‘the claim that there is no falsehood in perception is boldly 
counterintuitive.’ Cf. Sextus Empiricus Math. 8.66: ‘It is especially absurd that he tries to demonstrate 
things that are less under investigation by means of things that are more under investigation. For while 
we are inquiring about the reliability of apparent things, he introduces this monstrous and mythical 











Sextus’ criticism is simplistic and Lucretius’ explanation of the state of the dreamer offers some 
solution: the dreamer is not able to refute falsehood with truth because during sleep the senses 
are obstructed and memory is deactivated, only the mind is awake (4.762-767).156 This indicates 
that correct judgement depends on concomitant information from the other senses and on 
memory. Diogenes states that we form beliefs (δόξαι) about perceptions in the form of 
preconceptions (προλήψεις). 157  Preconceptions are derived from sense perception and, 
according to Diogenes, are a ‘memory of what has often appeared from outside’ – repeated 
exposure to simulacra formulates ‘concepts’158 which are stored memories of things and which 
determine our expectations of incoming images.159  
 
Preconceptions constitute so-called ‘special beliefs’ formed by ‘an accumulation of sensory 
impressions’ and they are acts of ‘application.’160 The status or ‘self-evidence’ of preconception is 
complex; preconceptions appear to belong to the category of sensation (as the product of 
accumulations of impressions), but seem also to consist of a distinct motion added by the mind 
which attends and forms concepts and inferences from these accumulations that would render 
them epistemologically subordinate to sensation (as the ultimate criterion which is always 
true).161 Preconceptions are clearly responsible for ordering sensory information into a priori 
                                                 
156 Lucr. 4.758: ‘mens animi vigilat’ 
157 Diog. Laert. 10.32-33; cf. Asmis (1999), 277: ‘their function is to serve as points of reference for 
inquiry.’ 
158 Asmis (1999), 277: ‘nor would we name anything unless we had first acquired a preconception of it’ 
and see n25. 
159 Asmis (1999), 276-7; Diog. Laert. 10.33. 
160 Asmis (1999), 277 and see Clem. Alex. Strom. 2.4.16.3: ‘[Epicurus] expounds “preconception” as a 
close attention directed to a clear object and a clear concept of the object.’  
161 Asmis (1999), 278. Asmis leaves this rather unresolved, concluding that ‘sensory impressions turn 











concepts and categories which are crucial to interpreting sensory information correctly in the 
mind. If perceptions are subordinate to scrutiny by the senses, then they provide evidence which 
is not always accurate in terms of their relevance to present external reality. As Elizabeth Asmis 
points out, this is essentially a restatement of the problems regarding the relative 
epistemological status of simulacra, and it is the frequency of common perceptions (in turn 
based on frequency of presentations) and consensus among them which appear to ensure their 
epistemological accuracy as opposed to supposed ‘false suppositions’ such as notions about 
centaurs.162 This suggests that proleptic reliability can be assessed statistically; presumably those 
merged simulacra which result in presentations of centaurs and other non-real entities are a 
relatively infrequent event on this account and as such do not constitute a valid preconception. 
 
Preconceptions are imprinted patterns in the mind, 163  they are special and natural ‘beliefs’ 
implanted in the mind through steady accumulation of simulacra. Cicero differentiates between 
natural and taught beliefs,164 but it is difficult to determine whether this distinction is properly 
Epicurean.165  The distinction leads to a theoretical division within the structure of mental 
processes which separately identifies preconceptions and beliefs: a preconception is ‘an inferred 
pattern imposed naturally from outside’ whereas reasoning is ‘an activity produced in the mind by 
means of atomic movements.’166 Both of these phenomena concern the arrangement of images: 
                                                 
162 Asmis (1999), 278-80: this is conjectural; Epist. Men. 123-4 refers to the relevance of beliefs which 
are commonly held.  
163 Asmis (1999), 281. 
164 Asmis (1999), 278, 281 Cicero ND 1.43-4. 
165 Cicero is speaking of belief in the gods in the Epicurean view which is not ‘established by some 
convention or custom or law,’ but this does not necessarily imply that other beliefs are necessarily 
established in this way.  











with preconceptions this is accomplished automatically through successive streams of images 
which ‘impose’ some kind of pattern in which those images are stored in an arrangement 
according to their similarity or difference; this natural faculty apparently trains our ability to 
arrange these images deliberately in the form of reason (ratio), a second movement in 
ourselves.167 In summary, this model generally presents a process that extends from an object in 
external reality to the formation of an impression prior to a belief about that object which can 
be judged true or false according to subsequent sensory evidence. This process begins with 
impinging simulacra, which are followed by mental selection and attendance (ἐπιβολή) on a 
particular sequence of impressions contained within the stream (to the exclusion of others), 
these perceptions result in preconception as those images to which we are frequently exposed 
are accumulated (according to similarity and difference) as natural patterns of memory in the 
mental sense organ. These actions occur prior to belief formation both temporally and 
epistemologically and are regarded as automatic and true in themselves and so free from 
interpretation or investigation; beliefs are rational inferences added by the mind from within 
and are similar to and formed from preconceptions (but supposedly not the same as 
preconceptions).  
  
This model seems unnecessarily complex and is a result of criticism which has been influenced 
by Epicurus’ and others’ not insignificant tendency to distinguish between beliefs proper and 
preconceptions, while simultaneously ascribing to preconceptions at least part of the domain of 
                                                 











belief. 168  The range of belief-formulation constantly diminishes in the physical model, as 
application, sensation, preconception and memory are shown to be normal acts of physical 
perception and subsequent natural arrangement rather than some elusive, secondary and 
cognitive movement in ourselves. The conceptual problem has to do with ascribing to these 
‘first’ acts an equivalent epistemological status because they are identical to, or derived naturally 
from, sense perception and distinct from ‘ratio’ which, though contingent on sensory data, 
somehow operates separately inside ourselves once formed. Lucretius makes this distinction 
between the outward appearances of things and ‘the inner workings’ repeatedly in his formulaic 
phrase naturae species ratioque (1.148 = 2.61 = 3.93 = 6.41).  Lucretius, however, typically 
alternates his descriptions of outward appearances and inner workings to describe identical 
phenomena as part of his protreptic approach which combines poetry and philosophy. Indeed, 
the relationship in Lucretius of poetry to species and Epicurean doctrine to ratio is well observed 
and has been responsible for the iden ification by nineteenth century critics of the insidious 
‘anti-Lucretius’ lurking beneath the text.169 Lucretius’ depictions of ‘the self destructiveness of 
mankind’ have historically been set in contrast to the Epicurean goal of ἀταραξία achieved 
through following its doctrinal philosophy.170 This apparent contradiction in Lucretius has been 
demonstrated to be part of his integrated approach for the uninitiated which takes account, on 
the surface, of human fears, subjectivity and frailty. 171 Part of Lucretius’ approach, I suggest, is 
to address a problem with the distinction between physiological and cognitive descriptions of 
                                                 
168 Diogenes explains that he will sometimes use πρόληψις for δόξα ὀρθή (Diog. Laert. 10.33: τὴν δὲ 
πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειµένην, 
τοῡτ’ έστι µνήµην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος). 
169 Charles Segal, Lucretius on Death and Anxiety: Poetry and Philosophy in De rerum natura, 
(Princeton: 1990), 9-12. 
170 Segal (1990), 10. 











the same processes, a duality already outlined by Aristotle. In Book 3 he provides typically 
distinct versions of human emotion: after the proem we are presented with a catalogue of 
‘outward’ descriptions of irrationality in the form of various vices and superstitions explained 
psychologically in intentional terms and induced by the fear of death (3.31-93: avarice, ambition, 
cruelty etc.). His subsequent argument on the material nature of the soul rapidly advances, after 
a brief description of oneiric irrationality (3.112-116), to a physical description of the 
quadripartite soul and a ‘bottom-up’ explanation of human emotions according to Epicurean 
doctrine (3.231-322). That the mention of dreams provides a transition into physicalism 
reinforces, perhaps, the relevance of how this state clarifies ordinary mental experience in terms 
of its basic physics.    
 
Modern attempts at describing the mental assemblage and its functioning are typically frustrated 
by this tension between physicalist and cognitive accounts. It is tempting to interpret 
perceptions and preconceptions (which have also been described as acts of application) as 
forming a physical account of beliefs and to entertain the possibility that our beliefs themselves 
are identical to our various preconceptions. This approach is partially compatible with later 
proponents of the School like Zeno of Sidon who assimilated preconceptions to the building 
blocks of rational enquiry,172 Philodemus, who seems not to distinguish beween the testing of 
initial perception and the testing of reasoning,173 and quite possibly with Lucretius who asserts 
                                                 
172 Asmis (1999), 281. 











that memory may have a role in judgement in that it has the capacity to contradict certain kinds 
of irrational appearances: the kinds we experience when asleep.174    
 
Moreover, one of the problems of the model which moves from mental application to belief and 
subsequent judgement is that it fails to explain exactly how the mind performs any kind of 
initial rational selection from the readily available abundance of impinging simulacra at any given 
moment. The most coherent account of mental application (ἐπιβολή) to incoming streams is 
given in Lucretius and, as mentioned earlier, this process involves an active response on the part 
of the mind because the organ is ‘in a state of attentiveness.’175 The selection of the first image 
is not, however, arbitrary: it requires some form of mental participation. Unfortunately 
Lucretius does not clarify how exactly it is that the mind is capable of initiating this kind of 
action (or indeed many other sorts of mental activity) and the frustratingly reflexive ‘se ipse 
paravit’ (4.804) betrays, at least, a difficulty in Epicurean physicalism or a complexity beyond the 
scope of Lucretius’ argument and purpose. Preconception, however, is involved in a similar sort 
of activity: the information grouped in stored preconceptions ‘explains why we seek things,’ by 
placing expectations on incoming information perceived by the senses (without these we would 
not seek anything).176 Preconceptions are also ‘applications’ and it seems plausible to suggest 
that they constitute the same applications of the mind which catch hold of parts of the sensory 
stream in perception; ἐπιβολή is based on expectations of subsequent simulacra and 
preconceptions are based on expecting, or seeking, subsequent simulacra according to 
                                                 
174 Lucr. 4.765-767. 
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preconceived concepts. In this way preconception will ensure the rational function of ἐπιβολή 
and ‘tune’ or direct the mind’s attention to those particular parts of the perceptual stream which 
are compatible with its own preconfigured pattern of associations and confirm the true nature of 
these perceptions if they are consistent with concomitant data from the other senses. Only the 
relevent προλήψις will materially collide with the simulacra which match it. 
 
Diogenes uses the example of distant objects:177 a real distant cow would only be able to be 
‘sought’ if we had already come to know the preconception of ‘cow’ (i.e. by frequent sensory 
exposure to cows). If this is what constitutes ἐπιβολή, then all other images (apart from those 
apprehended by similar application) would ‘vanish’ (or not collide with a προλήψις) and the 
incoming stream would thus be ordered according to the imprinted configurations of the 
physical mind. As Diogenes appears to say, we can only follow sequences according to our 
preconceptions. Beliefs also have to do with expectations placed on perception and are divided 
into two categories: (1) beliefs about what is waiting and (2) beliefs about what is non-
evident. 178 The first kind of belief is verified by ‘witnessing’ and falsified by 
‘counterwitnessing’:179 a belief is tested by subsequent evidence from the senses which either 
corresponds to the belief and proves it to be true or does not correspond to the belief and 
proves the belief to be false. Sextus uses a strikingly similar example to the one already described 
by Diogenes for preconceptions: if Plato is approaching from far away, a belief that it is Plato 
will be confirmed if it turns out to really be Plato on closer inspection, but be denied if it does 
                                                 
177 Diog. Laert. 10.33. 
178 Asmis (1999), 283. 











not.  180 Normally stated, ‘preconceptions correspond to the utterances used to state a belief;’181 
preconceptions are true in themselves in that they are causal evidence of atomic exposure, but 
they are subject to evidential investigation when they are present applications in which the mind 
seeks images.182 Beliefs take the form of expectations and are subject to the same scrutiny by 
sensory information and it is certainly possible to identify beliefs as present applications of 
preconceptions, be it Plato or cow which is approaching from afar. This is to explain the 
ordinary functioning of ἐπιβολή, preconception and belief as expressions of the same co-
ordinated act of presentation and response. Certainly all are involved in filtering and parsing the 
atomic stream – all are also contingent on our expectations of what will follow on from a 
particular image for a coherent and directed apprehension of the physical world. The conclusion 
should be that, while we can clearly distinguish between acts of reason on the one hand and 
sense perception on the other, they are both bound up in similar physical processes and this sort 
of rational proleptic organisation and subsequent sensation must be squared with Lucretius’ 
physical account of the soul and Epicurus’ theories of mental development in rational beings. 
 
The second type of belief is more complicated: these are beliefs about things which do not exist 
and are disproved by observing existent things which necessitate their existence (as the non-
existence of void is disproved by the observation of objects moving through space).183 Belief of 
this sort is associated with higher reasoning and is not stimulated in any abundantly clear way 
by a present or impinging image like Sextus’ distant image of Plato. Indeed here it becomes 
                                                 
180 Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.212 
181 Asmis (1999), 276. 
182 If the object is counterwitnessed this will presumably refine our preconception of that object. 











more difficult to trace any identification of preconception with belief, but there are indications 
that this sort of reasoning utilises more advanced configurations of preconceptions of the 
properties which inform the belief and the counterwitnessing claim (i.e. using preconceptions of 
the phenomena of body, motion and void).184 Present applications of preconceptions are at least 
very close to beliefs in their function and are afflicted in similar ways by the same general 
problems;185 they are also involved in the mind’s selection of images from the stream. However 
the relationship between ἐπιβολή, preconceptions and beliefs is precisely understood, it is clear 
from Lucretius that when we are asleep we no longer have access to memory (which otherwise 
enables us to apply beliefs or at least expectations about images to incoming simulacra) or to 
common sensory information which would normally enable us to accept or refute the beliefs we 
form while following successive simulacra.  
 
Returning briefly to the accuracy of images, another reason for supposed misperception is that 
the sense organ itself may become deranged and so alter its perception. Lucretius describes the 
process of physical derangement in Book 4 in a passage that is clearly meant to have broader 
intellectual implications in the work at large since he is discussing honey in terms of sweetness 
and bitterness – images and concepts he has deployed famously elsewhere in the honeyed-cup 
simile (1.936-50 = 4.11-25) to demonstrate the relevance of his poetic enterprise in terms of 
Epicurean ethics. Lucretius states that foods contain many different sorts of atoms; just as these 
are of different sizes and shapes and combined in different ways so is the configuration of the 
                                                 
184 Asmis (1999), 287. 
185 Beliefs share in the epistemological problems surrounding the accuracy of perceptions and 











sense organ’s passages or pores (4.642-657). This is why taste perceptions vary between 
organisms, because only atoms which correspond to the configuration of pathways in the sense 
organ are received and absorbed. Honey contains both smooth and rough particles which are 
responsible for sweet and bitter tastes respectively (4.671). In a healthy receiver the sweet 
particles in the honey stimulate the sense organ; if the sense organ is unhealthy, then the 
positions of its atoms are deranged (4.666-7: et omnes | commutantur ibi positurae principiorum)  
and the organ receives other sorts of particles from the object, in this case ‘rough and hooked’186 
particles produce a bitter sensation. It is not only the atoms of the palate which can be 
disturbed in this way, but the atoms of the ‘whole body’ (4.666: peturbatur ibi iam totum corpus). 
This theory is also observed in examples of visual sensation, the same presentations are not 
suitable to all organisms: lions supposedly fear the sight of roosters because particles from the 
rooster happen to be shaped in such a way that they cut into the pupils of lions and cause pain 
(4.710-17), yet this does not occur in normal humans. 187 Epicurus also explains that a sense 
organ receives what is ‘commensurate’ (σύµµετρον) with it: the arrangement of the sense organ 
determines which parts of the perceptual stream it will encounter.188  
 
Lucretius explains that when we sleep our soul is re-arranged (4.916-53),189 and it is clear from 
Lucretius’s discussion above that derangements in other sense organs result in attention to parts 
                                                 
186 Lucr. 4.662: ‘aspera … hamataque.’ 
187 Note David Konstan’s remark that ‘What we think of as fear in the case of animals is rather an 
instinctive avoidance of pain, and hence operates on the perceptual level, without necessary recourse to 
reason’ (David Konstan, Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude toward Grief (unpublished manuscript 
presented to the conference 'Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy and Science' at the University of Manchester, 
6-7 July 2009), 3). Cf. Pliny for this superstition (Pliny HN 10.47.9-48.1). 
188 Epist. Herod. 53 (of hearing and smelling). See also Asmis (1999), 270-1. 











of the stream which do not conform to proleptic consensus.190  The body is exposed to repeated 
blows by the air from without and by the air within us while we breathe and is possibly even 
ruptured (4.932-42). 191  These bombardments also invade the interstices or pores (parva 
foramina, 4.940) of the body and together they effect a collapse (ruina, 4.942) throughout the 
whole.192 This passage is strikingly similar to proofs offered in Book 3 of the interdependence of 
the body and soul; if the entire shell of the body is broken apart (3.576-78: resoluto corporis 
omni | tegmine … dissolui), then the sensations of both the animus and the anima are dissolved 
(3.578-9) as the soul is scattered outside the body (3.580-591). Lucretius frequently compares 
sleep to death referring to ‘the quiet sleep of death’ (3.211: leti secura quies, 3.977: non omni 
somnio securius exstat?), but it is clear that the assaults in Book 4 are non-lethal kinds from 
which we can be resuscitated.193 During sleep this assault likewise affects both the animus and 
the body: their particles are disordered (4.943-44: conturbantur enim positurae principiorum | 
corporis atque animi), and part of the ‘spirit’ (pars animai, 4.944) is cast outside the body while 
part is withdrawn inside it, another part, extended throughout the frame (distracta per artus, 
4.946), is no longer ‘interconnected’ (non queat esse coniuncta inter se, 4.946-7) or capable of co-
ordinated motion (neque motu mutua fungi, 4.948) and this affects the limbs and the senses 
which lose their strength (4.944-54). Editors have struggled with Lucretius’ use of animus 
(4.944) which suggests that the ‘rational soul’ is affected in addition to parts of the anima, or 
                                                 
190 Honey is attested only as sweet elsewhere by Lucretius: (2.398-407, 3.191-195). 
191 Plaga (4.940) and ictus (4.934) are words which Lucretius uses to describe ‘blows’ or ‘strokes’ in 
general as well as ‘cuts’ or ‘wounds’: ‘the overall effect is physical [and] perhaps very violent’ 
(Holowchak (2004),  558). Lucretius does not explain why this phenomenon only occurs during sleep, 
for surely we are continually exposed to these kinds of attacks? 
192 Bailey (1947), vol. iii. 1294: ‘this is not the direct effect of the blows, but as Lucretius Explains in 
the next two lines, the air causes changes in atomic positurae and that is the cause of the collapse.’ 
193 Holowchak (2004),  358 n26: ‘When the blow is not lethal, the vital motions prevail, stilling the 











‘irrational soul’ (which are quite clearly repositioned), noting that it conflicts with Lucretius’ 
earlier statement that, in sleep, ‘the mind remains vigilant’ (4.758: mens animi vigilat).194 It 
seems unlikely that this could be any kind of textual error or confusion since animus appears in 
such close proximity with anima on the same line (4.944: ‘…corporis atque animi. fit uti pars inde 
animai…’); Bailey suggests that animus could be being used here in the sense in which it is 
apparently taken to refer to the whole soul,195 but Lucretius tends to call the whole soul (anima 
and animus) the anima, rather than the reverse, and tells us that he does this (3.421-4).196 Again 
it seems unlikely that he would use animus here in an inclusive sense because of its textual and 
contextual proximity to anima. We have already demonstrated that preconceptions, or at least 
beliefs, take the form of rational events in the mind (animus) with an intentional aspect and that 
these assume a mediating role between external objects and their rational mental assimilation. 
Lucretius uses the word notitia, or ‘concept,’ to describe a range of mental applications: from 
ordinary preconceptions of secondary qualities like ‘colour’ (2.745) to abstract knowledge of 
concepts like ‘truth’ or ‘falsehood’ (4.496) which clearly inform rational applications. Lucretius 
does not appear to use a separate word for ‘belief’ or talk about beliefs in a concrete way, but 
does use credo to describe our believing in things which are non-evident using reasoning.197 The 
closest he comes to actually discussing ‘belief’ is credendum (2.1027) where he is explaining the 
                                                 
194 Bailey (1947), vol. iii. 1294: ‘animi is unexpected, for the animus is, as has been seen 757 ff., 788 
ff., unaffected in sleep.’ 
195 Bailey (1947), vol. iii. 1294: ‘animus may be used here in the inclusive sense of animus + anima as 
opposed to corpus.’ 
196 David West interprets this as meaning that ‘the words animus and anima are to be mutually 
inclusive’ (David West, "Lucretius' Methods of Argument (3. 417-614)," CQ 25 (1975), 95), yet 
proceeds to demonstrate that ‘animus and its synonym mens (3.94) appear in statements which would 
not normally apply to the other part of the soul.’ He explains the inclusivity as conceptual rather than 
arbitrary and it enables Lucretius ‘to draw deductions about the composite soul from propositions 
which apply only to one of its constituent parts.’ This is appropriate seeing that both parts of the soul 
share in the same atomic ingredients (as has been shown). 











discovery and formation of new truths (2.1023-47). There is nothing, he says, which is so easy 
to believe that it is not (at first) more difficult to believe; that is, all things are difficult to 
believe at first (neque tam facilis res ulla est quin ea primum | difficilis magis ad credendum constet, 
2.1026-7).198 Conversely, no new thing is so wonderful that it will not, over time, cease to cause 
wonder and become ingrained (2.1027-29). He then discusses the ordinary kinds of evident 
things to which we are routinely exposed: the sky, the stars, the moon and the sun; we are used 
to these things, because we have prepared proleptic concepts in our minds from exposure.199  
There are some things for which we are not prepared (ex improviso) and we will not eliminate 
these if we ponder them with judgement and find them to be true. Lucretius does not say here 
that we should judge any beliefs about these things, but that we should judge the things 
themselves which could only be done if we are already attending to them. Presumably we can 
attend to these types of things in the first place because we are able to construe other proleptic 
information gathered by the senses to extend arguments about non-evident things.200 Lucretius 
ends this passage with a flight of the mind (animus) through the universe as it extends its 
ἐπιβολή (animi iactus, 2.1047) ever onwards through infinite space, gathering and applying 
sensory information and seeking the ratio of distant things. 
 
In all cases notitiae, ratio and ‘beliefs’ are derived from the senses and are formed as patterns in 
the mind, i.e. the animus, which is as much a part of the body as the other sense organs; 201 and 
                                                 
198 I am taking both facilis and magis with the gerund. 
199 Because Lucretius juxtaposes these to things for which we are not prepared (ex improviso). Cf. 
2.744-45: scire licet nostrae quoque menti corpora posse | vorti in notitiam. 
200 See Asmis (1999), 287. 











it is the body which is physically assaulted in sleep. Bailey hesitantly offers a third explanation of 
Lucretius’ use of animus in his discussion of dreams, suggesting that the positurae of its atoms 
are changed but that this does not preclude its vigilance.202 He suggests that the reconfiguration 
of the organ may even enhance its vigilance; 203  his hesitation is because he can find no 
Epicurean doctrine which supports this theory. We might take a cue from Lucretius here and 
attempt to reason about things unknown by what is evident.204 As already stated, the mind is as 
much a sense organ as the others, and sense organs can become deranged such that they become 
commensurate with obscure parts of the atomic stream. If the positions of the atoms of the 
animus itself are re-arranged in sleep, then this mental derangement will make the mind, as a 
sense organ, commensurate with the ‘wrong’ parts of the perceptual stream. Further, this will 
explain why we encounter abnormal and novel mental visions in dreams: wonderful shapes, 
images of the dead (4.35) and dreams of those who are not present.205 These types of things do 
not always constitute the normal contents of the presentations we encounter in waking life, yet 
we are told that these images which form dreams are abundantly available all the time and in 
any given place (4.768-776).206 It is possible, I suggest, to be more precise about exactly why 
this particular example of mental derangement in dreams results in these kinds of presentations 
and so reinforce this hypothesis. Lucretius explains that memory is inactive in sleep, and it is 
memory which can rationally reject (dissentit, 4.766) incoming information such as that in 
images which present someone who is dead (which cannot be accurate because the person is not 
                                                 
202 Bailey (1947), vol. iii. 935. 
203 Bailey (1947), vol. iii. 935: ‘[this may] enable it to give greater attention to simulacra.’ 
204 Though the dangers of this form of inductive reasoning, possibly adopting a priori claims from the 
Eleatic School, are, however, duly noted (Asmis (1999), 286-94). 
205 See Diog. Oen. fr. 125-26 Smith = Epicurus’ Letter to Mother (Clay (1980),  353). 
206 Cf. Diog. Oen. fr. 9 Smith col. 4.5-6:  ‘dreams are created by the constant flow of images which 











present, 4.765-7). This must imply disturbance of the animus since it is the location of 
preconceptions that store this kind of memory which is responsible for mediation between 
concepts and solid bodies. The mode in which memory, in the form of repeated sense 
perceptions, is physically stored in the mind has been debated and has not been satisfactorily 
resolved.207 Some suggest that images physically enter the mind and that their particles are 
atomically retained,208 others maintain that it is preserved in patterns of arrangement of the soul 
atoms209 or in alterations to the kinesis of soul atoms without affecting their arrangement.210 
Kerferd’s objection to the second solution is that changes in the pattern of arrangement of soul 
atoms will interrupt the soul’s ‘psychicity’ (its capacity for sensation and thought)211 which 
depends on its special structure.212  While it makes sense the soul’s abilities depend on its 
specific structure, the case of memory or preconception need not preclude a finely tuned and 
organised arrangement, if we consider the probability that the whole organ’s capacity for 
rational perception, preconception and judgement is in fact dependent on its ordered, 
commensurate relationship with frequently arriving simulacra from the natural world. In other 
words, the special characteristics of the soul consist in this adapting and adjusting arrangement 
(formed and fine tuned from sensory evidence through accumulation) which conforms itself in 
accordance with its exposure to external reality. On this view, preconceptions and belief are 
compatible, if not identical, with this rational arrangement of the mental sense organ which 
explains how, in the case of the rational mind, the arrangement of the organ ensures that 
                                                 
207 See Kerferd (1971),  87-88. 
208 So Bailey (1964), 245, 417-419. 
209 Kerferd (1971),  87. 
210 So Furley (1967), 202. 
211 Kerferd (1971), 83. Kerferd coins this term from the Italian Psichicità to describe the soul’s 
essential and unique qualities; it does not seem to make the transition into later criticism. 











commensurate information is received, because preconceptions are stored concepts that explain 
why we seek things (ἐπιβολή) and expect successive images to conform to prepared types. This 
suggests a sympathetic relationship between proleptic arrangement and the natural order of 
external reality (for this is the order which frequently imprints itself on the mind): Lucretius 
explains in Books 2 and 5 why Centaurs, Scyllas and Chimaeras do not exist according to the 
fixed law of nature which places limitations on physical variation and this is evident (2.707: 
manifestum est). 213  
 
In dreams the mind (animus) is deranged and so (like other senses) it will receive deranged 
information; the more precise reason, in the case of the mind, is that this disordering is a 
disruption of proleptic arrangement which is responsible for directing ἐπιβολή and receiving 
images which are commensurate with our preconceptions. If our preconceptions are deactivated, 
as Lucretius implies they are, then we can no longer expect what will follow on from a 
particular image according to any preconceived concept; we are no longer prepared – instead our 
access to the external world is much more haphazard, disordered and volatile. In dreams we 
perceive wondrous objects (figuras … miras, 4.34-5) as if we are seeing things for the first time 
without preparation, a phenomenon described earlier as producing wonder (2.1033-5: si 
primum … | ex improviso si sint obiecta repente | quid magis his rebus poterat mirabile dici). Bailey’s 
interesting suggestion of hypervigilance is presumably to explain why during sleep the mind 
selects and perceives things which it does not ordinarily encounter in waking life, but 
preconceptions determine our mental selection and the expectations we attach to certain 
                                                 











impinging simulacra to the exclusion of others. These expectations normally involve 
simultaneous sensory scrutiny and elimination if they do not conform to plain sensory evidence 
and Lucretius explains that during sleep we have no access to the senses (4.763-4); so, even 
though we are exposed to the same images as we are when awake, we accept them all as real in 
the absence of sense criterion. It is clear that waking mental perception which, as we have seen, 
is not merely a raw perceptual act, but involves seeking images which are in accordance with 
stored concepts, is also subjected to the evidence of ordinary sensation, like vision, when we are 
awake. 
 
This is corroborated by Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 9 Smith col.4.7 - 6.1): 
 
col 4.7:        ... ὅτε καθεύ- 
δοµεν, τῶν αἰσ- 
θητηρίων πάντων οἱ- 
10  ονεὶ παραλελυµένων 
καὶ ἐξβεσµένων αὖθ[ις] 
[καθ'] ὕπνον, ἡ [ψ]υχή, [ἔτι] 
κ[αὶ γ]ρηγοροῡσα κ[αὶ γι]- 
  [νώσκειν οὐ δυναµέ]- 
col 5.1:  [νη τὸ] σύνπτωµα καὶ τὴν 
κ̣ατάστασιν αὐτῶν τὴν 
τότε, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτῇ προσι- 
όντα εἴδωλα ἐγδεχο- 
5  µένη, ἀνέλενκτον πε- 
ρὶ τούτων καὶ ψευδῆ λαµ- 
βάνει δόξαν ὡς καὶ κα- 
τὰ τὴν στερεµνίαν φύ- 
σιν ὄντων ἀληθῶν. 
10  οἱ γὰρ ἔλενχοι τῆς δό- 
ξης καθεύδουσιν τό- 
τε. ἦσαν δὲ οὗτοι τὰ αἰσ- 
θητήρια. ὁ γὰρ κανὼν 












‘When we are asleep and our sense organs are, as it were, paralysed and extinguished (in) sleep, 
our soul and mind within are (still) awake (and cannot distinguish ?) ... the occurrence and the 
(true) state (of these images) at that time, as it (the soul) receives the images that come to it, 
(and) about these it adopts an opinion which cannot be confirmed (by the senses) and is false in 
the sense that it interprets these images as realities in the same category as solid bodies. For the 
means to verifying opinions are then asleep. Now these were the sense organs. For (these are) 
the rule and criterion (of truth).’ (trans. Clay (1980), 363-4).214 
 
Diogenes explains that while the soul ([ψ]υχή, col. 4.12) is receiving impinging images (προσι-
|όντα εἴδωλα ἐγδεχο-|µένη, col. 5.3-5) it draws an opinion or a belief (λαµ-|βάνει δόξαν, 
col. 5.6-7) about all of them (πε-|ρὶ τούτων, col. 5.5-6) which is irrefutable (ἀνέλενκτον, col. 
5.5) because the refuters of opinion, the sense organs, lie asleep (οἱ γὰρ ἔλενχοι τῆς δό-|ξης 
καθεύδουσιν … τὰ αἰσ-|θητήρια, col. 5.10-13) and this opinion is false (ψευδῆ, col. 5.6) as it 
draws (λαµ-|βάνει, col. 5.6-7) this opinion as if it were conforming to the solid nature (κα-
|τὰ τὴν στερεµνίαν φύ-|σιν, col. 5.7-9) of true realities (ὄντων ἀληθῶν, col. 5.9).215 We are 
thus deluded in sleep, thinking that appearances during dreams constitute accurate perceptions 
of solid bodies in external reality and this thinking takes the form of false beliefs or suppositions. 
So the disorder in sleep is thorough: we are disposed, through mental derangement, to receive a 
disordered mental account of reality, our memory depends on an ordered disposition and is 
interrupted by this disorder such that the mind selects incoherent frequencies of the stream. 
Ordinarily such selections and expectations (which form opinions or beliefs) are rapidly 
eliminated by progressive evidence from the senses as part of the co-ordinated perceptual and 
                                                 
214 For a possible reading of the end of col 4., see Smith (1993), col. 4.13-5.1 ‘κ[αὶ | γινώσκειν οὐ 
δυναµένη’ and cf. Jürgen Hammerstaedt, "Zum Text der epikureischen Inschrift des Diogenes von 
Oinoanda," Epigraphica Anatolica 39 (2006), 11-13:  











cognitive process, but in sleep this is impossible. During dreams there is no escape from 
delusion (frustraminis, 4.817) because without the senses we consistently add large conclusions 
from small signs (4.816-7).  
 
I am careful to translate Diogenes of Oenoanda literally here. The present tense ‘grasps’ (λαµ-
|βάνει) is syntactically co-ordinate with the present temporal participle ‘receiving’ (ἐγδεχο-
|µένη), and the singular nouns ‘accident’ and ‘belief’ (σύνπτωµα and δόξαν) are opposed to 
the plural ‘images’ (εἴδωλα). Diogenes provides a special case. This appears to describe the 
arrival and reception of a single and discrete ‘thought’ or mental impression, forming a belief 
from multiple images. 216  The formation of the belief is participating in a co-ordinated 
perceptual act, and the model which moves temporally from perceptions and preconceptions (as 
prior acts) to beliefs and judgement (as secondary acts) is called into question. Lucretius 
explains that time is ‘parasitic’ for its existence on solid bodies, 217  perception of time is 
delimited by the perception of things (tempus item per se non est, sed rebus ab ipsis consequitur 
sensus, 1.459-60). Demetrius of Laconia says that time depends on the motion and rest of 
bodies218and for Epicurus time is a σύµπτωµα and can only be analysed by analogy (Epist. 
Herod. 72-3)219 and ‘viewed’ by ‘reason’ (Epist. Herod. 46-7): in the ‘times which reason can 
perceive’ (τοὺς διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους, 47.1), a body in motion does not exist in two 
places whereas in ‘perceptible time’ (ἐν αἰσθητῷ χρόνῳ, 47.3) we cannot grasp the distance of 
                                                 
216 Cf. Epist. Herod. 48: ὅτι ἡ γένεσις τῶν εἰδώλων ἅµα νοήµατι συµβαίνει. 
217 See Sedley (1999), 370. 
218 Sextus Empiricus Math. 10.219-27 and see Sedley (1999), 370. 
219 See Epist. Herod. 72-73 and see D. N. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, 











its movements between two points in infinite space (i.e. once the body is perceived it is already 
moved to a different location, 47.5). The minima, the arriving εἴδωλα,220 which constitute a 
present impression are perceptually non-existent and the event (Lucretius’ word for σύνπτωµα 
is eventum) is the smallest perceptual unit. Any authentic ‘priority’ of processes within the act is 
perceptually meaningless and sub-perceptual acts are all instantaneous. The status of the belief 
inside the perceptual act is ‘false’ because the senses are asleep and therefore sensory elimination 
of the image as a real one does not occur, the senses should identify the class of the image by 
correspondence (because the mind perceives one kind of image while the senses perceive 
another) and thereby differentiate between abstract thoughts or images and solid bodies.  
 
I suggest that mental-perception or belief formation, ἐπιβολή and judgement are effectively an 
instant act and that this explains why the mind as a sensory organ is not epistemically 
subordinate to the other senses (for no sense can refute another, Lucr. 4.483-488) since the 
formation of true ratio (which constitutes an instant mental impression) is internally subject to 
sensory scrutiny (inside a single perceptual moment) and should not form a solid (i.e. evident) 
presentation if the senses short-circuit this process; instead it will conform to a supposition. 
This clarifies why sometimes we may talk about the various movements between ἐπιβολή and 
true belief at the sub-perceptible level but why there is no temporal discrimination between 
them and why the act of ἐπιβολή instantly eliminates certain impressions, as the co-ordinated 
act includes judgement and determines the ‘total effect’. The same is true for words from which 
                                                 
220 There is an implicit analogy between the atomic minima and the sub-perceptible units in sensation 
(σee Sedley (1999), 375). The agglomeration of such theoretical  minima which make up solid bodies is 











we receive concepts, for in the time it takes to perceive something, which is the time it takes to 
utter a word, there are many ‘times’ (quia tempore in uno cum sentimus, id est, cum vox emittitur 
una | tempora multa latent ratio quae comperit esse, 4.795-6).221 Words need to form intelligible 
and internally consistent sequences for them to conform to a recognised type. 
 
Diogenes of Oenoanda makes clear that impressions exist in themselves as true natures 
(φάσµ̣α̣τα [φύσεις ἀλη]-|θεῖς)222 but what the mind receives in sleep is a secondary nature, or 
‘accident’ (σύνπτωµα, col. 5.1), 223  and the soul cannot assess the actual condition 
(κατάστασιν, col. 5.2) of these mental presentations in relation to present solid bodies because 
the sense organs are not simultaneously engaged. The images we receive in sleep form 
unfalsifiable mental impressions; the indication is that we only successfully form visual (i.e. solid) 
impressions in dreams because part of the process is missing – the verification by the senses – 
which would normally effect to in errupt this process and eliminate the image. The 
unfalsifiability of the δόξα means that the presentation survives the elimination process which 
is why we ‘see’ the image. This implies that some beliefs, at least, are subsumed within the 
minimum perceptual unit responsible for forming a presentation. We lock onto the ‘wrong’ 
mental images when πρόληψις is disordered224  and form the wrong impressions when the 
senses do not sub-perceptibly interrupt mental αἴσθησις and prevent it from becoming a visual 
presentation. This means, on the physical view, that if our beliefs are not internally falsified we 
                                                 
221 Cf. Epist. Herod. 47 on χρόνοι (pl.) διὰ λόγου vs. αἰσθητός χρόνος (sing.). 
222 Diog. Oen. fr. 9 Smith col. 1.6-7. 
223 ‘Accidents,’ cf. Lucretius’ eventa (1.450, 1.458, 1.467) as opposed to permanent properties 
(coniuncta = συµβεβεκότα), cf. Epist. Herod. 40, 68-73 
224 There is no ordered preconception (memory) in dreams and so belief formation itself is erratic or 











will actually form three-dimensional impressions of things which do not exist. This constitutes 
a hallucination by the synaesthesia of thoughts (mental impressions) as reality (visual 
impressions), and the implications of this are that any of our irrational and unwarranted beliefs 
have the ability to assume physically the illusion of present reality in those with pathological, 
diathetical imbalances and impaired senses.225  
 
This does not exclude every mental event as false. Diogenes’ problem is that, in sleep, images 
and beliefs are being drawn as if they correspond to natural solid bodies (fr. 9 Smith col. 5). A 
‘true’ opinion of mental simulacra would be one which is drawn preventing them from assuming 
solid form: if they are ‘natural’ mental images they should form thoughts (in the form of true 
beliefs) and not solids; if they are ‘unnatural’ mental images (i.e. the result of proleptic 
derangement) they should not even form complete mental presentations (an ordered 
constitution will not seek them), let alone visual presentations. The mental simulacra which are 
treated as visual simulacra are described by Diogenes as being drawn κατὰ φύσιν. Plato uses 
κατὰ φύσιν to identify the conformity of things or actions with their true nature or true 
opinion (i.e. κατὰ τὴν ὀρθήν)226 as opposed to conformity with other opinions (κατὰ πᾶσαν 
δόξαν) or contradictory to nature (παρὰ φύσιν)227 and this seems to be the sense used here. 
For the Stoics κατὰ φύσιν designates what is in accordance with nature and παρὰ φύσιν what 
is not, and this is related to moral character (προαίρεσις).228 Another relevant example comes 
                                                 
225 Cf. Lucr. 4.1020: fear of death becomes a real experience in dreams. 
226 Cra. 387a-b.  Cf. Diog. Laert. 10.33. 
227 E.g. Cra. 387a. κατὰ φύσιν is contrasted to both κατὰ ἡµετέραν δόξαν and παρὰ φύσιν. Cf. 387b. 
κατὰ πᾶσαν δόξαν is contrasted with κατὰ τὴν ὀρθήν. 
228 Gisela Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, (Cambridge: 1996), 200.  See 











from Sextus’ discussion of the Fourth Trope of Pyrrhonism, that circumstances or conditions 
alter perception (PH 1.101): he uses κατὰ φύσιν to designate the ‘natural state’ of perception as 
opposed to the supposed ‘unnatural state’ (παρὰ φύσιν); he uses similar examples of sensory 
derangement to Lucretius (PH 1.101.10: καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ µέλι ἐµοὶ µὲν φαίνεται γλυκύ, τοῖς | δὲ 
ἰκτερικοῖς πικρόν) and includes delusional delirium and divine possession (οἱ µὲν 
φρενιτίζοντες καὶ οἱ θεοφορούµενοι δαιµόνων). Sextus provides the Sceptic view that no 
state is more unnatural than the other and that the ontological existence of objects themselves 
is entirely relative to the subjective state of the receiver (e.g. waking or sleeping, PH 1.104). 
Epicurean ontology is not relative or variable,229 and, for Lucretius, contradictory perceptions 
are the result of attention to incommensurate parts of the stream (because of physical 
derangement of the animus) and malfunctioning belief formation (because of sensory 
impairment through disturbance of the anima or affectation of the sense organs themselves, or 
both).  
 
The world the sleeper experiences is a different one and this is a result of his subjective state, 
but Epicureanism differentiates epistemologically and ethically between healthy and sick (or 
compromised) states in the same way it differentiates between true and false belief.230 In the 
                                                                                                                                            
ζῆν’ (cf. Chrysippus: ‘ζῆν κατ' ἐµπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συµβαινόντων’ and Diogenes: ‘εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν 
τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ’) 
229 For Epicurus’ ‘general refusal to privilege the atomic ontologically over the macroscopic’ see 
Sedley (1999), 381-2. Cf. Polystratus’ response to Sceptical critics (De Contemptu, 23-6). 
230 Cf. Sedley (1999), 381-2: ‘accidental properties’ (i.e. σύνπτωµα) are not ‘per se existents.’ Cf. 30 
Us. = Plutarch, Adv. Col. 7, p. 1110C: ‘αὐτὸς γὰρ οὖν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν πρὸς 
Θεόφραστον οὐκ εἶναι λέγων τὰ χρώµατα συµφυῆ τοῖς σώµασιν, ἀλλὰ γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιάς 
τινας τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ µᾶλλόν φησι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀχρωµάτιστον 
σῶµα εἶναι ἢ χρῶµα ἔχον.’ Subjectivity does affect our perception of ‘accidental properties,’ but 
Diogenes of Oenanda’s description shows that these σύνπτώµατα are either in accordance with nature 











proleptically and pathologically disturbed sleeper, false beliefs physically supplant the reality of 
their bedroom and constitute ‘visions’ (conclusoque loco caelum mare flumina montis | mutare  … 
videmur, 4.458-462). The mechanism by which we obtain false impressions in sleep shows that 
the various processes involved in rational awareness, from ἐπιβολή to belief formation and 
judgement, are contained in the minima which constitute perception. For Epicurus, the 
φαντάσµατα of the dreamer and of the mad seem to belong to the same category (fr. 125 
Smith); both, then, involve derangement of the animus (which affects ἐπιβολή and πρόληψις 
and belief formation) and occlusion or impairment of the senses which is a result of a disordered 
anima. Hallucinations are a recurring theme in traditional depictions of madness: Pentheus sees 
a double sun; Orestes is pursued by Furies that no one else can see; Heracles sees Eurytheus 










                                                                                                                                            
Responsibility," in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, ed. James Warren, (Cambridge: 2009), 
151: ‘Famously, Democritus asserts that sensible qualities like sweetness, bitterness, and heat exist 
only ‘by convention’, whereas in reality there are atoms and the void (DK 68 B9). Because honey 
tastes sweet to some and bitter to others, Democritus infers that the honey is in itself neither. The 
Epicureans think that this eliminativism with regard to sensible qualities leads Democritus to deny that 
knowledge is possible. To avoid this scepticism, which would make life impossible to lead, Epicurus 
staunchly defends the reality of sensible qualities.’ 











Psychogenesis of Madness 
 
 
In the passage already cited in the previous chapter (fr. 9 Smith col. 4-6 [pages 48-9]), Diogenes 
of Oenoanda implies that our opinions or beliefs in dreams are false because they are being 
drawn as if they were both natural and solid (κατὰ τὴν στερεµνίαν φύσιν fr. 9 Smith col. 5.6-
9) and, as we have seen, similar expressions are used by Plato and the Stoics to designate natural 
things as opposed to the unnatural. For the Stoics, selection of natural things and rejection of 
unnatural things is not precisely identical to what is good or bad, as these ethical characteristics 
come with moral and rational development and maturity.232 Epicurean ethics identifies good 
and bad as self-evident from sense perceptions causing pleasure or pain on a fundamental 
level.233 The terms natural and unnatural can find their proper place in the Epicurean theory of 
emotions and the taxonomy of ‘natural’ and ‘empty’ desires which depend on the distinction 
between true and false beliefs (KD 29).234 An unnatural desire (ἐπιθῡµία οὔτε φῠσική) arises 
from an empty belief (παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν) and true beliefs conversely give rise to natural desires 
(ἐπιθῡµίαι φυσικαὶ). A scholium on KD 29 explains the canonical view: natural desires such as 
thirst can be easily fulfilled to alleviate pain; unnatural desires are insatiable, ultimately painful 
and predicated on false beliefs about their object’s intrinsic worth – examples include kingship, 
wealth and power. In De ira Philodemus implies that desires and emotions are connected and 
describes anger as the desire and anguish to exact revenge (δεινῆς | ἐπιθυµίας τοῦ µετελ|θεῖν 
                                                 
232 Sen. Ep. 121 and cf. Striker (1996), 200.  
233 See Diog. Laert. 10.33. Dem. Lac.; PHerc. 1012, 51.4-8. Cf. Voula Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, (New York: 2007), 17. 
234 KD 29 = Diog. Laert. 10.149: ‘τῶν ἐπιθυµιῶν αἱ µέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ <ἀναγκαῖαι· αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ 











καὶ ἀγωνίας, 8.24-26). Anger and the fear of death are both described by Philodemus as empty 
emotions; 235 empty anger (κ[ενὴν ὀργὴν) is bad (κακόν) because it results from a bad 
disposition (διαθέσεως γί|νεται πα[µ]πονήρου) and brings endless suffering (µυρία 
δυσχερῆ).236 
 
Philodemus explains that beliefs, or suppositions, create delusions (ἀπο]|φα[ί]νει ... [τῶ]ν 
ὑπολήψεων τὰς | ἀπ[α]τήσεις ἀπεργαζοµέ|νω[ν], De ira fr. 12) 237  and highlights the 
association of mental images with destructive emotions. 238  Defective beliefs affect our 
perception of the world and, as we have seen, when this includes sensory impairment, both our 
mental and our visual perceptions of external reality. False beliefs entail unnatural perceptions, 
invite unnatural desires in the form of empty emotions239 and so lead us to seek things which 
appear more than what they really are (like the examples of kingship, wealth and power). The 
angry person avenges himself imagining he is Apollo attacking the Niobids or that he is 
Dionysos punishing Cadmos (De ira. 16.18-26), and he is mistaken both in believing he is a god 
and that his revenge is justified.240 Voula Tsouna identifies such apparently symptomatic ‘mental 
images’ (e.g. imagining yourself to be a god) along with the feelings as one of the extra-
                                                 
235 Tsouna (2007), 40. 
236 De ira, 38.1-3. But cf. 6.14-15 (ψευδοδοξ[ίαν]) and Tsouna (2007), 43: empty beliefs are not 
identical with the passions.   
237 ‘Suppositions created the delusions.’ His use of ἀπεργάζοµαι (technically ‘complete’) is especially 
interesting in light of Diogenes’ implication that the formation of impressions can be interrupted.  
238 Tsouna (2007), 42: ‘pictoral thinking’ (but all ‘thought’ is constituted from ‘images’).  
239 Tsouna (2007), 43: ‘[false beliefs] persist as the intentional content of the emotion … [feelings] 
correspond to its affective content.’ 
240 See Tsouna (2007), 42 (and cf. De mort. 32.36-7 imagining the fate of your corpse at sea) – but 
another extremely important point here is that the children of Niobe and Cadmus are ‘innocent’ victims. 
Such delusions are the result of emotions which are described as dispositional or ‘content-sensitive’ 
states. Tsouna (2007), 38-39: ‘they involve one’s reactions to certain types of situations in accordance 











cognitive aspects of emotion (i.e. non intentional)241 contrasted to desires or beliefs, but it 
seems counterproductive to separate such mental images (‘imaginings’) from false beliefs since 
imagining oneself to be a god is similar to believing your revenge to be appropriate. Both of 
these are false beliefs because each of their objects is drawn as if it were natural when it is not 
(the angry person is not a god and his victims are innocent). Such mental imaginings do not 
simply accompany the violent emotions resulting from false belief; rather they are false beliefs 
themselves which are delusional perceptual effects.  
 
Unnatural desires or fears predicated on false beliefs always bring pain242 because they are empty, 
and they are destructive for this reason: they obstruct the ‘hedonic calculus’ and therefore the 
rational pursuit of pleasure which is the goal, for they are unattainable.243 Their unattainability 
can be stated in terms of perceptual delusion as it relates to reality and can be expressed at the 
atomic level in terms of those mental simulacra which coalesce and combine in the air to form 
new shapes: there is something added to these, no single referent can be found in reality and 
they are alien. These simulacra are also the content of supernatural and superstitious mental 
presentations like centaurs, Furies and the denizens of the underworld which cause fear.244 We 
will only experience such unnatural mental presentations consistently if we are proleptically 
disposed to seek abnormal images and so the formation of fully-fledged mental impressions 
(pictures, concepts, thoughts etc.) that are not in accordance with nature is a sign of a 
                                                 
241 Tsouna (2007), 41-2.  
242 Epicurus (KD 30) admits some natural desires are also caused by false belief but cause no pain 
(these are natural but not necessary).  
243 Tsouna (2007), 35, 38. 
244 Cf. W. V. Harris, "Roman Opinions about the Truthfulness of Dreams," JRS 93 (2003), 27: ‘dreams 











dispositional defect: we are having false beliefs concerning empty simulacra and our constitution 
is seeking things which are not real. Philodemus calls such defects vices (κακίαι): e.g. arrogance, 
flattery and greed - these are ‘stable dispositions’ to form certain kinds of beliefs and to behave 
in particular ways. 245  Vices and other character flaws such as irascibility (ὀργιλότης) 246 
pathologically prompt the formation of false beliefs precluding a correct understanding of nature; 
for Philodemus, all vicious people are irrational and unable to explain rationally their actions in 
terms of the hedonic calculus of pain and pleasure.247 Lucretius describes the faults (mala, 3.310) 
as the original traces of the nature of the mind (naturae cuiusque animi prima vestigia, 3.309) and 
relates each pathological tendency to one of the parts of the soul (heat, breath and air) 
explaining how each both dominates the mind and constitutes the natural character of various 
animals (3.294-306). What sets human beings apart from the animal examples is the capacity, 
through reason (ratio, 3.321), to all but eradicate any constitutional defects, and so these will 
not prevent us from living the good life (3.319-22). A higher order of reasoning is peculiar to 
human beings and is not available in the perceptual and cognitive responses of other animals.248 
Philodemus specifies that it is principally lack of ‘self-awareness’ which makes the vicious 
human being irrational:249 our rational powers seem to depend on our prolepsis of ourselves. It is 
clearly our rationality which enables us to develop morally and, according to Lucretius, to 
                                                 
245 Tsouna (2007), 32-4: ‘the vices are states that Philodemus describes as stable dispositions.’ Cf. e.g.  
De superb. 2.27: ‘the arrogant man has the disposition (διάθεσιν) to think himself as superior to others, 
to feel disdain towards them (6.29-30), and hence to express his arrogance in his actions and be 
generally hubristic (6.30-4).’ 
246 Tsouna (2007), 43. Philodemus does not appear to include all dispositions (e.g. irascibility) as 
‘vices’, but these are clearly dispositional states (e.g. De ira 34.20: δια[θ]έσεως).  
247 Tsouna (2007), 34-6: various examples. 
248 Konstan, Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude toward Grief, 1: ‘In ancient Greek, the relevant term 
is logos, and by and large philosophers, and probably most people, agreed that this was peculiar to 
human beings, and constitutive of what it was to be fully human.’ 











overcome the predispositions hard-wired into us from birth. 250  This involves the rational 
ordering of our desires and beliefs about the world, yet there is also an implication that the 
right kinds of desires are connected with something in our constitution which relates to what is 
natural. The Epicurean sage is not prone to the formation of false beliefs or empty desires 
because his constitution is delimited according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν).251 
 
Moral development over and above our innate constitutions seems to imply that rational beings 
exert some kind of agency over their atomic natures; we can alter or subdue our innate 
tendencies in ways that do not appear to be ‘predetermined by our natural endowment.’252 The 
simple ontology of Epicurean atomism raises serious concerns in relation to free will and agency 
with respect to metaphysical views on the relationship of the mind and body. A difficult passage 
in Book 25 of Epicurus’ On Nature253 preserved in three damaged Herculaneum papyri (PHerc. 
697, 1056 and 1191) concerns responsibility for action and psychological development and 
appears to try and reconcile human agency with our atomic nature. In a summary of the book254 
Epicurus distinguishes between internal and external causes for action (‘[τ]ῶν αἰτιων .... [τ]ῶν 
                                                 
250 Cf. Annas (1992), 129. 
251 548 Us.: ‘τὸ εὔδαιµον καὶ µακάριον οὐ χρηµάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγµάτων ὄγκος οὐδ' ἀρχαί 
τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάµεις, ἀλλ' ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν 
ὁρίζουσα.’ Cf. Konstan (1973), 63. 
252 Julia Annas, "Epicurus on Agency," in Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy 
of Mind: Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. Jacques Brunschwig and Martha 
Craven Nussbaum, (Cambridge: 1993), 67. 
253 Commonly known as liber incertus de libertate agendi. See David Sedley, "Epicurus' Refutation of 
Determinism," in ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ, Studi offerti a Marcello Gigante, (Naples: 1983) and David Sedley, 
"Teleology and Myth in the Phaedo," BACAP 5 (1989) and Annas (1992), 125 n5: ‘The text can be 
found in Arrighetti [34]; there are sections with translation in Sedley (1983); in Long and Sedley (1987, 
2:20 B and C; 1:20 j); and in Laursen (1988).’ See Annas (1993), 53 n1: ‘That this is its number has 
now been established by S. Laursen (1987) and (1989).’ 
254 The text corresponds to [34.30] 27 – [34.33] Arr. (with additions) and its present from with line 
numbers are found in Simon Laursen, "The Summary of Epicurus ‘On Nature’ Book 25," in Papiri 











δι' ἡµᾱς καὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ | τὸ περιέχον,’ 41-3) and relates each of them both to 
our feelings (pathological) and to ‘causes’ (aitiological).255 In his discussion of these Epicurus 
mentions that we have ‘after-sensations’ which have their origin in us (τὸ ἐξ ἡµῶν ἐπαίσθησις, 
10) and that the truth value of these are based on self-evidence.256 The capacity for after-
sensation, or perception,257 is described as a ‘permanent attribute’ (ἀΐδ[ι]ον, 15), a potential 
which ‘directs us at the beginning towards something else’ (ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἕ[τ]ε[ρον] 
ἀγ[ωγό]ν, 16) and these potentials (seeds) are responsible for our psychological development 
and ethical progress. Our after-sensations lead to ‘after-thoughts’ (ἐ]πινοηµ[ά]των, 27) or 
concepts and finally to ‘after-reasoning’ (τὸν ἐπιλογισµὸν) or empirical reasoning through a 
process which appears to depend both on ‘mechanics’ and on ‘conscient choice.’ 258  What 
Epicurus seems to be discussing here is a gradual formation from initial sensations and 
perceptions to our preconceptions or rational constitution, and finally its application in the 
form of reasoning through our beliefs.259 
 
                                                 
255 ‘κ[α]ὶ ὁ παθολ[ο]γικὸς | τρόπος καὶ ὁ αἰτιολογικός’ (43-44). This is presumably in response to 
criticisms like those of Sextus asking how pleasure can be found in ‘the heap of atoms’ that is the soul 
(Annas (1992), 125). 
256 Laursen (1992), 149. 
257 In Epicurus ἐπαίσθησις pertains to perception, without involving reason or logos: see  Elizabeth 
Asmis, Epicurus' Scientific Method, (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1984), 113, n21; 162-63. 
258 Laursen (1992), 153. 
259 See Laursen (1992), 153: ‘The philosophical schooling, now in progress, makes the pupil interested 
to grasp the full meaning of terms and phenomena relating to mental activity  - words, thoughts, “after-
thoughts”, representations and the ethical qualities connected with them. He therefore, as he has 
already decided to do by his “after sensation” above, starts his search for some criterium for his 
knowledge etc.: he possibly goes through yet another “after-sensation”, by which he acquires “after-
reasoning”, this is not clear. But he eventually ends in a little-by-little investigation of the problems 











Intuitively, a problem exists in reconciling a fatalist260 or at least predictable description of the 
world at the low atomic level with a world that permits what appears to be freedom of action 
and responsibility at the macro-level (if it is atoms and their motion which give rise to animate 
souls in the first place). Solutions to this problem are various, and Epicurus produces a 
commonsensical ‘self-refutation’ argument261 to assert that human beings are rational agents 
with some level of free will and that there are things which happen that ‘depend on us’ (παρ' 
ἠµάς).262 His argument is that human beings are a cause (αἴτιον) in themselves and that we 
cannot consistently argue against our prolepsis of ourselves as rational agents because to do so 
would undermine the validity of this form of argumentation in the first place—in order to be 
able to argue anything at all our reasoning must be ‘causally efficacious,’263 and so legitimise our 
practises of praise or blame.264 Sedley (1983, 1989) reads the argument as anti-determinist and 
anti-eliminativist,265 that the mind possesses emergent qualities, and as evidence of a breach of 
Epicurean physicalism. Annas (1993) interprets it to mean that human beings are ‘not just 
nodes in causal chains,’266 that there are ‘facts about atoms’ and ‘[irreducible] facts about human 
                                                 
260 Cf. Tim O'Keefe, "The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument of Epicurus' On Nature, Book 
25," Phronesis 47 (2002), 160: ‘Ι prefer to call it his “anti-fatalist” argument, because this avoids 
prejudging important interpretative issues. The person who thinks that all things occur of necessity is 
contrasted with one who thinks that some things “depend on us.”’ 
261 περικά[τω] | γὰρ ὁ το[ι]οῦτος λόγος τρέπεται, 34.28.1-2 Arr. = A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, 
The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 2, (Cambridge: 1987), 20C [5]. Annas (1992), 127: ‘He is using a 
standard ancient “overturning” argument. It involves what we would call pragmatic self-refutation’ and 
see Vatican Sayings 40 (Long and Sedley (1987), 20 D) and Annas (1992), 125-7. Lucretius uses a 
similar argument against refutation of the senses. 
262 Long and Sedley (1987), 20C (1). Cf. Epist. Men. 133.7. 
263 O'Keefe (2002), 166. 
264 i.e. The argument itself must be assessed on its merits to be successful or not. 
265 Annas (1992), 128 n16.: ‘… he conflates reductivism [reductionism?] with eliminativism and takes 
the argument to be stronger than it is, claiming that it shows that Epicurus was not only not a 
determinist but not a physicalist either.’ This type of self-refutation argument is similar to P 
Boghossian, "The Status of Content," Philos. Rev. 99 (1990), 157-84. 
266 Annas (1992), 126: ‘He begins from the fact that we have practises of praise, blame and the like, 
which make sense only on the assumption that we are agents capable of choice between perceived 











agency’ which are compatible but not identical, and this might make some sense on an anti-
determinist or anti-reductionist reading of the passage267 in which the protagonist argues that 
complex accounts of human action (like argumentation) cannot be reduced to simplex 
descriptions of necessitated atomic movements. However, the soul is not simplex:268 it is a 
complex mixture of atoms and the lacunal text clearly supports multiple readings of the 
argument, but it seems prudent to favour a weaker interpretation since atomic motion is surely 
not a mere ‘aspect’ of reality or psychological influence but rather, for the Epicurean, a well-
established truth. O’Keefe (2002) demonstrates that while Epicurus’ opponent thinks that all 
things occur ‘of necessity’ (κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκην), Epicurus sets out to show that there are things 
which depend on us (παρ' ἠµάς), precisely that we do participate in the causal network—this 
argument is essentially anti-fatalist and need not, in its weakest form, deny causal determinism, 
reductionism or epiphenomenal explanations of mental activity.269 
 
The Epicurean universe is, as already stated, materialist and entirely composed of atoms or 
particles, the atomist system is inherited from Democritus and is strictly determinist in its 
implications in that ‘physical laws governed all events.’270 Atomic motion, however, does give 
rise to various compounds, and among them, animate souls. In the surviving fragments of Book 
                                                 
267 Annas (1993), 128 explains that ‘the argument is more properly antireductivist than antideterminist,’ 
that there are ‘facts about human agency’ which cannot be reduced to ‘facts about atoms’ (i.e. they are 
not identical). 
268 See O'Keefe (2002), 159: ‘The soul has many capacities that individual atoms do not. It can 
perceive, deliberate, and feel emotions … A reductionist can accept that wholes have properties that 
their parts do not.’ 
269 See O'Keefe (2002), 169: ‘Epicurus nowhere in this passage says that, in order for an action to 
depend on us, it must not be antecedently caused .’ Sedley (1987, 20) inadvertently supports this view 
in supposing that Epicurus appeals to a version of the ‘Idle Argument’ and its potentially disastrous 
consequences in the hypothetical example of Democritus in Long and Sedley 20C 13-14 . Cf. the 
example in Stoic causation discussed by Bobzien (1998), 189. 











25 of On Nature Epicurus appears, on the surface, to refute pure atomic determinism and 
reductive physicalism, and to reject an ‘Identity Theory of Mind.’271 The main challenge, then, 
is to discover what exactly it is about our identity that makes us responsible agents or at least 
makes things depend on us (παρ' ἠµάς). It is difficult to sustain metaphysical attempts at 
solving the problem when Epicurean physicalism elsewhere means that any distinctions we 
might make in describing different parts of our mental identity can consistently be collapsed 
into descriptions of our atoms and their interactions—in Book 3 Lucretius elaborately defends 
the corporeality of the mind (naturam animi atque animai | corpoream … esse 3.161-2); indeed 
this is axiomatic to his primary argument in this book: against the fear of death. Lucretius’ 
account of the ravings of epileptics as a result of soul atoms tossed about like foam on a stormy 
sea (3.487-495) is another testament to this.272 Sedley (1987) provides an account of developing 
selves with ‘radically emergent’ properties which attain causal independence from their atoms 
and exert ‘downwards causation’ on those atoms; here the psychological ‘self’ is fundamentally 
different from its bundle of atoms and Lucretius’ atomic swerve is cited to provide an aperture 
for the special ‘non-physical’ causes of the mind in a manner which does not defy physicalism, 
but somehow takes advantage of the innumerable low-level atomic deviations predicted by the 
swerve to provide an account of volition.273 It is hard to imagine, though, an account of any 
mechanism by which volition could directly influence one way or the other any of the possible 
outcomes for atomic motion inherent in the swerve that is at the same time consistent with 
                                                 
271 See O'Keefe (2002), 153. i.e. similar to a ‘reductionist reading’: ‘the mind is a group of atoms in the 
chest, mental processes are atomic processes, and various mental capacities are explained from the 
‘bottom up’ by appealing to the intrinsic properties of the atoms constituting the mind and to their 
relationships to one another.’ 
272 See Tim O'Keefe, Epicurus on Freedom, (Cambridge, UK ; New York: 2005), 79. 
273 Long and Sedley (1987), 110; Sedley goes on to relate this superficially attractive theory to ‘modern 











Epicurean physicalism. While it is true that the swerve does weaken physical determinism on 
the atomic level so that any atomic motion potentially has various possible outcomes, it does 
not adequately explain how non-physical ‘psychological causation’ would actually work to exploit 
this uncertainty,274  especially considering that both Lucretius and Epicurus require that all 
causes, including mental events, depend on contiguous physical touch: ‘only bodies can act and 
be acted upon’.275 
 
Epicurus separates different aspects of ‘self’ in his descriptions of agency in Book 25:276 ourselves, 
our psychosomatic constitution (διάθεσις), ‘nature’ (φύσις), our ‘developments’ or ‘products’ 
(τὰ ἀπογεγεννηµένα)277 and our seeds (σπέρµατα).278 Together these terms are taken to 
inform a theoretically complete picture of human development and agency. He explains that 
from the very beginning (ἐκ τῆς πρ]ώτης ἀρχῆς) our ‘seeds’ (σπέρµατα) direct us towards 
various things and that these seeds are of actions, thoughts and dispositions (καὶ 
δια[θέσε]ων). 279  Our initial atomic composition is pluripotent in relation to the actions, 
thoughts and characteristics our atoms (i.e. ‘us’ / ourselves) 280  can produce and our 
predisposition to develop in certain ways depends on this initial make-up (i.e. on us, παρ' 
                                                 
274 For similar complaints against Sedley see O'Keefe (2002), 157 and J. Purinton, "Epicurus on the 
Degrees of Responsibility of 'things begotten' for their Actions: a New Reading of On Nature XXV," in 
Epicureismo Greco e Romano: Atti del Congresso Internazionale Napoli, 19-26 maggio 1993, ed. G. 
Giannantoni and M. Gigante, (Naples: 1996), 286-288. 
275 This is well attested: Lucr. 3.161-7 and see O’Keefe (2002) on Epicurus and Lucretius (157-8). 
276 Long and Sedley, 1987, 20C 
277 See O'Keefe (2002), 172: ‘Laursen (1998, 10) translates the term ‘products.’ Cf. O'Keefe (2002), 
172 n47: ‘Sedley translates the term as "developments." I follow Sedley (and most other interpreters) 
here and assume that the 'products' are mental states of some sort.’ 
278 Annas (1993), 55; Annas (1991), 88 and cf. Annas (1992), 129: the section of On Nature here is 
‘unfortunately fragmentary and difficult.’ 
279 Long and Sedley (1987), 20C (1-3). 
280 This takes for granted O’Keefe’s ‘Identity Theory of Mind’ and Annas (1992), 129 admits that for 











ἡµᾶς) 281  while our subsequent development will incorporate information we receive from 
outside ourselves, from nature, which is shaped by our beliefs which, in turn, come from us (καὶ 
τὰ | ἐ]κ το[ῦ περιέχοντος κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους] εἰσρέο[ν]τα παρ' | ἡµᾶς 
π[ο]τε γε[ίνε]σθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ὰς] ἡµε[τέρα]ς [ἐ]ξ ἡµῶν αὐτ[ῶν] | δόξ[ας). 282  What 
Epicurus seems to suggest is that we are responsible for our actions, thoughts and 
characteristics inasmuch as they depend on our developing selves together with our beliefs about 
the world.283 The distinction between our constitution and our developments is a crucial one in 
Lucretius, who stresses the importance of our ability to avoid or diminish whatever defects may 
be latent in our initial psychic constitution (usque adeo naturarum vestigia linqui | parvola quae 
nequeat ratio depellere nobis | ut nil impediat dignam dis degere vitam, 3.320-22). Human souls, 
then, are different from other atomic consilia in that their growth and development as agents is 
not accidental but depends on our beliefs that come from ourselves. As we have seen beliefs are 
directly involved in the formation of mental perceptions and this makes sense of the difficult 
phrase which says that things which flow in through the pores out of necessity from our 
environment also depend on us.284 This does not imply a breach of physicalism but rather shows 
that our developments rely on both external information and our internal beliefs. Philodemus 
(De ira fr. 12) also separates ‘necessity’ (τῆς ἀνάγκης) and beliefs (τῶν ὑπολήψεων), showing 
                                                 
281 Annas (1993, 55-44) suggests that παρ' ἡµᾶς (i.e. ‘depends on us’) is weaker than ἐπὶ ἡµᾶς (i.e. ‘up 
to us’). 
282 Long and Sedley (1987), 20C (4-7). 
283 Epicurus distinguishes between what flows in of necessity from the environment from what depends 
on us (παρ' ἡµᾶς). Cf. Susanne Bobzien, "Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus," 
in The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics, ed. B. Reis and S. Haffmans, (Cambridge: 2006), 212: ‘beliefs are 
certain structures of the atoms in the mind which make it possible that certain external influences can 
enter ourmind (and be thought, and reacted upon), whereas others cannot.’ 
284 Cf. Annas (1992), 130: ‘How they [rational agents] develop depends to some extent, though not 
totally, on themselves, on what they do with the information they take in, how they decide to react 











that false beliefs create delusions (ἀπατήσεις) because reason is abandoned (λογισµῶι τοί 
καταλειφθεὶς).285 We have various heuristic potentials and our developments depend on us, at 
first, absolutely (ἁπλῶς)286 and Lucretius stresses the importance of ratio (3.221) in modifying 
the natural state of our constitution. Reason (ratio) allows for our developments and 
distinguishes rational agents from wild animals which, according to Hermarchus, do not have 
λόγος, only ‘irrational memory.’ 287  Lions are naturally irascible because of their pyretic 
constitution and so are disposed to respond in anger to their environment and they have no 
choice in the matter because they are incapable of moral development.288 Another passage from 
Book 25 289  explains that in the case of animals their products or developments (τὰ 
ἀπογεγε[νν]ηµένα) and their constitution (τὴ[ν] σύστασιν) are conflated or entangled as a 
single thing (ὁµοίω̣ς ... συµπλέκοντες):290 
 
ἄν δὲ κ[αὶ] βαδίζη[ι] διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτου ἤδη α[ἰ]τίαν εἰς τὸ ὅµοιον τῆι ἐ[ξ] ἀρχῆς 
συστάσει φαύληι οὔσ[ηι]. ἔτι µᾶλλον ἐνίοτε κακίζοµεν, ἐν νουθετήτικῶι µέντοι 
µᾶλλον τρόπω[ι] καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ [τ]ὰ ἄγρια τῶν ζώιων, [κ]α[θ]αίροµεν µὲν 
ὁµοίως̣ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγε[ν]νηµένα [κ]αὶ τὴ[ν] σύστασιν εἰς ἕν τι συµπλέκοντες. 
οὐ µὴν ο[ὔ]τε τῶι νουθε[τ]ητικῶι τρόπωι καὶ ἐπανορθωτ[̣ι]κῶι οὔ̣̣τε τῶι ἄπλῶς 
ἀ[ντι]ποι[η]τικῶι χρώµεθα[ . . . . . .  ]µ[ . . . . . ]καθ[α]ίροµεν. 
 
‘If he, exactly because of the cause out of himself, goes in the direction of what is similar to the 
original constitution which is bad, we occasionally criticize him even more - and not in the way 
                                                 
285 For an examination of this passage see Anna Angeli, "Necessità e autodeterminazione nel De ira di 
Filodemo (PHerc 182 fr. 12 Indelli)," Pap.Lup. 9 (2000), 15-64. 
286 Long and Sedley (1987), 20C (1). 
287 Hermarchus, in Porphyry de Abstin. I 7-12, 26, 4. See O'Keefe (2002), 173-4 and Annas (1993), 66-
9. 
288 See John M. Rist, Epicurus: An Introduction, (Cambridge: 1977), 97 
289 Long and Sedley, 1987, 20j 
290 This passage has been revised from Long and Sedley’s edition. See Simon Laursen, "Epicurus On 
Nature XXV (Long-Sedley 20, B, C and j)," CronErc 18 (1988) and see Appendix Passage [B] in 











in which we exonerate those animals which are wild by conflating their products and their 
constitution alike into a single thing, and indeed do not use either the admonitory and 
reformatory mode or the simply retaliatory mode.’ (trans. O’Keefe (2002), 164). 
 
This passage is also interesting from another perspective; the opening conditional clause is 
added by Laursen (1998) to Sedley’s text and appears to introduce a case of abnormal 
development in rational agents. Whereas in animals we may conflate their developments with 
their constitution,291 in human beings we should distinguish between the two because ratio has 
a mediating role in our developments.  The person presented here has gradually developed in 
the direction of the original constitution (ἐ[ξ] ἀρχῆς συστάσει) which is bad (φαύληι οὔσ[ηι]). 
This person, though endowed with reason and therefore the capacity to develop flexibly, has not 
rationally developed towards ‘something else,’292 but has developed instinctively in line with his 
original constitution like Lucretius’ lion and may be blamed for this.293 This case study agrees 
with Philodemus’ description of the irrational or vicious person: his developments are aligned 
with the character flaws (Lucretius’ malae, 3.310) in his original constitution, this is a 
systematic error and his desires are determined by empty or false beliefs, and our beliefs are up 
to us: this is surely the meaning of ‘the cause from ourselves’ (τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτου ἤδη α[ἰ]τίαν) in 
the passage above.294 
 
                                                 
291 See Annas (1993), 61: ‘What it does is fixed by its constitution. That is, we take it that their 
behaviour is produced by instinct and that it is not open to the animal to develop in one way rather than 
another.’   
292 Here I am inferring the meaning from Epicurus’ summary given by Laursen (1992): ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς 
ἕ[τ]ε[ρον] ἀγ[ωγό]ν (16). 
293 A similar interpretation is found in O'Keefe (2002), 164-5 and cf. Annas (1993), 61-2. 
294 This ‘cause’ in ourselves need not be a sign that we must distinguish between our ‘physical’ and 











Another longer and more difficult passage from Epicurus On Nature Book 25295 elaborates the 
case of mentally disturbed or disordered agents. In this passage we are told that there are many 
developments (or products)296 capable of producing ‘this or that’ (πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶνδε καὶ 
τῶνδ[ε φ]ύσιν ἔχοντα ἀπεργαστικὰ [γί]νεσθαι). We criticise and attack these when they are 
in accordance with the nature which is disturbed from the beginning (κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
[τα]ραχώδη φύσιν).297 So far this passage supports the previous example, where blame can be 
attached to agents who develop along the lines of their original flawed constitution, and the 
passage agrees with Lucretius and Philodemus. The next part of the text causes some 
difficulties:298 
 
οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν εἰς ἔνια ἔργα τε καὶ µεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων ἡ 
τῶν ἀτόµων φύσις, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννηµένα τὴν πᾶσα[ν ἢ] τὴν πλε[ί 
σ]την κέ[κτ]ητ[αι] αἰτίαν τῶνδέ [τι]νων. 
   
‘For the nature of the atoms never did help them in any way to (perform) certain acts or to 
(develop) certain dimensions of acts and dispositions, but the products themselves were fully or 
for the most part responsible for these particulars.’ (trans. O’Keefe (2002), 172). 
 
This section appears to indicate a clear distinction in this instance between our atoms (here 
ἄτοµοι) on the one hand and our developments (ἀπογεγεννηµένα) on the other. Here the 
defective actions and dispositions (ἔνια ἔργα τε καὶ µεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων) of the 
agent are shown sometimes to be caused by their development rather than by their ‘atoms’ (and 
                                                 
295 Long and Sedley 1987, 20B 
296 Laursen (1998) argues convincingly that the subjects here are ἀπογεγε[νν]ηµένα. O’Keefe (2002) 
and Annas (1993) accept this suggestion.  
297 Long and Sedley (1987), 20B 2. 











these developments are later shown to ‘transmit’ this cause ‘to the primary natures:’ εἶτ' 
ἀ[να]διδ[οὺς] εὐθὺς µ[ὲ]ν [µέ]χρι τῶν [πρ]ώτω[ν] φύσε[ω]ν, Long and Sedley, 1987, 20B 6) 
hence Sedley’s interpretation of a radically emergent self, distinct from its atomic nature, which 
exerts ‘downwards causation’ on those atoms. Epicurus’ obscure jargon is notoriously difficult, 
exemplifying Lucretius’ well-worn analogy where language itself is considered as great a barrier 
to understanding such ‘Graiorum obscura reperta’ as the conceptual difficulties of the new ideas 
themselves (1.136f.), and the ‘dark findings of the Greeks’ are compared implicitly with the 
mental turbulence afflicting those uninitiated into the inner workings of Epicurean ratio.299 
Annas (1993) identifies key terms and concepts in the passage which are the source of 
conflicting interpretations of our identity because they appear to be discrete: the ‘agent,’ the 
‘atoms,’ the ‘developments’ and the ‘nature.’300 As Annas points out, these could be understood 
as different ‘aspects’ of the agent in the text and can be conflated in various ways, ultimately 
collapsed into the total self which is, she seems to maintain, atomic. The agent or ‘self,’ 
depending on context, can sensibly be identified with how we develop differentially over and 
beyond our initial psychic constitution where the self is identified as a centre of moral concerns 
connected with praise or blame, or the ‘self’ can, of course, be identified as the whole person: 
the parts which develop and the parts which do not.301 In the passage our developments are 
                                                 
299 cf. Clay (1983), 9, 40-5 on the ambiguity of Lucretius’ double journey and see Katharina Volk, The 
Poetics of Latin Didactic: Lucretius, Vergil, Ovid, Manilius, (Oxford: 2002), 115 on the De rerum 
natura as thus both an iter ‘primus’ and a ‘secundus’ and see 91: the respective ‘paths’ (and here Volk 
includes Memmius’ journey) are ‘similar structures bound up in similar processes’ and see David 
Konstan, "Lucretius on Poetry: III.1-13," ColbyQ 24 (1988), 67: ‘the "dark matter" refers both to the 
difficulty of Epicurus' doctrines and to the essential invisibility of the atoms posited by Epicurean 
physics, and the cross-reference illustrates the way in which Lucretius' claims for his poetry can seem 
to be in competition with the achievement of Epicurus.’ 
300 Annas (1993), 57. 











distinguished from the ‘atoms’ and yet our developments themselves, according to Epicurean 
physics, must be atomic, as indeed Epicurus implies.302 It is a question of terminology and here 
we can make a distinction between the whole self on the one hand, and that part of the self 
which subsists only in our differential developments (our ‘developing self’) on the other, where 
the latter is physically subordinate to the former which includes our ‘atoms.’ What Epicurus 
means by our ‘atoms’ cannot, therefore, be our whole selves (unless we introduce a metaphysical 
account of our developments) and seems far more likely to correspond to that part of us which 
does not apparently develop: our initial constitution.  
 
When Epicurus talks about the ‘nature’ he seems to use ‘nature of x’ to refer to the extrinsic or 
relational properties of different objects and according to Annas’ reading ‘the nature’ can often 
be substituted periphrastically for the object itself. 303  Here the ‘nature’ is most commonly 
attached to our ‘atoms’ and, as we have seen, our unchanging constitution and contrasted with 
our ‘developing self’. Annas argues for a progressive interpretation of what Epicurus calls our 
‘original constitution’ which consists of a compound constitution which is measured at each 
point before any mental event which involves receiving information from our environment, and 
is not the same as our ‘initial constitution at birth.’304 However we understand this, the overall 
picture presented is one in which the ‘atoms’ the ‘constitution’ and the ‘nature’ all refer, in some 
sense, to our constitution, i.e. that part of us which does not change and this is distinguished 
                                                 
302 Annas (1993), 60 on passages [20] 6-14 Arrighetti; [24] 3-15 Arrighetti – ‘The development itself 
has a primary constitution … [and] this is the same as the primary constitution of the atoms … and thus 
is itself atomic.’ 
303 Annas (1993), 57. 











from our ‘self’305 and our developments. This entire picture is of an atomic concilium in which 
certain aspects are separated conceptually by Epicurus306 so that he can assign certain properties 
to each for the sake of clarifying primarily those aspects of our self which are fixed at birth and 
those which consists in our developments.  
 
It is important to remember that, even with this distinction (between our atoms and our 
developments), these are, in the end, merely aspects of the same thing, the self, which is 
inevitably one atomic whole. The distinction that Epicurus makes, however, is of a seemingly 
irreducible duality in agents which have a ‘cause in themselves’ which is somehow separate from 
the ‘cause through nature.’ This might lead us to the uncomfortable conclusion that ‘they or 
their developments have a cause of a kind that does not reduce to the causality of their bodily 
constitution and its atomic make-up’307 and that agents ‘can bring things about in ways that 
cannot be ascribed to their atomic nature alone.’308 The familiar problem emerges between our 
‘physical and psychological’309  selves which is reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction between 
physiological and cognitive descriptions of the mind, but it is not enough to rely on the 
cognitive framework of desires and beliefs in a system on which ethics is subordinate to physics. 
Annas’ solution is to explain that it is in the very fact that our atomic natures undergo 
                                                 
305 As far as this may be said to subsist in our developments. 
306 See O'Keefe (2002), 174-5: ‘Thus, Epicurus recognizes that we can distinguish between different 
'things' in thought which are in reality all aspects of a single thing. We can distinguish the product from 
the atoms that make up the product, but this does not imply that the development is something non-
atomic.’ Here O’Keefe is commenting on another passage from book 25 (Arrighetti [11]), translated by 
Annas (1993), 59: ‘We could talk about this particular thing not just qua (hēi) assemblage, but also qua 
atoms and qua moving atoms or assemblage, not speaking only of the moving itself.’ 
307 Annas (1993), 62. 
308 Annas (1993), 63. 
309 Annas (1993), 63 uses this pragmatic description of selves as physical and psychological to attempt 












developments and are not static that the developments can be said to be distinct, but this need 
not imply that they are irreducible even in this relational aspect, yet, although we are capable of 
development, there is no obvious explanation as to what it is about our atomic constitution 
which makes it pluripotent, capable of differentiating with some freedom towards this or that. 
The problem is topographically reflected in Lucretius’ structural explanation of the soul where 
there is nothing which constitutionally divides the rational animus from the irrational anima 
apart from its fixed position in the chest:310 they are the same substance, but they are given 
different attributes.  
 
Epicurus does not seem to provide a readily available explanation for how it really is, atomically, 
that some part of us is able to respond in a rationally flexible way. The apparent distinction 
between the causal efficacy of the atoms (i.e. of those of the ‘original constitution’) and our 
developments in the passage from Book 25 (Long and Sedley, 1989, 20B 3) seems to imply that 
there is some extra-physical cause which supervenes on the atomic. O’Keefe (2002) has 
convincingly shown that some of the passages taken by Sedley to support this argument are 
amenable to quite different readings. Sedley takes our developments to be emergent and bases 
this on phrases from the last parts of the passage (Long and Sedley, 1989, 20B). The first of 
these comes from section 5 where Sedley reads that our developments take on some 
‘distinctness’ from the atoms (τινὰ ἑτερότητα τῶν ἀτόµων) but τῶν ἀτόµων could be 
taken as a subjective genitive: i.e. the developments take on some distinctness ‘within’ the 
                                                 











atoms.311 This interpretation suggests that developments are not separate from the atoms but 
rather a ‘complicated atomic structure’ within the atoms.312 The phrase cited from (20B 5) 
follows with: κατά τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν, οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἑτέρου διαστήµατος. Sedley 
takes διαληπτικον as ‘transcendent’ but the word need imply no more than ‘difference’ or 
‘distinction.’313 The phrase ‘οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἑτέρου διαστήµατος’ which Sedley takes to mean 
‘not like in the way that is viewing from a different distance’  - i.e. not in the way that colours 
(or συµπτώµατα) differ from atoms. Sedley has supplied ‘viewing’ and this is highly 
conjectural. Purinton interprets the phrase differently: ‘not in a way which is of a different 
spatial interval,’314 which changes the sense entirely: developments (or products) take place in 
the same location as the atoms: ‘the atoms and the product occupy the same space.’315  
 
The next phrase (20B 6) says that after these differential developments (i.e. different from the 
original constitution) the agent acquires a cause out of himself and this is immediately 
transmitted to the ‘first natures’ (ἰσχάνε[ι]τὴν ἐξ [ἑ]αυτοῡ αἰτίαν. εἶτα ἀναδίδωσιν εὐθὺς 
µέχρι τῶν πρώτων φύσεων). Sedley distinguishes between the cause (τὴν αἰτίαν) and the 
                                                 
311 O'Keefe (2002), 173-4. 
312 O'Keefe (2002), 174. 
313 O'Keefe (2002), 173. 
314 J. Purinton, ""Epicurus on 'Free Volition' and the Atomic Swerve," Phronesis 44 (1999), 293. 
315 This presumably means the same atoms. See O'Keefe (2002), 174. Another implication of the 
phrase ‘κατά τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν’ rests on the meaning of the word διαληπτικόν and its 
derivative, διαλήψις, which could mean something along the lines of προλῆψις; and διαλήψις can also 
mean ‘distinguishing in thought.’ See O'Keefe (2002), 175: ‘The Greek word from which διαληπτικόν 
is derived, διαλήψις, can mean simply a distinction of parts, but, as do many words that come from the 
verb λαµβάνω, to grasp, it often has overtones of some sort of mental grasp.’ Cf. 175 n54: ‘For 
instance, the Epicurean technical term προλῆψις  or "preconception," and the Stoics' "kataleptic 
impressions," the supposedly infallible impressions that are the foundation for knowledge.’ So O’Keefe 
translates the whole phrase: ‘Whenever something is produced that takes on some otherness within the 












atoms (which he interprets from ‘πρώτων φύσεων’). 316  Lucretius describes our initial 
disturbed constitution as naturarum vestigia (3.320), ‘traces of our natures,’ and to interpret 
‘πρώτων φύσεων’ as our initial constitution seems generally compatible with Epicurus’ 
argument here.317 Epicurus introduces a temporal term (εἶτα) which indicates a priority of 
processes: we acquire a differential cause out of ourselves in the form of a belief and this is 
transmitted to our primary disturbed constitution.318 We have seen that Epicurus may talk in 
terms of priority when he is discussing sub-perceptible intervals but that these can constitute an 
effectively instantaneous and co-ordinated act. The act of perceiving the environment and 
believing also seem co-ordinate and co-dependant in 20C 5-7. What Epicurus appears to be 
describing in 20B 6 is the incremental formation and consolidation of our προλήψεις from our 
exposure after birth to our surroundings, which is corroborated by O’Keefe’s interpretation of 
our ἀπογεγεννηµένα as ‘complicated atomic structures.’ The process describes ‘psychological 
integration’ 319  which depends on the arrangement of soul atoms, our beliefs and our 
environment as we have seen προλήψεις do.320  The summary of Book 25 shows that our 
                                                 
316 O'Keefe (2002), 176. 
317 There are other more convincing proofs of this interpretation, see O'Keefe (2002), 176-8: ‘Laursen 
notes that ἠ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σύστασις seems to be identical with ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσις ('the original constitution' 
and 'the original nature').’ 
318 Cf. Bobzien (2006), 218: ‘we ourselves become causes at the moment at which we – consciously 
– identify with an incoming idea or thought which is not in keeping with the beliefs we have so far 
taken in from our environment ‘unthinkingly’, as it were, and in accordance with the original nature of 
our mind. More precisely, when we identify with this new thought, we incorporate it into our mind, and 
thus change our mental dispositions; as a result, from then on our actions can be caused by behavioural 
dispositions that are at least partially the result of our identifying with something that was not part 
of our original constitution.’ 
319 O'Keefe (2002), 178. 
320 Cf. O'Keefe (2002), 179: ‘If the products are simply certain aspects of the mind (itself a body), 
which the mind acquires when the soul atoms are arranged in a particular way, Epicurus could 
consistently maintain that these features of the atomic arrangement do make a causal difference in the 
way the atoms of the body move, while denying that there is any sort of special "non-atomic" causation 
going on. The mind, at a certain point in its development, acquires the ability to take in information 
from the environment and to respond to that information. This ability will make the mind act 
differently than it would if it did not have that ability, and thus it does affect the atoms, without there 











developments track the psychological consolidation of perceptions as we move from ‘after-
sensations’ (ἐπαισθήσεις) and ‘after thoughts’  (ἐπινοήµατα) to reasoning (ἐπιλογισµός).     
 
In transient mentally disturbed states, such as sleep, it is proleptic derangement which is 
responsible for our seeking incommensurate parts of the atomic stream and thereby forming 
false beliefs. The descriptions from On Nature Book 25 show that although we are capable of 
pluripotent differentiation from the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἕ[τ]ε[ρον] ἀγ[ωγό]ν), 321 
sometimes we develop (or form προλήψεις) only in accordance with our initial constitution 
which is flawed (as in the case of the mentally disturbed), which in turn will entail false belief 
and invite delusions. O’Keefe (2002) suggests that the way in which we can receive differential 
information is though ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας (which Lucretius describes in Book 4 as our 
process of mental selection) 322  but ἐπιβολή depends on our preconceptions because these 
explain why we seek things, and so the argument regresses and it becomes difficult to see how 
rational and intentional flexible differentiation is possible in its initial stages. The process of 
psychological development is clearly a gradual one: 323 Lucretius offers a picture of development 
in Book 3 in which mental development tracks bodily development from infancy through to 
maturity and old age: the mind is initially weak along with the body (3.445-448), with maturity 
its powers are increased (3.449-450) and with old age, as the body is wrecked with time (validis 
                                                 
321 See Laursen (1992), 149. 
322 O'Keefe (2002), 166 n36: ‘This is what I think Epicurus is referring to (when) he says "the things 
which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us 
and dependent upon beliefs of our own making." The Epicureans talk about the epibolê tês dianoias, 
the "focusing of the mind," to explain how we can respond to the information that we take in 
differently from somebody else receiving the same information. For instance, Lucretius uses this to 
explain how we are able to focus on the image (e.g. a person walking) that we need to in order to do 
what we want (e.g. walking), out of the multitude of images constantly impinging on our mind.’ 











quassatum est viribus aevi | corpus, 3.451-2), so the mind fails and falls while the intellect limps 
and the tongue raves in delirium (delirat lingua, 3.453-4).324  
 
Passage 20C mentions that information comes from without through our pores (διὰ τοὺς 
πόρους) and these might explain how we form initial and irrational rudimentary coherence 
from the atomic stream. Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 9 Smith col. 3.6-14) explains that while we 
are asleep images penetrate through the pores of the sleeper. These pores are created through 
our repeated exposure to images we receive while awake (µετὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν πρώτων 
ἐνπτώσεις εἰδώλων ποροποιεῑται, 3.6-8) and as a result the soul is predisposed to receive 
similar kinds of images during sleep even if the objects are no longer present (καὶ µὴ 
παρόντων ἔτι τῶν πραγµάτων ἅ τὸ πρῶτον εἶδεν, τὰ ὅµοια τοῑς πρώτοις τῇ διανοία 
δεχθῆναι, 3.10-14).325 Lucretius provides a similar account (4.962-1014): constant attention 
(assiduas dederunt, 4.974) to certain things opens up passages in the mind (vias in mente patentis, 
4.976) and similar images can flow in. Lucretius shows that even animals are affected by this 
sort of perceptual exposure (horses dream of races, 4.987-8) and I suggest that this may be what 
Hermarchus identifies as ‘irrational memory’ (ἄλογον µνήµην).326 The pores are distinct from 
                                                 
324 Cf. Bobzien (2006), 215 on 34.24 Arr.; Laursen 1997: 28: ‘We may perhaps think of these 
necessitated developments as a kind of genetically directed ‘maturing’ of the mind. (Thus in this way it 
is determined that an individual develops a soul, and that that soul has a disposition and motion of a 
particular size.) We can imagine that with age our minds unfold to greater and greater complexity (in 
the combination of the atoms), and this means that we acquire more and more capacities and 
dispositions.’ 
325 See Clay (1980), 352-353: ‘What the new discussion of this same problem in Diogenes of Oenoanda 
supplies is the explanation of why the φαντασίαι or dream apparitions of people who are distant from 
the sleeper are to be equated with the apparitions of people who are at hand: they have originally 
created passages from the eye to the soul within and these are capable of conducting the same or 
similar appearances to the waking soul of the sleeper.’ 
326 See Annas (1993), 67. Lucretius makes it clear that animals have a mind (both mens and animus). In 
his account of the atomic swerve the race horse has a mens (2.265, 268) and an animus (2.170) also 
deer have a mens at 3.299. Hermarchus denies that animals have logos (Porphyry de Abstin. 1.12.5-6) 











proleptic arrangement in that they appear to be perceptual and do not in themselves constitute 
beliefs and Lucretius implies that memory lies inactive while this is going on (4.765). 
Perception may be distinguished (Diog. Laert. 10.34 = 260 Us.) in terms of the πάθη of 
pleasure and pain (ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα), these exist in every animal (περὶ πᾶν ζῷον), have 
to do with ourselves and our environments (καὶ τὴν µὲν οἰκεῖον, τὴν δὲ ἀλλότριον) and 
demonstrate our choices and avoidances (κρίνεσθαι τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγάς). Lucretius 
declares in Book 2 that nature demands (nil aluid sibi naturam latrare) that pain (dolor) be 
absent from the body (2.17-18) and Epicurus says that it is by our ‘experience on its own’ that 
we avoid pain (αὐτοπαθῶς οὖν φεύγοµεν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα). 327  Lucretius’ account of the 
swerve in Book 2 suggests that it is here that voluntas enters in and it is driven by voluptas 
(pleasure): unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas, | per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque 
voluptas (2.257-8). The verbal parallel suggests a strong connection between voluntas and 
voluptas328 and shows that our will perhaps consists in our initial and unpredictable perceptual 
responses (i.e. sub-cognitive affective responses to simulacra of pleasure and pain) which are 
                                                                                                                                            
(συνορᾶν) certain things but do not understand them and they cannot form prudential concepts. Annas 
(1993, 68) identifies a problem here that ‘memory does not seem to rely on inferential capacity’ and I 
think she is right to distinguish between reasoning and irrational memory: ‘Polystratus may be 
accepting that animals have irrational memory but denying them some more intellectual kind.’ 
Polystratus also insists (Annas 1993, 70) that ‘animals do not have inferential or reflective beliefs.’ Cf. 
Konstan, Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude toward Grief, 1-25. Konstan (1-2) shows that emotions 
depend on logos and these are distinct from our affective or perceptual responses which are common to 
humans and animals alike. Among perceptual responses he includes ‘sympathy’ and ‘parental love’ (cf. 
Polystratus: ‘animals have an appearance of the relevant things,’ (Annas 1993, 68) and these ‘arise on 
the basis of perception alone’ and are ‘instinctive responses’ (i.e. on my reading they will not involve 
preconceptions). These arise (3) from hard wired instinctive traits like agressivity (i.e. from the original 
constitution). Konstan (15) also points out that Lucretius ‘is not entirely consistent with his use of 
animus and anima.’      
327 Diog. Laert. 10.137 = 66 Us. 
328 A subtle yet emphatic link is made by the placement of voluntas and voluptas at the ends of their 
respective lines; they are metrically equivalent and there is only the difference of one letter which sets 
them apart; the implication is that, if pleasure is leading, then that is where we will voluntarily go, 












responsible for our differential 329  pursuit of pleasure. Lucretius suggests that this is the 
foundation of the cause within us (unde haec innata potestas, 2.286).330 The example goes on to 
describe race horses bursting from the starting gates (2.261-71), exactly what we find race 
horses dreaming of later in Book 4. Interestingly these physical channels are capable of affecting 
our waking visions (4.978-983): we might seem to see (videantur cernere, 4.979-980) swaying 
dancers or to hear the lyre or to be watching the theatre. This is an extremely important feature 
of the pores, one which seems to be overlooked in discussions of psychological development and 
its implications are disturbing. In my argument I have distinguished between mental delusions 
and hallucinations: mental delusions, or false beliefs, require proleptic derangement (i.e. some 
kind of disorder in the mind or animus); for delusions to cross the aesthetic barrier and invade 
our visual perception our senses need to be compromised. This passage in Lucretius 
demonstrates that exposure (or over exposure) to images not only modifies our proleptic 
psychology but also affects our various non-mental senses331 to the extent we seem to see things. 
This is disturbing because the aesthetic canon is meant to ensure that this kind of synaesthesia 
does not occur. Although the sub-cognitive effects of perception (i.e. πάθη) are usually 
transient, these appear with frequency to alter the epistemological guarantees of the senses and 
                                                 
329 The specific internal mechanism of atomic swerve, which accounts for our free action, is difficult to 
determine. See P. Conway, "Epicurus’ Theory of Freedom of Action," Prudentia 13 (1981), 81: (1) 
Bailey suggests that each free choice is caused by swerve and that this free choice is not irrational and 
random because overall the mind (a group of atoms) is rational – these atomic deviations can tip the 
balance in an overall reaction to a set of presentations. In the individual atom there is chance, in the 
overall movement there is ‘conscious chance,’ which to Epicurus is will. (2) Furley suggest a 
correspondence between Epicurus and Aristotle: the swerve breaks the ‘internal necessity’ of each 
individual’s inherited character; somehow the swerve allows us to reform our characters. (3) Long 
suggests that not every free action is preceded by an atomic swerve, but that the swerve is a source of 
new ideas, ‘helping the true Epicurean to initiate new actions in the pursuit of tranquility.’ It seems that 
the  
330 Notice, however, that the motivation for the horses to begin the race is expressed as a desire of the 
horse’s ‘mind:’ mens avet (2.265). 
331 Cf. Lucretius on sleep: Lucretius says that bombardments invade our pores (parva foramina, 4.940) 











so not only do false beliefs or delusions occur, but the beginnings of hallucinations. This feature 
points, I think, to proleptic psychological modifications which do alter our rational perception 
of the world and also to sensory derangement as a result of compulsive behaviour. Though this 
is illuminating and explains how it is through exposure that developments begin to form (and 
thus form differently depending on one’s environment)332 and how a pathological person may 
suffer profound sensory confusion, it does not explain how we might choose between this or that 
other than at the demands of nature. 
 
The dilemma is best expressed in different definitions of moral responsibility: that it means 
‘causal responsibility’ or that it means we can choose to do otherwise.333 The various passages of 
Book 25 show that our faculty of reason consists in the application of our beliefs about the 
world in our perceptions and so determining which of them will inform a preconception which 
is integrated into our constitution. The passage describing the mentally disturbed makes it clear 
that our responsibility is not with ‘the atoms’ of the original constitution but with the 
developments: they (the mentally disturbed) are ‘disturbed from the beginning’ (ἐξ ἀρχῆ[ς 
τ]αραχώ[δη] φύ-|σιν) and they are described as objects of rebuke (οἷς | δὴ καὶ µάλιστα 
µαχόµεθα καὶ | ἐπιτιµῶµεν)̣. The next sentence is consecutive: ‘For in their case the nature of 
the atoms has contributed nothing to some of their actions, but the developments themselves 
contain all or most of the cause of some of these things.’ This should not, I think, be read to 
mean that the the person is disturbed because their actions are caused by their developments and 
                                                 
332 Cf. O'Keefe (2002), 180: ‘That would help to explain why two people who have the same basic 
atomic nature develop differently - they respond to different inputs, to different environments, and 
hence develop differently. 











not their atoms,334 rather this is why we rebuke them. They are not responsible for their initial 
constitution any more than, say, a lion is, but we rebuke them because of how their 
developments have influenced their actions (because developments are complex and flexible and 
can be altered).335 The disturbed agent has developed along the lines of his original constitution 
(i.e. he is like a wild animal or an immature agent) and has not overcome his character flaws but 
instead reinforced them and developed false beliefs. The only feasible mechanism by which 
these abnormal developments could come about is through repeated exposure to the kinds of 
affective perceptual responses that the original flawed constitution produces.336  There is no 
indication of how we can control or limit our instinctive responses (i.e. avoid pathological 
behaviour) apart from our capacity to reason from nature and there is no reason to infer in 
Epicurus a moral responsibility which requires choice.337 This indicates that our practices of 
                                                 
334 E.g. Annas (1993), 65: ‘their choices are not made within the normal limits of constraint by our 
bodily nature [i.e. atoms], and thus are deviant’ (italics mine). The problem with this is that we are told 
that the natural initial condition of all animals’ constitutions is one which is already disturbed from the 
beginning. If we read ‘original constitution’ for ‘atoms,’ is this really what we want affecting or 
limiting our actions in the first place? There is a problem locating our ‘natural limits and desires’ in our 
unstable initial psychic constitution (as Annas seems to do here) when this is simultaneously the 
location of that those malae which must be suppressed in Lucretius (3.310).  
335 Ι.e. reading γάρ as consecutive on the fact that we rebuke the mentally disturbed and what we are 
given is simply an account of what makes us responsible and not what makes us mentally imbalanced. 
For this interpretation see O'Keefe (2002), 180: ‘I interpret this sentence as follows, given the context. 
Some people fail to develop in the way they should, and they behave in accordance with their original, 
disturbing constitution. For instance, some people, because they have an overabundance of fire atoms, 
are naturally quick-tempered and angry. Unlike lions, however, people have the ability to overcome 
this original tendency. Many people fail to do so. How do we explain this failure? We do not say that it 
is because of the nature of their atoms. After all, other people have just as great an original 
preponderance of fire atoms and yet manage to overcome this disposition. People who have the same 
basic atomic make-up develop differently, and it is because of these later developments that one person 
overcomes his natural anger and another does not. That is why, even though the "disordered motions" 
of anger are a result of the fiery nature of the person's atoms (C4), we do not place responsibility for 
these disordered motions on the atoms, but on the person's inability to overcome this disposition.’ 
336 Bobzien (2006), 208: “A preconception is some kind of veridical general conception or true opinion 
that we have acquired empirically, by having repeatedly the same sort of perceptual experience.” 
337 See Bobzien (2006), 207: ‘our sources univocally suggest that Epicurus had a concept of moral 
responsibility based not on the agent’s ability to do otherwise, but on the agent’s causal responsibility.’  
And cf. 212: ‘There is no trace of a concept of moral responsibility which takes it to be a necessary 
condition that we (the same persons, in the same circumstances) are capable of deciding or acting 
otherwise than we do.’ This is similar to the argument found in O’Keefe (2002), who finds On Nature 











praise and blame are therapeutic and non-retributive,338 they are useful tools in moral correction 
because they come from the environment and so have the ability to reform our character.339 The 
young, because they have yet not developed complicated belief structures, will accept the beliefs 
of others as ‘face value’ sensory information in the same way that they receive other kinds of 
perceptual information from their environment. 340  Epicurus advises, for example, that we 
should watch over the young to prevent them forming ‘maddening’ or insatiable desires (τὰς 
ἐπιθυµίας τὰς οἰστρώδεις),341 which should be compared to his statement that excessive anger 
begets madness. 342  Thus reason (ratio), once it has attained causal independence 343  from 
perceptions (these are progressively accumulated as preconceptions and inform our beliefs), 
operates independently as the cause within us, and our troubled constitution can be settled in a 
cognitive way. 
 
This also explains, from one perspective, why empty anger (κενὴ ὀργή or θυµός, which is 
expressed as a desire for revenge) is irrational (i.e. as an example of retributive and non-
therapeutic blame),344 but we also encounter what Philodemus calls ‘natural anger’ (φυσικὴ 
ὀργή) and this potentially has a didactic purpose. Philodemus says that empty anger ‘comes 
                                                 
338 Cf. Bobzien (2006), 210: ‘There is, then, one element all these passages on moral responsibility 
have in common: they connect the concept of moral responsibility with us as causal factors of the 
things for which we are considered morally accountable.’ 
339 So O'Keefe (2002), 180-1.  
340 See Bobzien (2006), 215-6. Cf. De ira. 37.32-9: natural anger, for example, arises ‘from an 
examination of what the nature of states and affairs really’ (trans. Armstrong).   
341 Vatican Sayings 80.  
342 484 Us. = Sen. Ep. 18.14. 
343 This is a distinct cause because it no longer relates only to present external stimuli. Cf. O'Keefe 
(2002), 183: ‘reason is predictable only to souls not to individual atoms.’ But ratio is predictable to 
atoms if we say that it is identical to complex atomic structures and demonstrate that our responsibility 
is causal.  
344 ‘Empty anger’ is based on the false opinion that any worthwhile satisfaction comes from revenge 
(that retaliation and punishment are intrinsically good) and the Epicurean would say that these things 











about from a bad disposition,’345 it is bad in itself and in the evils it brings. The Epicurean sage 
does get angry, but not very angry, he is subject to ὀργή but not to θυµός;346 this sort of anger 
may be a ‘good’ and it derives from a good constitution. 347  In relation to the distinction 
between our original constitution and our developments, we may distinguish between 
perceptual affects (πάθη) 348  and cognitive desires or emotions (i.e. just as Epicurus and 
Lucretius have been shown to distinguish between our instinctive responses to perceptual 
information based on our original constitution and our developments which form our ordered 
and rational response to the world). Natural anger, ὀργή, is a πάθος, but excessive and 
uncontrollable anger, θυµός, is the result of our developments and is a cognitive defect. All 
emotions are accompanied by pain, what Philodemus calls a δηγµός or ‘bite,’ a term probably 
derived from the Stoics, who use it to describe ‘feelings without assent,’349 but in Epicurean 
criticism often identified with a fully-fledged emotion.350 Feelings of pleasure and pain, though, 
                                                 
345 De ira. 37. 
346 See Don Fowler, "Epicurean Anger," in The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature, ed. 
Susanna Morton Braund and Christopher Gill, (Cambridge: 1997), 26. 
347 De ira 38.18. See James Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics, (Oxford: 2004), 195: 
there are ‘feelings which even the wise man will inevitably and naturally feel’ and cf. Elizabeth Asmis, 
"Philodemus' Epicureanism," ANRW 20.2 (1990), 2398: ‘it is good insofar as it attends a correct view 
of nature in general and personal losses and fitting punishments in particular. Against the Stoics, 
Philodemus maintains that anger is not always associated with false beliefs, but may result from true 
beliefs. If it attends the disposition of someone with correct beliefs, it is good in relation to the 
disposition, though bad in itself. A person naturally feels anger when insulted or harmed and it is good 
to admit this natural anger, and bad not to admit it.’ 
348 See David Konstan, A Life Worthy of the Gods: the Materialist Psychology of Epicurus, (Las Vegas: 
2008), 22. Konstan argues that ‘Epicurus deliberately restricted the use of the term pathos to the non-
rational sensations of pleasure and pain, as opposed to emotions such as fear that entail rational 
judgements.’ 
349 Konstan, Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude toward Grief, 16: ‘this has been the source of some 
confusion, since the Stoics employed the same term to describe the effects of pre-emotions, those non-
rational or instinctive responses, such as jumping at a loud noise, to which anyone, including the Stoic 
sage, would naturally react.’ See Graver (2007), 85 -108 (esp. 92-3 on feelings without assent).  
350 See e.g. Tsouna (2007), 48: ‘The Epicurean sage feels the 'bite' of a real emotion (which is more or 
less severe), whereas the Stoic sage senses the 'bite' of some pre-emotional state’ and Armstrong (2008), 
83: ‘They are all produced by a correct understanding that some state of affairs is true; they are not 











appear to be directly mediated by perception and are specific to the anima351 (whereas fear and 
joy depend on beliefs and are specific to the animus). 352 These natural feelings (πάθη) or ‘bites’ 
also attend rational emotional states (because, as we have seen, these are perceptual but involve 
beliefs and preconceptions),353 for example Philodemus (On Death 25 Kuiper) describes the 
natural bite (δηγµὸς φυσικώτατος) at the thought of the pain experienced by loved ones left 
behind after one’s death.354 It is for this reason that our characters may be reformed, even 
rational behaviours are accompanied by basic pleasure or pain and these will affect our beliefs in 
sufficient quantity. In the second part of De ιra, Philodemus relates actions in terms of what the 
‘wise man’ or sophos would or would not do; the Epicurean sage who is neither angry or irascible 
(ἀόργητος) may give the appearance (φαντασία) of being irascible and even Epicurus does 
this. 355  In De ira Philodemus refers (36.17-28) to another work On Freedom of Speech, 
Philodemus demonstrates that a wise person appears to get angry at the mistakes of neophytes, 
though will not suffer rage (θυµός). 356 
 
                                                 
351 See Konstan (2008), 12-15, 15: ‘The pâthe (i.e. pain and pleasure) are very elementary forms of 
awareness, operating at the level of the non-rational psukhê. They consitute the physiological basis of 
approach and avoidance, and are instinctive, pertaining as much to animals as to human beings. In 
themselves, they admit of no delibiration, no reasoning.’ E.g. the lion’s avoidance of roosters, an 
example of physical pain produced directly by simulacra: ‘The entire process occurs at the level of the 
non-rational soul’ (21).  
352 See Diog. Laert. 10.66 = 311 Us. Fear and joy are used as proof here that the animus is in the chest 
since this is where we feel the emotion. See Konstan, Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude toward 
Grief, 15 and Konstan (2008), 7: ‘These latter (fear and joy) pertain to the rational part of the soul; that 
is why our awareness of them in the chest proves that the rational part of the soul is located there.” Cf. 
Lucretius 3.141-2: ‘hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum | laetitiae mulcent: hic ergo 
mens animusquest’ and 3.145-146: ‘idque sibi solum per se sapit | id sibi gaudet, | cum neque res 
animam neque corpus commovet una. 
353 Tsouna (2007), 50: the bites of grief (which is, as Konstan argues, a rational emotion) ‘consist of 
both sensings and beliefs.’ 
354 Konstan, Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude toward Grief, 17-18: ‘The sentiment that Philodemus 
discusses in On Death is a kind of proleptic pain.’ 
355 See De ira generally 34.16 – 37.9. 
356 Fowler (1997), 28 and cf. Giovanni Indelli, "The Vocabulary of Anger in Philodemus' De ira and 











So we have seen that ratio is contained in our psychological developments357 and that these are 
stored structures of the information we receive from our environment (perceptions). 
Irrationality or madness stems from our common pathological diathetical defects and our 
differentiated developmental abnormalities (it tracks the former, though not necessarily, and is 
defined by the latter) and we have seen that beliefs are at least partially bound up in perception 
and are responsible for our delusions, which are dependent on our psychosomatic constitution 
which is also responsible for our desires and rational emotional responses. Philosophical truths 
are also counted as evidence or ‘signs’ and fall within our experiential ambit. We may attend to 
these directly, as the summary of On Nature 25 shows: we can have an ‘after-sensation’ or a 
perception of a philosophical maxim, and such perceptions are essential for accomplishing the 
goal.358 All dispositions and environments differ from one individual to another from birth 
onwards and according to Seneca, this leaves individuals who have developed cognitively in one 
of three situations:359 (1) some can attain ataraxia by their own impulses (ex se impetus) and 
efforts (e.g. Epicurus (si quaeris huius quoque exemplar, Hermarchum ait Epicurus talem fuisse), (2) 
some can easily follow in the footsteps of someone else (bene secuturos), and (3) some need force, 
or to be compelled to truth. Mental correction requires restructuring one’s prolepseis, and 
                                                 
357 Though exactly how self-prolepsis is achieved is somewhat mysterious. Perhaps this is the 
usefulness of Lucretius discrete positioning of the animus in the chest. The animus must receive 
sensory information via the anima (Lucretius uses the absurd example of the removal of the eyes to 
improve vision, Lucr. 3.367-9). The animus does not simply have direct sensory awareness, but these 
things, along with pleasure and pain, are transmitted to it. Perhaps this allows the animus to have a 
prolepsis of anima in a unique way. Cf. Bobzien (2006), 225: ‘our natural instinct to pursue pleasure 
may be helpful for adopting the belief that we should pursue pleasure.’ This broadly follows a 
‘homunculus argument’ and may be prone to some of the same problems of endless regress, see Gilbert 
Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (Harmondsworth: 1976). 
358 Laursen (1988, 149) clarifies ‘we should understand the essential phrase ‘what had its origin in us 
was the after sensation of the maxime’ etc. to mean that whenever someone is to accomplish what the 
book is about, he must do so by an ‘after sensation.’’ 












consequently, one’s beliefs and desires.360 For Epicurus this is a complex task, since our beliefs 
about the world are complex and inter-dependent, contingent on what has been a gradual and 
compound process. Therapy will require a complex, multi-faceted and convincing didactic 
approach that addresses gradually the complex total of our rational belief structure. 361 
Repetition is vital since preconceptions are only ingrained over time (and single thoughts which 
are not compatible with our beliefs are rejected).362 Bobzien rightly concludes that this explains 
the method of philosophy in the Epicurean school, ‘the practice of memorising the canon of 
Epicurean philosophy by repeating it again and again to oneself and others;’363 hence Epicurus’ 
advice to Menoecus (Epist. Men. 135) to repeat or ‘practice’ (µελέτα) the doctrines contained in 
the letter (e.g. the Tetrapharmakos) to prevent disturbances (διαταραχθήσῃ) both while awake 
and asleep, so that he will live like a god among men (ζήσῃ δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις).364 
Similarly, the Epicurean practice of producing a number of different arguments to prove the 
same point becomes comprehensible in this way.’ It is as if the therapeutic method must 
resemble the complexity, organisation and associative intersection of our proleptic developments 
which are responsible for false beliefs and the delusions they create.365 Human beings only 
                                                 
360 See Bobzien (2006), 223. 
361 See e.g. Bobzien (2006), 225: ‘For this (i.e. fear of the gods) I may have to rehearse the arguments 
against the existence of vengeful gods repeatedly, and as many such arguments as possible, and 
especially so, when the clouds get darker.’ 
362 See Bobzien (2006), 227. 
363 Bobzien (2006), 228. 
364 See Michael Erler and Malcolm Schofield, "Epicurean Ethics," in The Cambridge History of 
Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra, (Cambridge: 1999), 670-1: ‘Practise here must mean 
simultaneously verbal repetition and the attempt to put Epicurus’ teaching into effect. The last page of 
the Letter, for example, recapitulates the Tetrapharmakos: Menoecus will need to run through its main 
points in his mind over and over again, so that as they become settled convictions they will drive out 
the deeply rooted empty opinions which fuel fear of pain and death.’ 
365 See, e.g. Bobzien (2006), 228: ‘similarly, the Epicurean practice of producing a number of different 
arguments to prove the same point becomes comprehensible in this way. (Recall the twenty-nine or so 
proofs for the mortality of the soul in Lucretius, book 3).’ See also P.H. Schijvers, "Le regard sur 
1'invisible: Etude sur 1'emploi de 1'analogie dans l'œuvre de Lucrèce," in Lucrèce, ed. Olof Gigon, 











acquire reason by making generalisations or preconceptions (correctly or incorrectly) from 
discrete experience. However, reason is not discrete or simplex, and so it makes sense on some 
levels to use complex cognitive (i.e. non reductive) vocabulary when discussing emotions and 
emotional disorders and O’Keefe (2002) who puts forward an Identity Theory of Mind is forced 















                                                                                                                                            
Schrijvers, "Seeing the Invisible: A Study of Lucretius' Use of Analogy in De Rerum Natura," in 
Lucretius, ed. Monica R. Gale, (Oxford: 2007), 258: ‘the theory which flows to analogy or root 
metaphor relies on the selection, emphasis, suppression and – in general – the organisation of aspects 
of the primary illustrandum by association with properties of the secondary subject. This heuristic 
function of the root metaphor can be seen very clearly, in Lucretius’ argumentation.’ 














Epicureanism assumes that the central goal of life is to secure happiness or tranquillity of mind 
(ataraxia), to free the mind from all disturbances, pains and terrors (Lucretius’ terrorem animi, 
1.146 = 2.59 = 3.91 = 6.39), and so the vices or our pathological disturbances and subsequent 
cognitive and perceptual abnormalities are ‘diseases of the soul which must be cured.’367 These 
diseases of the soul are necessarily complex inasmuch as the soul is complex.368 Human nature is, 
from the beginning, disturbed and the remedy for this exists both inside and outside of 
ourselves.369 Memmius is probably an example of the third candidate for learning in Seneca’s 
divisions; he needs to be coaxed, as Lucretius demonstrates in the honeyed-cup simile where he 
compares himself to a doctor coating the rim of a cup containing bitter medicine with honey so 
that children might benefit.370 Lucretius explicitly identifies his own path as he writes his poem 
as following Epicurus’ godlike flight of the mind371 and so Lucretius can be shown broadly to 
                                                 
367 Tsouna (2007), 60. This is ‘considered in the light of a normative conception of nature an psychic 
health.’  
368 See e.g. Hershkowitz (1998), 2-10.  
369 See Nussbaum (1994), 30-31. Ancient accounts of ‘human nature’ are value laden accounts, ‘they 
select some aspects of human beings and their lives as especially important or valuable, deciding only 
then that a certain element should be counted as part of our nature … norms follow from an account of 
“nature” because the account is frankly normative to begin with.’ Cf. Procopé (1998), 171-2: ‘Epicurus 
too, though not a teleologist, could none the less speak in quasi-religious language of ‘blessed nature’ 
who makes it easy to obtain what is needful.’ 
370 Lucr. 1.936-950, 4.11-25. Note that Philodemus also perceives the philosopher as a kind of doctor, 
see Tsouna (2007), 60. Cf. Nussbaum (1994), 13, 132 on 221 Us. (‘Empty is that philosopher’s 
argument by which no human suffering is therapeutically treated. For just as there is no use in a 
medical art that does not cast out sickness of bodies, so too there is no use in philosophy, unless it casts 
out the suffering of the soul’) and Hershkowitz (1998), 6: ‘the division between what would now be 
termed philosophy of mind and psychology is non-existent.’  
371 This journey is developed over the course of the poem, instead of wandering the untrodden realm of 
the Pierides in a distinctly poetic image from book 1 (avia Pieridum peragro loca nullis ante | trita 
solo… ; 1.926-7), in book 3 we read that Lucretius is planting his feet in Epicurus’ footsteps (te sequor, 
o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc | ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis; 3.3-4); the path is 











represent each of the three kinds of character type. Lucretius provides a direct visual analogy to 
the troubling kinds of mental simulacra to which our disturbed minds are exposed: he describes 
clouds massing together and marring the sky at peace (ut nubes facile interdum concrescere in alto 
| cernimus et mundi speciem violare serenam, 4.134-5). Just as abnormal minds can detect strange 
patterns in mental simulacra, so we can discern strange shapes, giants and monsters in the 
turbulence of the darkening storm clouds (4.136-42). The imagery of clouds marring the 
peaceful light of the heavens is connected with Lucretius’ pervasive themes in the poem of light 
and darkness and of order and disturbance.  
 
The figure of Venus at the the opening of the poem who drives away the clouds (te, dea, te 
fugiunt venti, te nubila caeli | adventumque tuum, 1.6-7) and ensures tranquillity for mortals (tu 
sola potes tranquilla pace iuvare | mortalis, 1.31) is substituted in Book 3 by Epicurus who brings 
light out of great darkness to mortals, showing them the good life (O tenebris tantis tam clarum 
extollere lumen | qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda vitae, 3.1-2), and whose teachings 
disperse the the terrors of our souls (diffugiunt animi terrores, 3.16) by revealing all of nature 
(quod sic natura tua vi | tam manifesta patens ex omni parte retecta est, 3.29-30). The transition is 
gradual and has been shown to demonstrate a transition from species (or the outward appearance 
of nature) to ratio (reason provides the hidden inner workings of nature). 372 This movement is 
                                                                                                                                            
ramparts of the world (processit longe flammantia moenia mundi | atque omne immensum peragravit 
mente animoque 1.73-4). 
372 See E.M. Thury, "Naturae Species Ratioque: Poetic Image and Philosophical Perspective in the De 
Rerum Natura of Lucretius" (Ph.D Thesis, 1976), 140-146 for the ‘erosion’ of Venus imagery 
subsequent to the first proem. Cf. Hahn, E. A. (PAPA 72 [1941] XXXII-XXXIII); and see J.M. Duban, 
"Venus, Epicurus and Naturae Species Ratioque," AJPh 103 (1982) who observes the association 
between Venus and species (the ‘outward appearance of nature’ / ‘human observation’) and between 











precisely the kind associated with mental development as perceptions (i.e. from species) are 
consolidated into complex preconceptions (ratio), this can especially be seen in the shift from 
nubila caeli to animi terrores since this is the implication of Lucretius’ analogy in Book 4, and 
Lucretius’ therapeutic approach is suitable because it tracks our initial superstitions or false 
beliefs based on the prima facie appearance of nature (i.e. the figure of Venus) 373  and 
deconstructs these progressively into rational images, concepts and personifications. Venus is 
also linked with Epicurus through use of similar vocabulary and expressions: ‘te diva … te 
sequitur’ (1.13-16) anticipates the hymnic invocation of Epicurus in the third proem ‘te sequor, o 
Graiae gentis decus’ (3.3);374 the extensive use of second person pronouns are characteristically 
hymnic and at the same time provide a ‘syntactic framework for the substitution of Venus by 
Epicurus and the deification which attends such replacement.’375 The symmetry of imagery and 
language between these prooemia (in Books 1 and 3) is important because it is as if we are 
looking at the same scene but with modified perception, as if Orestes is made gradually to 
realise that he is looking at Electra and not the Furies. Venus is not a personification of the 
                                                 
373 Epicurus himself asserts the existence of the gods. Discussions dealing with the gods appear 
repeatedly at the beginning of Epicurean writings; see Obbink (1996), 4-5, gods are the subject of the 
first of the Kuriai Doxai and are at the beginning of Epicurus Ad Menoecum, cf. Lucretius (1.62-4), 
Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 34 Smith col.7) and in the first colon of the tetrapharmakos quoted by 
Philodemus (PHerc 1005, 4.9-14). Epicurus maintains that they are ‘supremely blessed’ and immortal’ 
(τὸν ζῴον ἄφθαρτον καὶ µακάριον, Epist. Men. 123 and see Obbink (1996), 5) yet he makes clear 
that they do not intervene in mundane affairs or in the workings of the cosmos on account of their 
blessedness. See Epist. Herod. 76-8 and cf. Obbink (1996), 7: ‘Epicurus states emphatically that the 
gods, being blessed and imperishable, could not conceivably reside in this world where they could be 
neither entirely free from care nor immune to terrestrial forces of destruction.’ Cf. Lucretius 5.146-7, 
illud item non est ut possis credere, sedis | esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis and see Cicero De 
Div. 2.40 for gods dwelling in the intermundia the interstices between kosmoi in the Epicurean universe; 
This view contrasts and develops the ideas of Epicurus’ atomist predecessors like Democritus (whose 
gods consist as virtually indestructable circumambient εἴδολα, larger than human beings, prophetic, 
and capable of conferring benificent or malific influence). 
374 See Duban (1982), 174: ‘The verbal link tua vi, so intimately connecting the powers which Venus 
and Epicurus respectively command, is one of many devices through which Epicurus ‘replaces’ Venus 
in the scheme of prologue three.’  











good life, rather it is Epicurus who represents the godlike ataraxia which we glimpse in the 
poets.376 The gods are not troubled by clouds and winds or by any terrors of the mind:  
 
apparet divum numen sedesque quietae, 
quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis 
aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina 
cana cadens violat semperque innubilus aether 
integit et large diffuso lumine ridet: 
omnia suppeditat porro natura neque ulla 
res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo. (3.18-24) 
 
Such deconstruction or rationalisation of things which appear at first sight to be something 
which they are not in reality is pervasive in Lucretius and can be translated into the language of 
empty desires such as love. Lucretius lists the emptiness of sexual desire alongside the natural 
and quenchable desires of hunger and thirst and the emptiness of dreams in a discussion of 
appearance and reality and his infamous diatribe against love. The lover ‘feeds’ on images 
emanating from the body of the beloved but love is deceitful (and women conceal their 
individual imperfections, 4.1171-91) and his desire attaches significance to what is nothing but 
simulacra, little ‘hopes’ that are often lost in the wind (nil datur in corpus praeter simulacra 
fruendum | tenuia quae vento spes raptast saepe misella, 4.1095-6).377 The verbal echoes in the 
prooemia of Books 1 and 3 are significant because they point to a degree of convergence at the 
the micro-level, an effect achieved through repetition and variation (both of which we have seen 
                                                 
376 The abode of the gods is an adaptation of the conventional Homeric description at Odyssey 6.42-6. 
377 Cf. Hershkowitz (1998), 173. Hershkowitz discusses love as a ‘crisis of engulfment’ (i.e. loss of self 
to the other) but in Lucretius’ account physical engulfment cannot be attained. Aspects of engulfment 












to be important in Epicurean therapy in the previous chapter). Lucretius draws the analogy 
between words and images of things in his discussion of perceptible time in Book 4: words 
correspond to perceptual units but many sub-perceptible times lurk beneath. 378  Lucretius’ 
modifications of words and letters suggest simulacric modification, or changes that affect which 
parts of some underlying atomic stream is grasped and the mimetic relationship of the textual 
surface of the DRN to the kinds of simulacra described within it has been well noted.379 In 
Book 2 (398-407) Lucretius makes an implicit correlation between the construction of a 
substance out of atoms of a different quality and shape, and the construction of words out of 
different qualities and shapes.380 Poetry is especially suited to Lucretius’ task because of its 
repetitive format; Lucretius can modify or tune the simulacric surface of the text and subtly 
alter our perceptions and associations. Lucretius will sometimes change the positurae of the 
letters within a word to effect his atomic manipulations of the mimetic stream. Sometimes this 
is marked by perceptual difference involving the guiding sensations of pleasure and pain,381 
sometimes the difference is not mediated by perceptual affect in terms of the feelings associated 
with the word based on its physical (i.e. atomic) qualities but by meaning and detectable only 
                                                 
378 quia tempore in uno cum sentimus, id est, cum vox emittitur una | tempora multa latent, 4.795-6 
379 See E.M. Thury, "Lucretius' poem as a simulacrum of the rerum natura," AJPh 108 (1987), 270-294 
and Jane McIntosh Snyder, Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' De rerum natura, (Amsterdam: 1980), e.g. 
1.196-8. 
380 See e.g. Snyder (1980), 92. 
381 Lucretius describes how pleasant substances (like milk and honey: uti mellis lactisque liquores; 
2.398) are rolled in the mouth and provide a pleasant sensation on the tongue (iucundo sensu linguae 
tractentur in ore; 2.399) because they are formed with smooth, round atoms, and are therefore 
appealing to our senses (ut facile agnoscas e levibus atque rutundis | esse ea quae sensus iucunde 
tangere possunt; 2.402-3); on the other hand, foul-tasting wormwood and astringent centaury twist up 
the mouth with their repulsive taste (…foedo pertorquent ora sapore; 2.401). Just as liquid honey is 
attractive to the senses because of its atoms, so the word ‘mellis’ is attractive because of the collocation 
of its letters, especially the liquid sound ‘l’ which is emphasised by the position of liquores (2.398) and 
linguae (2.399); the liquid sounds associated with honey are brought out in the honeyed cup simile in 
1.938: mellis dulci flavoque liquore. The words themselves are actually composed and arranged so that 












with reason,382 for example, in his deconstruction of amor to umor (4.1052-1057) which suits 
his rationalisation of irrational desires.383 We, non-Epicureans, perceive umor as amor and our 
perception is, on an atomic level, only minutely defective in doing so, yet the effects are 
disastrous and painful. Small modifications of internal atomic minima within structures (and 
therefore the images they shed) produce entirely different compound appearances (e.g. 
Lucretius’ example of ignis et lignum, 1.912),384 which applies to mental as well as visual objects. 
Interestingly here umor is not compared to another existent (as in the case of ignis et lignum) 
but to a supernatural non-existent. We are presented with a physical and mental manifestation 
of the desire: umor and amor (or, more appropriately, Love i.e. Venus: ‘haec Venus est nobis; hinc 
autemst nomen amoris, 4.1058).385 If we mistake umor for the mental image of love (with its 
various poetic connotations) or the goddess386 then we are commiting a grave error indeed and 
one that borders on synaesthetic madness, mistaking the physical for the mental.387 Lucretius 
proceeds with a description of how empty images feed love: when the object of desire is absent 
their images are still present (nam si abest quod ames, praesto simulacra tamen sunt | illius, et 
                                                 
382 In book 1 Lucretius describes invisible particles which can only be seen with ratio (in parvas igitur 
partis dispargitur umor | quas oculi nulla possunt ratione videre 1.309-10). Note that his use of umor 
in this explanation prepares us for its usage later. 
383 See Robert D. Brown, Lucretius on Love and Sex: a Commentary on De rerum natura IV, 1030-
1287, with Prolegomena, Text, and Translation, (Leiden: 1987), 64: ‘the woman casts love from her 
body and the man casts liquid into it’ and 188: ‘thus emphasising the physical essence of love.’ See 
also Snyder (1980), 95: ‘the blunt physiological reference in association of amor and umor is perfectly 
consonant with the treatment of sex elsewhere in Book 4, as, for example, when  Venus is used to mean 
membrum virile (4.1200 and 4.1270).’ 
384 See Snyder (1980), 41: ‘the two substances are composed, he says, of slightly different 
combinations of atoms, and the two words are composed of slightly different combinations of letters.’ 
Cf. Paul Friedländer, "Pattern of Sound and Atomistic Theory in Lucretius," AJPh 62 (1941), 17: on 
this argument contra Anaxagoras. 
385 See Snyder (1980), 94 and Friedländer (1941), 18. Friedländer takes haec (4.1058) with umor. 
386 Konstan (2008), 71: ‘In Lucretius, and in literature of the Roman republic generally, (amor) often 
had the sense of a mad and limitless idea or obsessive love.’  
387 It is important, however, that non-Epicureans do not ‘see’ Venus, rather, they might believe in her. 
This is a delusion or false belief. For this to cross the ‘synaesthetic’ barrier and become an 
hallucination our senses need to be compromised. In other words mistaking umor for amor is to 












nomen dulce observatur ad auris 4.1061). Lucretius’ use of nomen dulce indicates that this is 
probably a lingering perceptual affectation388 and it seems likely that this is the sort which 
initially creates pores by compulsive or obsessive activity (cf. per multos itaque illa dies eadem 
observantur, 4.978). Here our defective pathologies begin and here Lucretius cautions us to turn 
away (sed fugitare decet simulacra et pabula amoris | absterrere sibi atque alio convertere mentem, 
4.1063-4). The progression is gradual, the sore thrives (ulcus enim vivescit, 4.1068) and becomes 
fixed, presumably in our preconceptions (inveterascit alendo, 4.1068): this is compatible with our 
model of perceptions, pores and preconceptions. Lucretius describes this abnormal development 
as a growing madness (furor) 389  accompanied by pain (inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna 
gravescit, 4.1069). Lovers ‘confuse’ their first wounds with new blows (prima novis conturbes 
volnera plagis, 4.1070). 
 
Apart from this description (4.1070), conturbo occurs only seven other times in Lucretius and its 
usage is quite technical:390 three times in Book three (discussing the disordering of the soul 
atoms in alcohol intoxication and epilepsy), three times in Book four (once discussing the 
degradation and combination of words in the air over distance and twice discussing the psychic 
derangement of sleep) and once in Book 6 (describing the slow formation of gathering clouds 
which cause disturbance and compel change as an analogy for the spreading of the plague). 
Combined with the mention of plaga and volnera (which echo the language of psychic disarray 
                                                 
388 Cf. E. J. Kenney, "Doctus Lucretius," in Lucretius, ed. Monica R. Gale, (Oxford: 2007), 319: ‘a 
desire, prompted by a physical stimulus in which the mind has no part, to transplant seed from one 
body to another.’ 
389 Here I am following Indelli (2004), 103-110: Indelli identifies Epicurean ὀργή with ira and θυµός 
with furor. 











in somatic destruction and sleep from Books 3 and 4) we should interpret this instance as an 
account of similar mental disturbance created by blows (plaga, ictus) from without (this is the 
aetiology of somatic and psychic disturbance in the previous examples).391 Lucretius also uses 
the same violent words fairly often to describe impinging simulacra,392 most significantly in an 
example preceding this one where ictus is related to love’s wound:  
 
idque petit corpus, mens unde est saucia amore; 
namque omnes plerumque cadunt in vulnus et illam 
emicat in partem sanguis, unde icimur ictu, 
et si comminus est, hostem ruber occupat umor.  (4.1048-1051) 
  
Here we find the comparison of amor and umor. The body seeks what had wounded the mind 
with love. This is a conventional image of love’s wound found in the Greek epigrammatists and 
Euripides, and it also resembles the madness of Medea in Ennius,393 though, I think, he has 
carefully located it in both (Euripides’ ἐκπλαγεῑσ' and Ennius’ saucia).  Lucretius has adapted it 
to his purpose and the connotations in this passage are both military and perceptual. The 
wounded lover falls towards the direction of the blow like a wounded warrior and his blood 
spurts out just like the lover’s umor.394 This is a response to simulacra striking the senses395 and 
                                                 
391 E.g. plagae per parva foramina (4.940); Cf. unde icimur ictu (4.1050); (ictus in this context: 2.954, 
3.488, 3.636, 3.813, 4.746, 4.934). Not how often ictu occupies the final spondee of the hexameter. 
392 Cf. e.g. 2.136, 2.808, esp. 4.746-7 (facile uno commovet ictu | quae libet una animum nobis subtilis 
imago), etc. 
393 See Kenney (2007), 300-327. Kenney has shown that Lucretius draws extensively on the imagery 
and vocabulary of love poetry, especially Greek epigram, precisely in order to reject the ideal of 
romantic love, its idealisations and disillusions. See 316 on the Garland of Meleager and Love’s bow 
and arrows: ‘There is, it seems to me, a characteristically Roman immediacy and vividness about the 
word saucius; for the relatively colourless Euripidean ἔρωτι θυµὸν ἐκπλαγεῑσ' (‘her mind struck with 
love,’ Medea 8) Ennius in his version had given the emphatic and pathetic Medea animo aegro amore 
saevo saucia, ‘Medea, her sick mind wounded by savage love.’ Cf. Brown (1987), 191, ‘[the] 
application [of saucius] to the mens is highly novel.’  











the beginning of Lucretius’ discussion of sexual desire is located in his passage on dreams 
(where simulacra of a beautiful form strike the mind and produce ejaculation, 4.1030-1036); 
from the first love is positioned within the discourse of mental delusion and hallucination.  
 
Lucretius’ use of conturbo (prima novis conturbes volnera plagis, 4.1070) indicates psychic 
derangement whereby we mix up new sensory assaults as if they are connected to the initial and 
delusional impact of the appearance of the beloved. This indicates obsessive and pathological 
reception of incoming sensations and the kind of psychic disturbance that becomes assimilated 
to a mental disorder.396 Lucretius indicates that it is possible to interrupt this process while it is 
still in its initial pathological stages by diversifying our obession (volgivagaque vagus Venere, 
4.1071) or by turning our minds in some other direction (aut alio possis animi traducere motus, 
4.1072). This advice indicates that sex is not intrinsically empty, only the psychopathological 
desire called love. Love for Epicurus, comes from a natural desire, but the sort which can invite 
false belief in the wrong attitude about sex, a desire for sex with a specific person or even a 
specific kind of sex is misguided because it brings pain (i.e. it has an unstable object), it is 
neither natural nor necessary. 397  Epicurus distinguishes between the terms ‘natural’ and 
‘necessary’ which seem to be defined physiologically in terms of their expression of desires for 
objects that produce kinetic and katastematic pleasure respectively.398 Sex per se is fine, in terms 
                                                                                                                                            
395 Cf. mulier toto iactans e corpore amorem, 4.1054. 
396 Cf. Donald Reynolds Dudley, Lucretius, (London: 1965), 122: ‘Love was a source of disturbance, a 
ταραχή which must from the outset be separated from its pseudo-romantic attributes. Hence he 
embarks on his denunciation by way of its physical origins.’ 
397 See testimonies collected under 456 Us. And see Julia Annas, "Epicurean Emotions," GRBS 30 
(1989), 152. 
398 Fowler (1997), 25 and 25 n14: ‘Hence, Annas’ point (152 n16) that ‘we have as plausible a need for 











of its obvious kinetic pleasure, but love is predicated on unnatural, unnecessary and empty beliefs 
about the intrinsic and unique properties of the beloved. Lucretius (4.1073-1076) distinguishes 
between love and the ‘fruit of Venus’ (nec Veneris fructu caret is qui vitat amorem, 4.1073) and 
asserts that he who enjoys indiscriminate sex has all the kinetic benefits and none of the 
drawbacks (sed potius quae sunt sine poena commoda sumit, 4.1074). The kind of frustration and 
pain attendant on sexual desire for the particular qua particular will only offer transient 
pleasures and its long term pains will be an obstacle to katastematic pleasure; this is the kind 
typified in Catullus’ portrayal of his affair with Lesbia.399 Lucretius compares the madness of 
love to an insatiable hunger; whereas love is empty, hunger for food is both natural and 
necessary and can be easily fulfilled. 400  Love feeds on little images, fine and insubstantial 
thoughts which can no more fulfil desire than the dream images of water (laticum simulacra, 
1099) can slake real thirst (sitiens, 4.1097).401 Irrational passions stem from real needs but have 
an unreal or ‘misperceived’ object,’402 love’s object is like the dream of water, not water itself, 
even though it stems from a natural desire for sex. Similar images of frustrated, or empty, 
activity appear in Lucretius’ figurative mythological descriptions of the suffering of vicious and 
superstitious people in his finale of Book 3 (978-1023).403 The irony is that superstitions and 
                                                                                                                                            
clearly a natural desire, but I suspect Fowler is mitaken in suggesting there is no pain associated with 
abstinence. For Lucretius some can divert their attentions, others must divert their affections.  
399 See e.g. Catullus 86. The language of Catullus is remarkably similar to Lucretius here. Quintia is 
beautiful to others (in all of her features), but Catullus cannot reductively trace her beauty. Lesbia, to 
him, is totally beautiful but this is not physically qualified; instead she has, according to his delusions, 
‘robbed all the Venus from all other women.’  
400 See Brown (1987), 41. 
401 Konstan (2008), 70. 
402 Konstan (2008), 72. 











vices are simultaneously responsible for their suffering on earth and for their false belief in the 
reality of supernatural punishment in the afterlife. 
 
From the passage on the genesis of love it is clear that abnormal pathology and proleptic 
derangement are co-ordinate and mutually influential which should be expected: the initial 
presentation of the beloved is delusional; we mistake umor for amor and so are proleptically 
seeking the wrong images in the first place and not parsing the atomic stream quite correctly 
(this could be through genetic defect or perhaps a bad education in the poets). The pathology, 
as we have seen, requires a false belief which interprets new sensations as connected with the 
original impact (this further points to deranged proleptic seeking and the verb conturbo suggests 
this), these pathologically similar images presumably create pores, as any repeated exposure to 
the same thing would (this begins as a non-rational or sub-cognitive process and we continue to 
hear the sweet name of the beloved in her absence), and so our perceptions become increasingly 
compromised as these are consolidated, through exposure, into our rational proleptic memory. 
Lucretius emphasises that it is possible to avoid pathologies with our mind (simulacra et pabula 
amoris | absterrere sibi atque alio convertere mentem, 4.1063-4) which indicates that there is a 
point up to which ‘irrational memory’ (i.e. ἄλογον µνήµην) can be prevented from becoming 
thoroughly mentally integrated (inveterascit alendo, 4.1068) as madness (furor), before it is too 
late (ante recentia cures, 4.1071) through the involvement of the animus. The perceptual affects 













In sleep, sensory impairment depends on disturbance of the anima,404 which is responsible for 
sensation and the concomitant πάθη of pleasure and pain because of its connection with the 
body;405 the anima is connected with the outward physiological symptoms of the sufferer in 
other examples. In the case of wine (3.476-486), the anima is disordered (conturbare) by the 
violent force of the wine: vemens violentia vini | conturbare animam consuevit (3.482-3). That the 
anima is disturbed is inferred from the various outward symptoms:406 e.g. heaviness of the limbs 
(gravitas membrorum, 3.478), slurring tongue (tardescit lingua, 3.479), swimming eyes (nant oculi, 
3.480) and the drenching of the mind (madet mens, 3.479). These symptoms compromise the 
senses, most noticeably the wetness or deviant motion of the eyes,407 and so two criteria are 
affected: αἴσθησις and the πάθη which depend on it. We also see that the mind is affected 
(madet mens, 3.479) and so the remaining criterion (πρόληψις) is also compromised. Lucretius’ 
language, however, does not specify that this is necessarily an example of mental ‘derangement’ 
                                                 
404 Cf. 3.365: at dimissa anima corpus caret undique sensu. 
405 This is the point of Lucretius’ argument, see 3.143 (per totum dissita corpus) and 3.483 (corpore in 
ipso) and cf. West (1975), 95: ‘Nunc age, nativos amantibus et mortalis | esse animos animasque levis 
ut noscere possis, (3.417-18). Souls and minds and living creatures are etymologically connected.’ 
406 The implication of nisi (3.482). There is some debate over which is first affected in this example, 
body or anima. See Kenney (1971), , 141: ‘drunkenness attacks the anima directly (483) - which in 
turn affects the body’ (the last phrase is omitted in the 1984 edition) and West (1975), 105: ‘bodily 
afflictions affect the soul.’ The latter perhaps makes more sense in terms of Lucretius’ overall 
argument (in delirium, coma and epilepsy bodily afflictions seem to affect anima). These arguments, 
though, are awkward and we should consider that body and soul suffer mutual and simultaneous effects 
because their natures are physically entangled. Lucretius may distinguish subtly between cause and 
effect if only for the sake of argument (Epicurus also has a tendency to separate intellectually 
imperceptible causes and effects). 
407 nant oculi is interpreted as ‘wetness of the eyes,’ West (1975), 103. But see Bailey (1947), vol ii. 
1077-1078: ‘cf. Virg. Georg. 4.496: conditque natantia lumina somnus; Aen. 5.856 natantia lumina 
silvit.’ i.e. the state of the eyes just before sleep. This could be compared with one of the traditional 
symptoms of madness: ‘rolling eyes,’ cf. Nonnus Dionys. ὀφθαλµοὺς µεθύοντας ἀπειλητῆρας 
ἐλίσων, see Ainsworth O'Brien-Moore, "Madness in Ancient Literature" (Ph.D Thesis, Weimar: 1924), 
144 n1: ‘On rolling eyes as a sign of madness, compare Aeschylus P. V. 882 (10): Euripides HF 868, 
932; Orestes 253 (ὅµµα σὸν ταράσσεται); Virgil Aen. 7.399 (Amata); Seneca Aga. 714 (Cassandra); 











and he can infer only the disturbance of the anima from outward symptoms.408 Wine is sharp 
(vini vis penetravit | acris, 3.476-7), it brings heat (in venas discessit diditus ardor, 3.477),409 but its 
effects on the mind are not caused by its effect on the anima. The mind is drenched (madet)410 
and this indicates a direct physical action of the wine. The violent forces of the wine (vini vis 
penetravit | acris, 3.476-7; vehemens violentia vini, 3.482) share in the language of the violent 
forces that rend the body and soul (both animus and anima) in death and throw the whole soul 
into disarray in sleep.411  Inebriation is less profound than either of these states but clearly 
involves complications of the anima and the animus. Although the mind and the anima are each 
affected directly by intoxication, the example of love and Epicurean theories of mental 
development suggest that there will nevertheless be an on-going rapid exchange between the 
anima and the animus which results in gradual mental differentiation. In the example of love 
this process takes days to become a profoundly abnormal development (inque dies gliscit furor, 
4.1069). We should expect transient delusional mental effects to begin to emerge from 
perceptual disarray, especially if both the anima and the animus are temporarily compromised, 
and the passage indicates this might begin to happen: clamor singultus iurgia gliscunt (3.480).412 
There is confusion as to whether this phrase presents simply the effect of wine on the soul (i.e. 
gliscunt from wine) or whether Lucretius intends to show a progression within the drunken 
                                                 
408 See West (1975), 104 and cf. Kenney (1971), 141. 
409 See Kenney (1971), 141: ‘Epicurus himself held that wine might be either heating or cooling 
according to circumstances.’ This depends on the temperature of the body, see 58-60 Us. 
410 This is a common word to describe drunken states, see Kenney (1971), 142. Cf. Bailey (1947), vol ii. 
1077: ‘cf. Plaut. Truc. 855 si alia membra vina madeant, cor sit saltem sobrium.’ 
411 Cf. West (1975), 104. 
412 Cf. West (1975), 104: ‘Singultus are presumably the sighs of self-pity or maudlin sex; clamor and 











state (i.e. gliscunt from on-going psychic interactions aided by inebriation).413 I suggest both: 
clearly wine affects the soul, but sensory impacts through the anima, in this case a deranged one 
(cf. nant oculi, 3.480), can affect the mind although this is neither a necessary condition nor an 
immediate danger in the transient example of intoxication. The example of love’s cure shows 
that we are capable of differentiating our general mental state from our specific sensational state.  
 
Drunkenness was a popular subject for ancient philosophers and near the end of his extant 
treatise On Anger Philodemus compares the susceptibility of the Epicurean sage to anger and to 
drunkenness (De ira cols. 48-49).414 In his discussion of natural anger, Philodemus cautions that 
we should not confuse ὀργή with θυµός415 they are different kinds of things, it is not quite the 
difference between moderate and excessive, it is different in intensity and quality (δῆλον δ'ὅτι 
καὶ καθὸ µεγέθει καὶ καθὸ ποιότητι διαφέρει τῆς ὀργῆς οὐδὲ φυσικός ἐστιν ὁ θυµός, col. 
45.33-37).416 θυµός (furor) entails proleptic derangement (i.e. in the animus), ὀργή (ira) is 
associated with natural feelings (πάθη) (i.e. in the anima).417 The Stoic objection is that if there 
are stimuli which can make the sage angry, then surely increased stimuli will make him furious 
(if anger is proportionate to stimulus) and so even the sage would be susceptible to θυµός.418 
Philodemus responds to arguments that the wise man will become enraged no less than the 
                                                 
413 See Kenney (1971), 141: ‘mounting loss of self control’ and Bailey (1947), vol. ii. 1078: ‘it is noted 
that these are the expressions of three stages of drunkenness’ but see West (1975), 104: ‘Lucretius is 
not presenting the graded narrative of a single drunken bout from tipsiness towards insensibility, but 
rather a list of symptoms which support the inference that soul is affected.’ 
414 Indelli’s text has been updated and emended in Daniel Delattre, "Le Sage épicurien face à la colère 
et à l'ivresse: une lecture renouvelée du De ira de Philodème," CronErc 39 (2009), 71-88. 
415 De ira 45.37-46.5; though these terms seem fluid to some (e.g. the Peripatetics and the Stoics).  
416 Excessive ὀργή is not equivalent to θυµός, it sometimes lead to θυµός; the distinction is between 
natural and empty desires… Cf. Procopé (1998), 173.  
417 See Sen. Ep. 85. and Konstan (2008), 23-4. Cf. Fowler (1997), 23. 











common man (τινὲς δὲ καὶ θυµωθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν οὐχ ἢ τὸν κοινόν, col. 46.12) and one 
of these arguments (De ira cols. 48-49) is that ‘people of good company’419 and wise men get 
drunk alike, as do fools, and therefore if fools are liable to intentional anger then so are the wise. 
The implication is that wine as a stimulus is like anger. Philodemus objects with common sense, 
saying that if ‘people of good company’ and wise men are taken to be Epicurus and his circle 
then this is absurd (φλυαροῡσιν col. 49.1-2) because the critic is making observations about 
the wise on the basis of people in general and the logical conclusion of this argument will be 
that the wise man is not Epicurean: he will strive for glory (φιλοδοξήσειν col. 49.7), will fall in 
love and be plagued by many other ‘feelings’ (µυρίοις ἄλλοις συσχεθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν 
πάθεσιν col. 49.8-10) if they hold that (ὁµολογοῡνται col. 49.13) all people of good company 
(τῶν πάνυ χαριέντων col. 49.11-12) experience continuous ‘empty suppositions’ in succession 
(συνεχῶς κενοὺς στοχασµοὺς ἔχειν col. 49.12-13). If we argue that wise men are so ruled by 
feelings (this is inferred as there is a lacuna in the text) then he will be inclined to anger (εἰς 
τὰς ὀργὰς ὑπάρχειν col. 49.22) as much as those without reason (ἐνίων ἀλογίστῳ col. 
49.21) are since alcohol affects him in the same way as it does them (καὶ τὸ µὴ τῶν ἀφρόνων 
ἧττον τοῡτο πάσχειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐχ ἧττον αὐτῶν µεθύσκεται col. 49.22-26). Philodemus 
implies that the critics’ mistake may be with the way they define ‘drunk’ (καθὸ λέγεται µεθύειν 
col. 49.26). Wine seems to affect the non-rational part of the soul like a πάθος and, as in the 
case of natural anger, this does not amount to proleptic derangement and seems to show that 
the sage will have proleptic security against any effects being consolidated. This is compatible 
with the development of erotic madness which is a possibility but not an entailed effect of love’s 
                                                 











wound. Inebriation is a transient state and Philodemus implies that the wise man retains his 
ratio or λόγος. Even if we do interpret Lucretius’ madet as indicative of profound mental 
derangement, then the example of wine is like the example of sleep, only weaker in its effect: 
the anima and the animus are coaffected but not, from the outset, because of any mutual 
influence. 420  This is consistent with Philodemus’ argument. Once in this state we might 
hallucinate, but this is not the result of our developments; differential influence may result 
however: e.g. we may form mental prolepseis of large anthropomorphic gods during sleep421 
because of the impairment of our senses and these are the origins of our superstitions which 
may feed significant cognitive fears. 
 
Those things which affect the anima and the animus transiently are not sufficient causes of 
mental disarray because we have proleptic discrimination to some extent, and as Philodemus 
appears to confirm when he says that emotions are not involuntarily aroused (δραστικὸν αἴτιον 
col. 50.6-7)422 even by true impressions (e.g. τὴν ὑπόληψιν τῆς βλάβης col. 50.7-8). In more 
profound distress, such as delirium and coma, the effects are longer lasting (3.463-73). The 
passage speaks about the effects of disease (morbis in corporis, 3.463): the animus is deranged,423 
the mind strays (avius errat | saepe animus, 3.463-4) and is demented and brought into delirium 
(dementit enim deliraque fatur, 3.464). A few lines earlier Lucretius mentioned the delirium of 
                                                 
420 Contra West (1975), 102: ‘When body suffers disease, intoxication, or epilepsy, mind too suffers 
(and from those bodily afflictions).’ 
421 E.g. Lucr. 5.1169-1171 and 353 Us. 
422 De ira col. 50, i.e. it is an ‘efficient cause’ and not a ‘sufficient cause.’ Cf. e.g. Aristotle De part. an. 
1.1. 
423 See Bailey (1947), vol. ii. 1076: ‘animus is again rightly used in preference to anima, since Lucr. is 
again treating of the mind.’ See West (1975), 96: ‘Animus and its synonym mens (3.94) appear in 











old age (claudicat ingenium, delirat lingua labat mens, 3.453) and in Book 5 Lucretius mentions 
that men frequently speak in dreams and rave deliriously in disease (per somnia saepe loquentes | 
aut morbo delirantes, 5.1158-5.1159). In each case (delerium senilis and delirium morbi) delirare is 
used of raving speech.424 The tongue is animi interpres (6.1149) and delirat lingua is indicative of 
disturbance and deviation425 of the animus and this is much stronger than tardescit lingua (in the 
case of intoxication, 3.479). Sleep-talking and raving in disease are paired in Book 5 implying 
that the states are analogous, and so we might infer the same of delira fatur in Book 3. In sleep 
the animus and the anima are affected and the same seems to be true of the example of delirium 
here: the body is clearly affected in disease (morbis in corporis) and this should be taken as 
indicative of the involvement of the anima. In disease this comorbid state (i.e. simultaneous but 
independent affectedness of the animus and anima) lasts longer than in sleep or in wine 
drinking and, if both the animus and the anima are affected over a long period, we should 
expect abnormal proleptic developments to emerge as the senses can no longer guarantee that 
mental or visual images are interpreted correctly. In the case of delirium we see that the anima 
is affected (even though this is not stated) because sometimes as the mind withdraws426 into 
deep coma (interdumque gravi lethargo fertur, 3.465), the eyes and head droop (oculis nutuque 
cadenti, 3.466) and this is once again compared to sleep (in altum | aeternumque soporem, 3.465-
6).427 Again the cause of mental derangements here is not in any deviant or differential cognitive 
                                                 
424 Cf. 2.985: delira haec furiosaque for the only other example.  
425 The literal sense of delirare, ‘to wander from the straight in ploughing.’ See West (1975), 100.  
426 For the ‘withdrawal’ of the mind, note unde, exaudit and revocantes (3.467-468), see West (1975), 
102. 
427 Cf. 3.907, 3.911 i.e. a long time, see Bailey (1947), vol. ii. 1076 and Kenney (1971), 140 ‘unbroken 
sleep’ and cf. 3.921: ‘aeternum . . . soporem’ as death. See also West (1975), 102-3 that this makes 
Lucretius’ argument ‘more persuasive’ because coma is like a long sleep but can also lead to death, see 
Lucr. 3.472: nam dolor ac morbus leti fabricator uterquest. Disease destroys the body, therefore the 











development (though this could emerge from a protracted comorbidity of animus and anima) 
but from disease and this is the point of Lucretius’ argument: quare animum quoque dissolui 
fateare necessest, | quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi (3.470-1). The state, like sleep, 
clearly emulates cognitive madness and does so more emphatically than in the case of 
intoxication, the mind is caused to ‘deviate’ and the condition involves delirious raving and 
would, if sleep is any analogy, entail psychotic hallucinations with the concomitant impairment 
of the anima and the failing of the senses. Because this state is often protracted (it sometimes 
results in death) it could produce abnormal differential cognitive develoments. 
 
The epileptic is assaulted suddenly and very violently (subito vi morbi saepe coactus, 3.487), as if 
struck by a thunderbolt (ut fulminis ictu, 3.488); he foams at the mouth (spumas agit, 3.489), 
moans (ingemit, 3.489), his limbs tremble (tremit artus, 3.489), he raves irrationally (desipit, 
3.490), his tendons are strained (extentat nervos, 3.490), he twists (torquetur, 3.490), pants 
irregularly (anhelat inconstanter, 3.490-1) and wears himself out with his flailing (in iactando 
membra fatigat, 3.491). Lucretius endeavours to explain the cause of these physiological 
symptoms. The epileptic foams at the mouth: the anima is thrown into disorder and foams 
because it is torn apart throughout the body (nimirum quia vi morbi distracta per artus | turbat 
agens anima spumas, 3.492-3) by the violence of the disease (vi morbi, 3.492), it is like the 
surface of the salty sea (aequore salso, 3.493) boiling under the strong force of the winds 
(ventorum validis fervescunt viribus undae, 3.494). He moans because the atoms of voice are 
                                                                                                                                            
rorantes ora genasque, 3.469), this ‘seems to show that L. has in mind rather the week-long mourning 
ritual of the conclamatio: only when this has been faithfully performed was the corpse judged to be 











ejected from his mouth en masse (quod semina vocis | eiiciuntur et ore foras glomerata feruntur, 
3.496-7). He raves irrationally because the powers of the animus and the anima are deranged 
(quia vis animi atque animai | conturbatur, 3.499-500) and divided apart and flung in different 
directions (divisa seorsum | disiectatur, 3.500-1) by the poison (illo veneno, 3.501). When disease 
has retreated (ubi iam morbi reflexit, 3.502) and the sharp umor428 of the afflicted body has 
returned to its lair (reditque in latebras acer corrupti corporis umor, 3.502-3), then, little by little 
he returns to his senses (paulatim redit in sensus, 3.505) and recovers his anima (receptat, 
3.505).429 The violent symptoms indicate the involvement of the anima which is distributed 
throughout the body (per totum dissita corpus, 3.143), intermingled with the tendons (nervi 
3.217, 3.567, 3.691, 3.789) and responsible for moving the body (3.158-60).430 For Lucretius 
the anima (and the animus) is made up of air and wind atoms and Lucretius is using this to 
explain the foaming at the mouth which is caused by the windy turbulence of the anima which 
creates foam.431 The reason that the epileptic groans as the semina vocis are ejected is that the 
particles are located inside the body and forced out (cf. hasce igitur penitus voces cum copore nostro 
| exprimimus, 4.549-50).432 The sea is salty (salso) and I think this should be taken as more than 
‘a purely ornamental epithet on the Homeric model;’433 Lucretius explains that the saliva of the 
                                                 
428 See Charles Segal, "Lucretius, Epilepsy, and the Hippocratic On Breaths," CPh 65 (1970), 180 n 2. 
‘The Hippocratic On the Sacred Disease stresses the role of phlegm and bile.’ 
429 Bailey (1947), vol. ii. 1078 demonstrates the correspondence between this description and 
descriptions found in Pseudo-Galen (Medicus 14.739) and Celsus (3.23). 
430 See West (1975), 105. 
431 See West (1975), 106: ‘Lucretius is again exploiting the range of meaning of anima--wind, breath, 
soul.’ 
432 West (1975), 105 argues that this is the release of the anima since the anima is associated with 
breath at 3.432 (I’m not sure of any connection here) and breath is relevant in the decription of the 
production of sound in book 5.  











angry man is salty, and both Galen434 and the Hippocratic On Breaths435 use the image of a 
storm to describe the epileptic.436 The implication is that ‘salty’ atoms come from the foaming 
anima in the angry who also foam at the mouth.  
 
Lucretius tends to group his arguments together to demonstrate a point and all of these 
(intoxication, delirium and coma, epilepsy) deal with the malfunctioning of the soul and 
epilepsy is another example of transient comorbid disturbances of the animus and the anima. In 
the case of intoxication, delirium and coma the cause is external. In the case of epilepsy the 
cause is internal, some umor residing in the body. Though this is clearly tied to medical theory, 
I think Lucretius makes his point by demonstrating that this is like an external attack.  He 
describes it as being struck by lightning (ut fulminis ictu),437 a blow from without. Philodemus 
uses exactly this image directly after the statement of the critics’ argument about the 
drunkenness of the sage: just as the sage can get drunk naturally (µεθύσκεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, col. 
47.15), so anger must happen to him for the same cause (διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν ὀργὴν αὐτῶι 
προσάππτεσθαι, col. 47.16-18). He says: ‘nor is it because lightning struck the fool’438 (ὁ 
µάταιος γενόµενος κεραυνόπληκτος, col. 47.20) that he is prone to empty anger 
(συνέχεταί … ταις µαταίοις ὀργαῑς, col. 47.19) rather it is the case that this (i.e. empty anger) 
is brought about by beliefs (ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ὑπολήψεις τὰς προηγουµένας, col. 47.20-1). 
The general argument is taken to be that it is not from such external blows (and intoxication is 
                                                 
434 Comm. in Hippocr. Aphor. 17.2,554 K. 
435 252.55 Jones (Cf. 252.63). 
436 Segal (1970), 181. 
437 Cf. Hershkowitz (1998), 221 on the comparison between Caesar’s furor and lightning in Lucan’s 
Bellum Civile and cf. Seneca who compares (De ira 3.1.4) the intensification of anger to lightning. 
438 The word for fool here is µάταιος. Philodemus is linking the foolish person to the emotion of empty 











clearly similar by implication, and the other examples by further implication) that empty anger 
emerges but from false beliefs, and some will be driven crazy (ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐξίσταθ’, col. 
47.29)439 by these in the right circumstances.  
 
Lucretius uses the word ictu in epilepsy (3.488). These states resemble, in the vocabulary of 
Lucretius, the arrival and impact of simulacra on the soul:440 the selection and attendance on 
these requires proleptic engagement, but the impacts do not entail cognitive psychological 
disorders such as extreme anger, if we follow Philodemus’ argument; he says (col. 47) that the 
sage will be angered if he is harmed (πάντως µὲν ὀργισθήσεται, col. 47.36), inasmuch as 
anger is said to depend on thoughts like ‘I am injured’ (βεβλάφθαι δοκῶν, col. 47.22-3). 
Philodemus is intentionally sarcastic here since ‘empty anger’ (i.e. the kind the critics are 
arguing about) is not a mere result of such images but a deviant psychological apprehension of 
these and their consolidation into our minds. The sage can have a true understanding that he is 
intentionally harmed (ὁ σοφὸς ὑπὸ τινος ἑκουσίως ὑπολαµβάνει βλάπτεσθαι, col. 47.32-3) 
but just to the extent he has actually been harmed (τηλικοῦτο δὲ µόνον ὅσον βέβλαπται, col. 
47.34-5). So this sort of anger (i.e. φυσικὴ ὀργή) is transient (βραχέως, col. 47.37) and the 
sage never receives a presentation of being greatly harmed (διὰ τὸ µηδέποτε µεγάλης ἔµφασιν 
βλάβης λαµβάνειν, col. 47.36-8) since he never takes such external things to be very 
important (οὐδὲν εἶναι παρὰ µέγα τῶν ἔξωθεν ἡγούµενος, col. 47.40-1). Lucretius uses ictu 
to describe the first blow of love and the progression of love is like the progression of disease or 
                                                 
439 ἐξίστηµι refers to change or alteration and is often used of psychological disturbance (cf.  or to 
depart from one’s nature. Cf. e.g. Plato Republic 380 d: ‘ἐξίστασθαι τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας.’  
440 Cf. Philodemus‘συνεχῶς κενοὺς στοχασµοὺς ἔχειν’ for the fallacious explanation of the sage who 











injury, progressing from saucia amore (4.1048), ictu (4.1050) and vulnus (4.1049) to a developing 
sore (ulcus enim vivescit, 4.1068) but it is not a disease, rather a psychological psychosis: love 
feeds on images or beliefs (simulacra et pabula amoris, 4.1063) and madness can result (gliscit furor, 
4.1069). Physiologically the conditions of comorbid diseased states and sleep resemble the 
symptoms of extreme emotional states like anger or love. The angry person foams at the mouth, 
his saliva is salty, his sinews are stretched and his eyes flash: all of these point to physical 
turbulence in the anima and fiery atoms and ‘salty’ atoms are brought forth from there. Extreme 
(i.e. empty) anger also requires a disproportionate response to a perceived harm in the form of 
an empty desire for revenge: this indicates proleptic derangement of the animus; the 
constitution of the sage is not susceptible to this. Love also has a physiological effect: Lucretius 
uses the language of blinding (4.1113, 1146-49) and debilitation (4.1114, 1121) and this 
indicates that the anima is involved.441 But whereas intoxication, disease and epilepsy come as if 
from without, extreme emotions (e.g. empty anger and love) come from within and, as we have 
seen, are the result of abnormal psychological development.   
 
It is important that Lucretius never uses the word furor to describe any of the states of disease 
or intoxication in Book 3. He only uses it later for a furor which he says is ‘peculiar to the mind’ 
(adde furorem animi proprium, 3.828); this does not have to do with bodily disease (praeter enim 
quam quod morbis cum corporis aegret, 3.824), it is rather associated with fully fledged cognitive 
emotions: something often comes that torments the mind about the future (advenit id quod eam 
de rebus saepe futuris | macerat, 3.825-6), holds it in fear (inque metu male habet, 3.826) and 
                                                 











wearies it with anxiety (curisque fatigat, 3.826). These kinds of prudential cognitive concepts are 
the sort which Hermarchus denies non-rational animals and which are located in the animus. 
Lucretius also uses furor in Book 4 to describe the madness of love but the animals who 
copulate under the directions of Venus in Book 1 do not suffer the furor of the lovers in Book 4 
despite the violence of their attacks of passion (e.g. omnibus incutiens blandum per pectora 
amorem, 1.19).442 It is only once Lucretius has tracked differential psychological development 
from the first appearances of things (species) in Book 1 to their inner workings (ratio) in Book 3 
that a deviant development called love becomes associated with abnormal mental development 
and a madness special to rational human beings emerges. Lucretius also uses the word rabies 
alongside furor to describe the madness of the lover in Book 4: rabies, ‘beastlike fury’ is 
sometimes used in the context of war, but usually applies to animals.443 The implication here is 
that we are in a state of cognitive madness which is like the state of some animals, but the 
animals are not mad (since they are incapable of reason) whereas we have developed ‘along the 
lines of our original constitution.’ One needs to be capable of reason to be truly insane. 
 
So sometimes, as in the case of love, images are transmitted to the animus pathologically, i.e. 
with sufficient frequency to cause profound proleptic derangement, but this is possible for us to 
avoid if caught in time. Lucretius shows that sometimes extreme emotions (examples of 
                                                 
442 See Brown (1987), 191. 
443 See Timothy A. Joseph, "Tacitus and Epic," in A Companion to Tacitus, ed. Victoria Emma Pagán, 
(Oxford: 2012), 377-83 for a comparison of furor and rabies. Both Tacitus (Hist. 1.63.1: furore et rabie) 
and Lucan (BC 4.240: redeunt rabiesque furorque; BC 7.551, 10.72) use these words in combination to 
‘convey a type of compounded, redoubling “super” madness’ (380), ‘rabies is a condition appropriate 











proleptic derangement), even though these are peculiar to the animus once formed,444 can affect 
the anima – and this is particularly interesting. That the anima is affected is evident by the 
outward symptoms of the man whose mind is afflicted by tremendous fear: 
 
…ubi vementi magis est commota metu mens 
consentire animam totam per membra videmus 
sudoresque ita palloremque existere toto 
corpore et infringi linguam vocem aboriri, 
caligare oculos, sonere auris, succidere artus, 
denique concidere ex animi terrore videmus  
saepe homines; facile ut quivis hinc noscere possit 
esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi vi 
percussast, exim corpus propellit et icit.  (3.152-160) 
 
In this state both the animus and anima are affected just as in sleep and this is, as we have seen, 
the condition that changes our perceptions of reality to the extent to which we may suffer 
hallucinations in the form of synaesthesia between the mental and the visual. Extreme fear is 
already a sign of proleptic disarray in the animus (Philodemus says that the sage simply does not 
get this worked up about such things, and implies that to do so requires false beliefs), and the 
anima shares in this feeling (consentire animam, 3.153) because of its connection to the mind (ut 
quivis hinc noscere possit esse animam, 3.158-9). Here the anima is not struck by an external blow 
but by the internal force of the animus (animi vi | percussast, 3.159-60) and this affects the senses 
                                                 












(caligare oculos, 3.156). This means that our false cognitive beliefs can cross the synaesthetic 
barrier and become real in our subjective perceptual realities. 
 
Extreme anger also implies disturbance of the animus and produces disruption of the anima: 
anger makes the eyes flash, the mouth foam, turns the saliva salty and strains the victim’s 
tendons. These are conventional symptoms of madness,445and Lucetius explains flashing eyes in 
terms of the fire atoms of the anima (est etiam calor ille animo, quem sumit, in ira | cum fervescit 
et ex oculis micat acrius ardor, 3.288-9).446 Profound proleptic derangement, the kind reached 
gradually and differentially through sensory exposure and applications of incrementally false 
beliefs (which take shape as empty desires and empty emotions), entails disruption of the anima 
and therefore compromises the senses, resulting in fully fledged delusional and hallucinogenic 
madness. Transient derangement of the anima by initial delusional perceptions (i.e. the vision of 
love) or disease (a large part of these are unavoidable effects of our initial constitution) need not 
entail or develop incrementally into mental derangement, provided our characters are so 
constituted by appropriate developments which maintain proleptic security, because this is a 
differential process. Initial constitutions vary and some, like Epicurus, may have an innate 
constitutional capacity (or a constitution that has, through external factors, been properly 
directed from birth) for safeguarding against the differential developments which might 
                                                 
445 Euripides seems to make foaming at the mouth a conventional symptom, see O'Brien-Moore (1924), 
191 n2: ‘Heracles (HF 934) and Agave (Bacchae 1122) both foam at the mouth, and Heracles bellows 
(HF 869-70). In a fragment of the Aithiopis it seems to be Ajax’ flashing eyes that attract attention: 
Podaleirius the physician notes: ὄµµατά τ’ ἀστράπτοντα βαρυνόµενόν τε νόηµα (Fr. 2 West = 
Edelstein T 141 & 142), however, in the Aithiopis these flashing eyes are more probably intended to 
indicate wrath than madness.’ Cf. Indelli (2004), 108 on Turnus’ flashing eyes during furor in Virgil’s 
Aeneid (12.101-2). 











otherwise derive from troubling appearances, but others, like the Lucretian reader, will need 































For the mad or the sleeper the defective mental instrument grasps a defective object and the 
phenomenal world becomes internalised as a subjective reality from the information received by 
the defective mind as all three criteria for knowing external reality (sensations, feelings and 
preconceptions) are disordered. In the formation of preconceptions, atomic arrangements in the 
animus, the rational mind mirrors the macrocosmic world and the accuracy of these is ensured 
by repeated exposure and consensus among the impressions received by the mind. A perfect 
constitution delimited by nature is not, however, guaranteed and is troubled by genetic defects 
and environmental anomalies from the beginning. The status of preconceptions is a difficult 
concept and I have tried, perhaps rather reductively, to locate their truth value inside the 
perceptual minimum when working in combination with the senses. This seems to show that 
the rational (or truthful) application of prolepseis depends both on the successful organisation of 
the animus (which mirrors, through exposure and imprint, the order found in nature) and the 
present, evident, information of the senses which depend on a healthy anima. 
 
In transient states of psychic disarray the anima and the animus respond as if to an external 
stimulus and this is like the stimulus of arriving images (the anima and animus are co-affected). 
Sensory impairment is most common in transient somatic trauma of some kind but examples 
from Philodemus and Lucretius show that extreme emotional states (i.e. cognitive states) affect 











irrational behaviour because of temporary psychic derangement, but it is not enough to qualify 
as furor proper because it does not entail permanent psychosis as it is only an efficient cause. To 
further the analogy theoretically: we shouldn’t attach blame to intoxication because it doesn’t 
constitute a moral or intellectual development and even the sage is susceptible to it (unless the 
person becomes an alcoholic) just as blame is not attached to an episode of proportionate or 
natural anger to which the sage is also susceptible (unless the person becomes irascible).447 If we 
adopt causal determinism in Epicureanism, 448  then praise and blame (as ‘appearances’ in 
themselves, like philosophical maxims) are only useful for character reform not for retribution 
and need not necessarily be tied to responsibility, only to therapy. This is a pragmatic way of 
approaching empty anger: it is an empty retribution not a therapeutic contribution and so the 
sage might give the appearance of being angry as reported by Philodemus). These transient 
states on their own are not long enough to generate new proleptic information during the 
disorder (e.g. the madness, furor, of love takes ‘days’ to develop and become mentally 
consolidated in Lucretius). Developments require and entail repeated behaviour which, when 
deviant, is translated into a psychotic condition. Philodemus uses intoxication to show that, 
even though this disrupts the animus and the anima (also clear from Lucretius’ madet mens), the 
fact that the sage, like fools, can be drunk does not prove he is susceptible to extreme (empty) 
anger since the difference between natural and empty emotion is qualitative and empty emotion 
requires false belief. Ordinarily sensory information is relayed from the anima to the animus; in 
co-morbid states and intoxication this is a ‘top down’ effect on both and the disorder of either is 
                                                 
447 Cf. The distinction made between getting drunk (vino gravis) and the habitual drunkard (solet ebrius 
fieri et huic obnoxius vitio) in Seneca (Ep. 83.10) = Posidonius F 175 Edelstein and Kidd.  











not caused by disorder in the other. In extreme fear, however, Lucretius says that the anima is 
affected by the animus (because of their substantial connection) and the fearful person’s senses 
are occluded. My general argument is that this state constitutes furor proper (the word is not 
used by Lucretius in examples of disease which on Philodemus’ analogy must more resemble 
affective impact). The cognitive derangement of extreme emotion which scrambles the anima 
would lead, from the analogy of dreams, to hallucination. The idea is that this would bridge a 
gap which Graver identifies in the Stoics between cognitive madness (i.e. in the fool's paradox) 
and melancholia (which produces hallucination and afflicts Orestes). The interlocking between 
the defective instrument and the defective object is ensnaring and self-reinforcing (compare 
Lucretius’ description of Venus’ snares, 4.1058-1072). 
 
It is tempting to separate completely the affective feelings of the anima and the cognitive 
emotions of the animus and show that feelings and sensation operate automatically without the 
involvement of the mind. This may be true of animals, but for rational developing beings this is 
a dangerous logic. Basic feelings like pain or pleasure attend our deepest emotions of grief or joy 
and our mental sensations, or most basic thoughts, are selected by their compatibility with the 
proleptic arrangement of our animus and only form complete and therefore intelligible 
impressions or presentations once they have been subjected to sensory evidence. As children we 
have only our polymorphous genetic dispositions of character and irrational memory with which 
to inform our awareness, but our mind is pluripotent in its capacity for further developments. 











preconceptions from basic sensory evidence which in turn is responsible for filtering that 
evidence. This compound process which results in an increasingly complex mind shows that our 
mental development could be understood as a graded differential abstraction from the outer 
appearance of reality which results, depending in its course, in inferential or abstract reason 
(ratio) which is compatible with reality, can see its inner workings, and results in ataraxia or in 
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